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Introduction
Pyrrhus, Plutarch tells us, surveyed the carnage at Asculum and
declared, "If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans,
we shall be utterly ruined."1 Twenty-three centuries later, champions
of state-imposed limits on the number or timing of the terms an indi-
vidual may serve in Congress may soon echo Pyrrhus' words if they
emerge "victorious" from what promises to be an intriguing legal
struggle. The reasons for this Pyrrhic foreboding, however, have little
to do with traditional arguments against term limits, and much to do
with a provision of the Constitution regarded by some as "little more
than an historical curiosity," 2  Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. 9 PLUTARCH'S LIVES, Pyrrhus, ch. 21,416-17 (B. Perrin trans., 1920) ("A-u 9tt ga'c
-&Xu ' Pgaio g vtactlogzEv), itoXo6t0ca ntmucr;X pq."). Pyrrhus, King of the Greek
city-state of Epirus, won two battles at Asculum in 280 B.C. at the cost of most of his
commanders, his army, and his reserves. His famous line was uttered to one who congratu-
lated him on his "success." As quoted by Plutarch, the statement includes an important
dimension not usually reflected in the popular paraphrase, the nature of the adversary.
Individuals routinely describe virtually any costly triumph as a "Pyrrhic victory." See, e.g.,
Walter Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27
IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1951) ("[T]he Government, therefore, has won many a suit but lost many a
cause."); Allan C. Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 659
(1987) (book review) ("The escape turns out to have been bought at too high a price-to
be a Pyrrhic victory."). For term limit devotees, though, just as for Pyrrhus, the nature of
the opponent matters a great deal, for term limits inevitably must conform with the com-
mands of the supreme legal force, the Constitution.
2. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1810 (rev. 1982).
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SECTION 2 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Our focus in this Article is not on the wisdom of state-imposed
term limits, although that debate does provide a necessary context for
our task. Our objective is, rather, to consider the implications of the
mandate of Section 2 on the term limits controversy.
Section 2 provides,
[W]hen the right to vote at any election for... Representatives in
Congress ... is denied to any of the... inhabitants of such State....
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such... citizens shall bear to
the whole number of... citizens ... in such State.3
This "historical curiosity" has received limited attention by the courts
or in legal literature4 and has been noticeably absent from the discus-
sions of term limits appearing to date.5 We suspect, however, that res-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). As originally ratified, Section 2
protected only the right to vote of "male inhabitants" and "male citizens" who were
"twenty-one years of age," limitations rendered meaningless by the subsequent passage of
the Nineteenth and IWenty-Sixth Amendments. Id.
4. We discuss the cases infra at text accompanying notes 324-362. We have found
only four articles that discuss Section 2 at any length: Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to
Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 108 (1960); Ben Margolis, Judicial Enforcement of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 128 (1963); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 33; George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1961). Section 2 is
discussed in other materials, either as a necessary element in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see, e.g., HORACE EDGAR FLACK, PH.D., THE ADOPTION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 97-127 (1908), or as part of the ongoing argument about the extent
to which the "original intent" of the Amendment's framers can be discerned-much less be
deemed controlling. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THm TRANs-
FORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 64-68 (1977); Raoul Berger, The Four-
teenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 311, 318-21 (1979);
Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV.
213,228-29 (1991); Neil K. Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional View of Making
and Interpreting Constitutions, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 208 (1987).
5. For a summary of the arguments, for and against, such measures, see LIMrrNG
LEGISLATIVE TERMS (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992). For discussions
favoring term limits or defending their constitutionality, see JAMES K. COYNE & JOHN H.
FUND, CLEANING HOUSE: AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN FOR TERM LIMrrs (1992); Neil Gorsuch
& Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of
State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HoFSTRA L. REv. 341 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A
Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV.
97 (1991); Cleta D. Mitchell, Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental De-
mocracy, 7 J.L. & POL. 733 (1991); James C. Otteson, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Congres-
sional Term Limits: Improving Representative Legislation Under the Constitution, 41
DEPAuL L. REV. 1 (1991); Mark P. Petracca, Do Term Limits Rob Voters of Democratic
Rights? An Evaluation and Response, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 547 (1993); Stephen J. Safra-
nek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGHTON L.
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olution of the term limits debate demands that advocates on both
sides revisit this constitutional question. We also sense that this jour-
ney will prove simultaneously exhilarating and uncomfortable for pro-
ponents of these measures. Section 2 affords a plausible constitutional
foundation for a state initiative to limit the terms of its senators and
representatives. But such limitations, if constitutional, may "deny" or
"abridge" the right to vote in ways that pose the disquieting spectre of
Section 2 sanctions against the offending state.6
Fourteen states had term limit measures on their ballots in the
November 3, 1992 election,7 and it is anticipated that the voters in at
REV. 321 (1993); Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term
Limits Under the Qualifications Clauses, 71 TEx. L. REV. 865 (1993); Dwayne A. Vance,
Comment, State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits: What Would the Framers of the Con-
stitution Say?, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 429. For treatments opposing term limits or expressing
a belief that they are unconstitutional, see Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits,
80 GEO. L.J. 477 (1992); Troy Andrew Eid & Jim Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The
Constitutionality of State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 DENy. U. L.
REV. 1 (1992); Steven R. Greenberger, Democracy and Congressional Tenure, 41 DEPAUL
L. REV. 37 (1991); Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality of State-Passed Congressional
Term Limits, 25 AKRON L. REV. 155 (1991); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Are Congressional
Term Limits Constitutional?, 18 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y (forthcoming Winter 1994);
Brendan Barnicle, Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Unconstitutional by Initiative, 67
WASH. L. REV. 415 (1992); Anthony E. Gay, Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Good
Government or Minority Vote Dilution?, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2311 (1993); Tiffanie
Kovacevich, Comment, Constitutionality of Term Limitations: Can States Limit the Terms
of Members of Congress?, 23 PAc. L.J. 1677 (1992); Joshua Levy, Note, Can They Throw
the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits, 80 GEO.
L.J. 1913 (1992); Johnathan Mansfield, Note, A Choice Approach to the Constitutionality of
Term Limitation Laws, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 966 (1993); Erik H. Corwin, Recent Develop-
ments, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
569 (1991). For two articles discussing both the general issues and applications in a specific
state, see P.C. Doherty, A Quodlibet, a Mumpsimus, and the Rule of Infield Flies: The
Unfinished Business of Term Limits in Florida, 18 NOVA L. REV. 921 (1994); Lawrence
Schlam, Legislative Term Limitation Under A "Limited" Popular Initiative Provision?, 14
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
6. Note that Section 2 also applies when a state "denies or in any way abridges" the
right to vote for "the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof .... U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. For reasons explained infra at
text accompanying notes 469-470, our focus in this Article is on the implications of Section
2 for state-imposed limits on the terms of United States Representatives. If our assump-
tions about Section 2 are correct, however, many of our conclusions apply with equal force
when the state measure affects only the enumerated state offices.
7. These states were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. The Nebraska measure has since been invalidated in its entirety, see Duggan v.
Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994) (stating failure to comply with state constitutional
requirements regarding number of signatures on petition invalidates initiative), as have
those portions of the Arkansas and Washington measures dealing with qualifications to
serve in Congress. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994); Thorsted
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least seven more will consider them in November 1994.8 Every mea-
sure that has come to a vote has passed,9 often by overwhelming mar-
gins.10 And while each enacted formulation is different in material
respects, they all share one striking common denominator, a declara-
tion of intent by voters to limit the number of terms an individual can
serve in the United States Senate or House of Representatives. Term
v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994). On June 20, 1994 the Supreme Court
granted the requests for a writ of certiorari in two appeals of the Arkansas decision. See
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994), and Bryant v. Hill, 114 S. Ct.
2703 (1994). The cases were consolidated and will be heard together during the Court's
October 1994 Term. The Court also refused requests for expedited consideration of the
Washington state case. See Citizens for Term Limits, Inc. v. Foley, 114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994),
and Gregoire v. Thorsted, 114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994).
8. These states are Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Utah. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Decide if States Can Set Term Limits for
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1994, at Al, A10. The Oklahoma measure was cleared for
placement on the ballot over objections that the limits, if enacted, would be unconstitu-
tional. The court did not resolve the question, stating that "we simply cannot say th[e
opponents] have carried their burden to show a clear and manifest facial unconstitutional-
ity which in our view would be sufficient to interfere with the peoples' [sic] right to vote on
this important question." In re Initiative Petition No. 360, State Question No. 662, 1994
WL 387370, at *5 (Okla. July 19, 1994). However, the court was also quite sensitive to the
fact that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear the Arkansas case, see id., and we suspect
term limit advocates should not read too much into the qualifying language.
9. The fifteenth state is Colorado, which passed a measure in 1990 designed to
"broaden the opportunities for public service and ... assure that members [of Congress]
are representative of and responsive to Colorado citizens" in 1990. See COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 9a(1) (approved Nov. 6, 1990). The Colorado measure limits Senators and Rep-
resentatives to, respectively, two and six "consecutive" terms, with "consecutive" defined
as "at least four years apart." Id. However, a measure certified for inclusion on the ballot
in the November 1994 general election "would restrict members of the U.S. House to three
consecutive terms of two years each .... " John Sanko, Two More Proposals Are Certified
for November Ballot; Secretary of State OKs Voting on Term Limits and Change in Welfare,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Sept. 1, 1994, at 8A.
The only recent measure to fail was in Washington in 1991, when that state's voters
defeated Initiative Measure 553 by a margin of 54% to 46%. See Timothy Egan, State of
Washington Rejects a Plan to Curb Incumbents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16. That
defeat was reversed in 1992 with the passage of Initiative Measure 573, possibly because
voters did not fear "losing influence in Congress" since it seemed clear that Washington
would no longer be "the only state taking such a drastic measure." Id. The margin of
victory-52% to 48%-was, however, the smallest in the nation. See Robert Reinhold,
Move to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 5, 1992,
at B8 (listing results in each state).
10. The measures were approved "by a landslide average of 66%," George F. Will,
Term Limits: Let the States Decide, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1992, at A29, with margins rang-
ing from a high of 77% to 23% in Wyoming to a low of 52% to 48% in Washington. See
Reinhold, supra note 9, at B8. See also George F. Will, What Voters Did for The System,
WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1992, at A21 [hereinafter Will, What Voters Did] ("In 13 of the 14
[states], limits got more votes than Clinton got. Limits won more votes in 14 states than
Perot won in 50 states.")
July 1994] 1W2
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
limit supporters understandably have characterized the election re-
sults as a "mammoth mandate"" and have declared that state-im-
posed term limits are "the first step in the liberation of a new energy
for political elections," dooming "cozy relationships between special-
interest lobbyists and lifetime politicians.' 2 Opponents of these pro-
visions, predictably, have initiated a constitutional war against their
"abomination," believing that "[w]e should allow the public to select
anybody they want, subject to the limitations of the Constitution.' 13
Two skirmishes have been fought in this legal campaign. 14 Each
has given opponents of state-imposed term limits an initial legal vic-
tory in a dispute that poses two interrelated questions, only one of
which will be resolved when the U.S. Supreme Court takes up this
matter during its October 1994 Term. Obviously, the Court can, and
11. Reinhold, supra note 9, at B8 (quoting James K. Coyne III). Mr. Coyne served a
single term as a Representative from Pennsylvania from 1981 to 1983, founded Americans
to Limit Congressional Terms, and is coauthor of COYNE & FUND, supra note 5. In what
might be a tacit concession that the measures are largely hortatory, he also stated, "We
now have a six-year window of opportunity to force, or persuade, Congress to do the right
thing and pass it uniformly for the whole country by a Constitutional amendment." Rein-
hold, supra note 9, at B8. The six-year window turned out to be much shorter than Mr.
Coyne supposed. Both the federal district court in Washington and the Arkansas Supreme
Court found the issues posed by the limits on congressional terms ripe for adjudication,
even though the disqualifications would not begin to operate for a number of years. See
Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at 1074-75; U.S. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 353-54.
12. Bill McAllister, Hill Term Limits Dominate Long, Varied List of Ballot Initiatives,
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A31 (quoting Ralph Nader).
13. Reinhold, supra note 9, at B8 (quoting Professor Gerald Gunther).
14. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding the portions
of the Washington measure involving U.S. Senators and Representatives unconstitutional
under the Qualifications Clauses and the First and Fourteenth Amendments); U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994) (striking Arkansas limits on members of
Congress as a violation of the Qualifications Clauses, while holding limits on state officers
do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994), and Bryant v. Hill, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994).
Neither side treated the decisions as anything other than preliminary bouts. The petition
for a writ of certiorari in U.S. Term Limits was filed a scant two days after the Arkansas
Supreme Court refused to reconsider its March 7th ruling. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 62 U.S.L.W. 3642 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1994) (No. 93-1456) (noting filing of petition).
Representative Thomas S. Foley of Washington characterized that decision as simply "an
important framework for the resolution of one of the most important constitutional ques-
tions of the decade," while Ms. Sherry Bockwinkel, one of the leaders of the movement
that placed the initiative on the Washington ballot, stressed, "We need five votes on the
Supreme Court, and that's where we're going." Timothy Egan, Federal Judge Strikes Down
Law Limiting the Terms of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1994, at A20. An attempt by
the supporters of the Washington measure to skip the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and go directly to the Supreme Court was rejected by the Court. See Citizens for
Term Limits, Inc. v. Foley, 114 S. Ct. 2727 (1994), and Gregoire v. Thorsted, 114 S. Ct. 2727
(1994) (granting the motions for expedited consideration and denying the petitions).
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presumably will, address the threshold legal issue, whether state-im-
posed term limits are constitutional, particularly in light of the appar-
ently clear dictates of the Qualifications Clauses15 in Article I. It is
equally evident, however, that the Court cannot, and should not, tell
us whether term limits are good policy, perhaps even necessary policy,
in response to what many characterize as an increasingly entrenched
political establishment.
Since the policy debate provides an essential context for explor-
ing the constitutional issues, we begin this Article with a discussion of
the policy questions posed by term limits. In Section I-A, we examine
the recently enacted state limitations: their texts, the arguments enun-
ciated in their favor, and the policy considerations raised by their op-
ponents. Section I-B reviews the debate over term rotation and
limitation at the time the Constitution was framed. Section I-C ex-
plores the opposing views of Thomas Jefferson and Joseph Story on
whether the Tenth Amendment grants states the power to limit terms
of national representatives.
The record indicates that a substantial number of the framers ini-
tially believed a constitutional amendment was required to secure "ro-
tation" or term limits, suggesting that state-imposed limits on terms
are unconstitutional. Simultaneously, we suspect that Jefferson had
the upper hand in his debate with Story and that the Tenth Amend-
ment offers a post-Qualifications Clauses modification of the constitu-
tional scheme that recognizes residual state power over such matters.
Since the historical and textual evidence on term limits is incon-
clusive, we turn next to the constitutional inquiries raised most often
in connection with term limits. Section II-A considers whether term
limits are unconstitutional additions to the Qualifications Clauses in
15. The Qualifications Clauses state that "[n]o Person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of th[at] State in
which he shall be chosen" and repeat the formulation for Senators, changing only the age
and citizenship requirements to, respectively, thirty and nine years. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §2,
cl.2; art. I, §3, cl. 3. Both appeals confined the request for review to questions posed under
Article I. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 62 U.S.L.W. 3696 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994)
(listing question presented as "Does Article I of Constitution forbid state to decline to
print on its election ballots names of multi-term incumbents in U.S. House of Representa-
tives and Senate?"); Bryant v. Hill, 62 U.S.L.W. 3831 (U.S. June 6, 1994) (listing question
presented as "Does state have power under Elections Clause ... to restrict incumbent
candidate's access to ballot in such manner, or do Qualifications Clauses... prohibit state
from imposing such ballot restrictions?"). The Court may not reach the First Amendment
question, even though that issue was addressed in the lower court opinion in the context of
state office holders whose terms were limited by the Arkansas measure. See U.S. Term
Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 359-60.
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the context of what many regard as the definitive Qualifications
Clauses case, Powell v. McCormack,16 and the significance of require-
ments held to be constitutionally acceptable as restrictions on the
"manner" of elections. Section II-B explores whether term limits are
burdens on the speech and association rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, and Section II-C examines prior debates and adjudica-
tions of related arguments.
Once again, the message that emerges is mixed. Traditional read-
ings of Powell suggest that the age, duration of citizenship, and resi-
dency requirements stated in the Qualifications Clauses are
exhaustive. But we suspect that these interpretations are incomplete.
The statutory requirement that members of the House be elected
from districts is generally considered a stipulation of the "manner" of
election rather than a basis of qualification.'7 But if that is the case we
see no logical reason for not characterizing analogously state-imposed
term limits as pertaining to the "manner" of election, a finding that
suggests they also do not violate the Qualifications Clauses. Further,
many laws designed and administered to protect the integrity of elec-
tions have been deemed permissible limits on speech, and not a viola-
tion of the First Amendment, even if they preclude a candidate from
running in certain elections.' 8 Term limits also may be characterized
fairly as measures to protect the integrity of the electoral process, with
some room for them within the First Amendment.
Perhaps the most interesting finding presented in this Article is
that virtually all of these issues have been debated or litigated before,
albeit in different contexts. In every instance, either Congress or the
courts has rejected the attempt to add qualifications. Moreover, as we
indicate in Section III-C, courts in ten of the fourteen states that re-
cently enacted such limits had invalidated measures closely akin to
these initiatives even before the recent Arkansas and Washington de-
cisions striking such measures.' 9 Many of the decisions have drawn on
the same record and precedents now being debated, and the uniform
refusal to sustain prior term limit measures casts serious doubt on the
16. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 201-214.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 216-248.
19. For a list of the states and decisions, see infra note 264. One of the ten states was
Washington, a fact Judge Dwyer noted in his opinion in Thorsted. See Thorsted, 841 F.
Supp. at 1077 (characterizing State ex reL Chandler v. Howell, 175 P. 569 (Wash. 1918), as
one of "the many [prior] state court decisions reaching the same conclusion"). Adding
Arkansas, this means that eleven of the fifteen states with state-imposed limits have either
held them unconstitutional or strongly suggested that they are.
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likelihood that the new term limits will be upheld. Nonetheless, not
one of these precedents definitively resolves the issue, particularly
since no single decision has considered all of the evidence now avail-
able, much less the complicating issues addressed in this Article.
Given the lack of a conclusive answer to the constitutional ques-
tions as traditionally framed, we shift our focus to Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and find two powerful arguments that alter
the tone of the debate. After a brief exposition of the history of Sec-
tion 2 in Section III-A, Section III-B explores the treatment of Section
2 by the courts and commentators. In particular, we focus on the
views of Justice Harlan, who argued for a broad application of Section
2 recognizing inherent state authority over electoral matters, and the
views of Professor Van Alstyne, who disputed Harlan's characteriza-
tion of Section 2.
The implications of Section 2 regarding state regulation of the
vote are considered in Section IV-A. A summary of the current appli-
cation of Section 2 finds it to be a viable recognition of reserved state
power over suffrage, subject only to certain limits imposed by subse-
quent constitutional amendments. The transition of suffrage from a
nineteenth-century privilege to a twentieth-century right is examined
in Section IV-B. In the contexts afforded by modem decisions, the
ban on one person's candidacy for office imposed by term limits may
be characterized as an "abridgment" of the right to vote within the
meaning of Section 2.
The conclusions vde draw from these decisions are modest, but
they have broad implications. Initially, state-imposed term limits may
be recognized as constitutional because Section 2 contemplates a
much greater state power over franchise matters than is ordinarily ac-
knowledged.2 However, any such "victory" for state-imposed term
limits may also exact an extraordinary price in those states, regardless
of whether the victory is predicated on Section 2. If a term limit "de-
nies" or "in any way abridges" the right to vote, each enacting state
may then be required to forfeit some or all of its representatives in
Congress and some or all of its electoral votes.
20. The second Justice Harlan argued vigorously that Section 2 enshrined the power
of states to condition or deny the right to vote. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
589-632 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). We discuss Justice Harlan's arguments and the re-
sponses to them, infra at text accompanying notes 365-418.
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Section 2 offers renewed hope for completing what some have
characterized as "the unfinished business of the founding fathers," 2'
assuming, as their proponents do, that the framers left this question
open. But Section 2 also threatens to transform term-limit triumphs
into Pyrrhic victories of the worst possible sort. Term limits might
provide a sound theoretical basis for measures designed to cycle indi-
viduals through Congress in a timely fashion. In return, however, they
may also leave the electorate that enacts the limits with a substantially
smaller delegation.
As is often the case in constitutional matters, these conclusions
are by no means certain. Regardless, the meaning of Section 2 must
be addressed in these debates, and if Section 2 does not apply, to para-
phrase the second Justice Harlan, "we are at least entitled to be told
why."22
I. State-Imposed Term Limits: The Policy Debate
Admittedly, there is something comforting in the idea that mil-
lions of Americans wish to employ the device of term limits to reclaim
the government from a group of otherwise "extremely smart person[s]
who went into politics anyway instead of doing something worthwhile
for [their] country. '23 The truth of such a charge is immaterial. What
is important is that the people believe the situation requires their at-
tention and have initiated a fundamental restructuring that may again
"decide the important question: whether societies of [human beings]
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflec-
tion and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for
their political constitutions on accident and force. '24
Our primary purpose in this Article is not to debate the wisdom
of term limits or to determine definitively the extent to which the his-
torical record resolves the issue on one side or the other. Rather, we
want to explore the constitutional implications of measures approved
by voters that, for example, purport to make a person "permanently
ineligible" to stand for election "if, by the start of the term in which
the election is being held, that person will have served as a United
21. McAllister, supra note 12. McAllister treats the statement as a quote, but does
not identify the speaker.
22. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. P. J. O'ROURKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES XiX (1991). O'Rourke was speaking
specifically of Senator Moynihan of New York, and it is probably unfair to treat his com-
ment as a generic characterization of all members of Congress as "extremely smart."
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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States senator or a representative in Congress, or in any combination
of those offices, for at least twelve years."5 But virtually all of the
constitutional questions posed implicate either history or policy. Ac-
cordingly, we begin with a relatively brief exploration of those aspects
of the debate.
A. Contemporary Arguments For and Against State-Imposed Term
Limits
Today's term limit movement is about more than voters' anger
with Congress, and state term limit laws reach much further than re-
stricting congressional representation. For instance, some state laws
restrict the length of service for governors26 and state legislators,27
while others restrict service in positions as diverse as cabinet officer, 28
university regent,29 state superintendent of public instruction,30 and
county council members and executives.31 The initiatives also display
varying degrees of sophistication and, occasionally, defiance. One of
the arguments against term limits is that states with such limits would
be placed at a disadvantage in relation to those states that do not have
them. The voters of Michigan, accordingly, instructed their public of-
ficials to "use their best efforts to attain such a limit nationwide," 32
and the limits in Missouri "become effective [only] whenever at least
one-half of the states enact term limits for their members of the
United States Congress. ' 33 Perhaps in anticipation of rulings against
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-13 (1992) (enacted by initiated measure Nov. 3, 1992).
The North Dakota measure is one of the more draconian, given its assignment of "perma-
nent ineligibility."
26. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 30 (approved Nov. 3, 1992) ("No person shall be
elected more than two times."); MoNT. CONST. art. IV, § 8(1)(a) (approved Nov. 3, 1992)
("8 or more years in any 16-year period.").
27. See, e.g., Apx. CONST. amend. 73, § 2(a)-(b) (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (three two-
year terms as state Representative and two four-year terms as state Senator); MICH.
CoNsT. art. 4, § 54 (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (elected no more than three times as represen-
tative or two times as senator); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 8 (approved Nov. 3,1992) ("No more
than eight total years in any one house ... nor more than sixteen years total in both
houses."); OHio CONST. art. II, § 2 (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (two successive terms as state
senator and four successive terms as state representative).
28. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)(4) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
29. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 15 (approved Nov. 3, 1992). As indicated supra note 7,
the Nebraska measure was invalidated in its entirety.
30. Wyo. STAT. § 22-5-103(a)(i) (approved Nov. 3, 1992 as § 22.5-102).
31. Charles Babington, Term Limits Backed In 3 Md. Counties; Montgomery, P.G.
Voters Reject Tax Limits, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 1992, at A36.
32. MIcH. CONSr. art. II, § 10 para. 2 (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
33. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 45(a)(1) (approved Nov. 3, 1992). Obviously, a substantial
number of states must join the "movement" before this condition is met. Washington,
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their constitutionality, proponents of term limits have also attempted
to make term limits virtually a contractual matter between the voters
and the individuals they elect. In Michigan, accordingly, a candidate
for Congress now pursues the office mindful of her constituents' dec-
laration that "federal officials" should "voluntarily . . . observe the
wishes of the people as stated in this section, in the event any provi-
sion of this section is held invalid."34
It would be easy to dismiss these expressions as noble sentiments,
but unrealistic ones, given the mixed message of the recent elections.
Ninety-three percent of the House incumbents who ran in November
1992 were reelected, 35 a result suggesting that while term limits them-
selves are becoming a fixture among American values, "[m]ost voters
think better of their incumbents than worse. '36 However, it would be
a mistake to underestimate voters' anger and frustration expressed
through passage of the term limit measures. The North Dakota mea-
sure, which contained an elaborate recitation of the justifications for
such limits borne of frustration, made it abundantly clear that North
Dakotans
[b]elieve this measure is constitutional and intend it to be so.
Therefore, even if a court holds any portion of this measure uncon-
stitutional, thereby substituting its own judgment for that we have
expressed in enacting this measure, the Legislative Council shall re-
however, enacted a similar limitation that has been fulfilled. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 29.68.015-016 (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (Sections "regarding candidates for federal elec-
tive office, are not effective until nine states other than Washington have passed" similar
laws.).
34. MICH. CONsT. art. 2, § 10 para. 3 (approved Nov. 3, 1992). Similar language was
approved in Florida (Issue 5, § 3 (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (people "declare their intention
that federal officials elected . . . will continue voluntarily to observe the wishes of the
people as stated in this section")) and Oregon (OR. CONST. art. II, § 21, 1 (approved
Nov. 3, 1992) ("[I]t is the expressed intent of the People of Oregon that their elected
officials should respect the limits within this Act")).
35. Will, What Voters Did, supra note 10, at A21. As one observer noted, "The term-
limit votes presented a stark paradox. Even as voters passed them by margins of nearly 2
to 1 or larger, they handily re-elected most veteran incumbents to Congress." Reinhold,
supra note 9, at B8.
36. Bill McAllister, Success of Term-Limit Measures Puts "Incumbents on Notice":
Arizona Becomes the Final State to Approve King Holiday, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1992, at
A37 (quoting Thomas E. Mann, Director Governmental Studies, Brookings Institution).
On the other hand, Paul M. Weyrauch, a conservative supporter of term limits read the
same results as an indication that voters "put their incumbents on notice: 'You're going to
leave.' They did it in an antiseptic way: 'Nothing personal, but you're going to have to
leave."' Id. Of course, as Terry Eastland sadly notes, "The contradiction here is akin to
the familiar one concerning federal spending: Americans seem to want to reduce spending
in general but not when it comes to particular cases." Terry Eastland, The Limits of Term
Limits, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1993, at 53.
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quire the publisher of the North Dakota Century Code to include
the text of this measure, in the manner as if not so held but with
appropriate annotation, to stand as a testament to our expressed
will, and as a memorial to the defiance of that will by whatever
court holds this measure unconstitutional.37
These sentiments are unlikely to lead to the sort of constitutional
struggle that forced the Court to remind us that "the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since [Marbury v. Madison38 ] been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system. ' 39 But it is clear that the litigation initiated
over term limits, which began before the measures were placed on the
ballot in some cases,4° will be pursued with vigor and determination
by citizens who have become completely frustrated with political
incumbents.
The measures themselves tell us why. State term limit laws
starkly proclaim that "[e]lected officials who remain in office too long
become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as repre-
sentatives of the people,"41 and that "[e]ntrenched incumbents have
an inordinate advantage in elections because of their control of cam-
37. N.D. CENr. CODE § 16.1-01-14(13) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
40. A proposed initiative in Nevada was ruled unconstitutional and a place on the
ballot denied when the court found limits on federal offices would be a "violation of the
paramount law." See Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Nev. 1992). Questions were
raised, but not resolved, about the constitutionality of a proposed measure in Massachu-
setts. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 595 N.E.2d 292, 301-02 (Mass. 1992) (re-
fusing to answer "questions of first impression under the United States Constitution").
Preelection challenges were filed and rejected in two states: Florida, see Advisory Opinion
to the Att'y Gen.-Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla.
1991), and Arkansas, see Plugge v. McCuen, 841 S.W.2d 139 (Ark. 1992). Both courts
rejected the challenges for technical reasons that had little to do with the constitutional
merits, although both decisions also generated strong dissents arguing vigorously that the
measures were unconstitutional to the extent they limited federal terms. See Advisory
Opinion, 592 So. 2d at 229-31 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Plugge, 841 S.W.2d at 143-50 (Dudley, J., dissenting). In the Arkansas case, observers
were treated to the spectacle of the citizens' group that sponsored the measure retaining
counsel to intervene because the group does not trust the state to defend the amendment.
See Rachel O'Neal, Term Limit Backers Hire Lawyer to Defend Amendment in Court,
ARK. DEM.-GAZETTE, Dec. 31, 1992, at lB. Moreover, Congress, with predictable enthusi-
asm, entered the dispute, authorizing Senate legal counsel to represent the two Arkansas
Senators, who were named in the suit. See S. Res. 63, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (en-
acted). As part of that process Senator Mitchell read into the record a brief argument that
all such measures are unconstitutional, per the logic of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969). See 139 CONG. REc. S1146-47 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993).
41. ARK. CONST. amend. 73 pmbl. (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
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paign finance laws and gerrymandering of electoral districts. '42 Term
limit propositions unambiguously express the belief that "federal of-
ficeholders have become too closely aligned with the special interest
groups who provide contributions and support for their reelection
campaigns, give them special favors, and lobby [them] for special in-
terest legislation, all of which creates corruption or the appearance of
corruption of the legislative system. ' 43 These referenda express the
view that term limits are not just desirable, but are essential for voters
to eliminate a "self-perpetuating monopoly of elective office by a dy-
nastic ruling class." 44 Collectively, term limit measures express voters'
frustrations that entrenched incumbents paralyze congressional will,
frustrate change, and ensure that the few legislative initiatives that do
emerge are "special interest legislation," operating "to the detriment
of the people of [the] state. '45
The term limit measures also incorporate a related yet distinct
argument, the belief that many of the recent congressional scandals
occurred partly as a result of the curse of longevity. The California
and Washington measures speak generically of "corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption in the legislative system." 46 And the voters of
North Dakota, finding James Madison was wrong when he postulated
that "the House of Representatives would always be responsive to the
will of the people," have made clear their belief that "Congress has
arrogated to itself powers not granted to the people, a recent notori-
ous example being the bank of the House of Representatives in which
members were allowed to kite checks." 47
We do not, at least for the purposes of this Article, judge the
validity of the assumptions stated in these ballot measures or contest
the inferences their supporters draw from them. Indeed, we suspect
many of these contentions are virtually impossible to prove or dis-
prove at this time, since much of the analytical case for term limits
42. Preamble-Laws 1993, ch. 1, reprinted in WASH. REV. CODE § 43.01.015 (1993) (In-
itiative Measure No. 573 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
43. California Term Limitations Act of 1992, § 2(b), reprinted in CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 25003 (West Supp. 1994) (Proposition 164 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
44. Preamble-Laws 1993, ch. 1, reprinted in WASH. REV. CODE § 43.01.015 (1993) (In-
itiative Measure No. 573 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
45. Id.
46. California Term Limitations Act of 1992, § 2(b), reprinted in CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 25003 (West Supp. 1994) (Proposition 164 approved Nov. 3, 1992); Preamble-Laws 1993,
ch. 1, reprinted in WASH. REV. CODE § 43.01.015 (1993) (Initiative Measure No. 573 ap-
proved Nov. 3, 1992).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-14(12)(a) (1993) (approved Nov. 3, 1992) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison)).
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remains inferential. All participants in the term limits debate must
recognize that until recently "no model of a politician who cannot be
reelected [existed]," 48 making empirical analysis impossible since "the
question of renewability of terms requires comparing the behavior of
a politician who cannot be reelected with one who is focusing all of his
[or her] efforts on maximizing votes in the next election. ' 49 Some ini-
tial conclusions can be drawn based on data suggesting the current
system tends to place barriers between constituents and their elected
representatives.50 However, the only "formal" study available is pred-
icated on assumptions about legislative "impatience" and incentives to
serve constituent interests; in theory, these are "powerful enough to
place a heavy burden of proof on anyone arguing in favor of term
limits," 51 but the conclusions remain largely modeled and inferential.
And while proponents have alleged that term limits will open Con-
gress up to historically underrepresented groups 5 2 all we know for
certain at this time is that one likely effect of such measures will be for
the dedicated, career politician to simply "move his office, and
considerable power, to the other end of the Capitol. '53
In reality, it may be more than an insightful witticism that
"[slitting Congressmen are almost as likely to be sentenced to jail as
48. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 5, at 484.
49. Id. Professors Cohen and Spitzer note that the issue is raised, but not resolved,
for this very reason in at least one study. See id. (citing William R. Keech & Carl P. Simon,
Inflation, Unemployment, and Electoral Terms: When Can Reform of Political Institutions
Improve Macroeconomic Policy?, in THE POLITICAL PROcESS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 77,
77-107 (Kirsten R. Monroe ed., 1983)).
50. See, e.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 103
(1990); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congres-
sional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979); Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congres-
sional Voting, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 181 (1984).
51. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 5, at 479. We use the term "formal" here as Cohen
and Spitzer do. That is, they have constructed "models" and have attempted to "predict"
in the "scientific" sense. Their analysis is provocative, but we are not convinced their find-
ings are incontrovertible; too many variables and assumptions remain.
52. See, e.g., Jonathan Ferry, Women, Minorities and Term Limits: America's Path to
a Representative Congress, 3 U.S. TERM LiMrrs OUTLOOK SERIES No. 2 (July 1994) (assert-
ing that "[t]erm limits are the only viable political reform that will increase representation
of these groups by breaking the hold of incumbency on the nation's legislature"); John C.
Armor, "Foreshadowing" Effects of Term Limits: California's Example for Congress, 3
U.S. TaiRM LiMrrs OUTLooK SERIEs No. 1 (July 1994) (arguing that California's state term
limits produced "massive change").
53. Richard L. Berke, Unseated by Term Limits (But It's Musical Chairs), N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1994, at Al (discussing the possibility that Willie L. Brown, Jr., Speaker of the
California State Assembly, will simply run for the State Senate once barred from the
Assembly).
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they are to be sent home by the voters. Since 1988, six Congressmen
went home and five were sentenced to the slammer. ' 54 Retention
patterns have changed dramatically over the years, and the character
of a Congress with a substantial proportion of long-term office holders
will be different from one in which no member will have served for
more than twelve years.55 Supporters believe, accordingly, that term
limits offer at least one plausible means for the electorate to "promote
varied representation, to broaden the opportunities for public service,
and to make the electoral process fairer by reducing the power of in-
cumbency .... -56
Clearly, a term limit promotes varied representation by denying
individuals who have served a specified time further opportunities on
the ballot, whether permanently, or for a certain period, or by al-
lowing election only by write-in votes. The mandated shorter time in
office would increase the number of individuals who would be elected
to office during the same period, and a more diverse pool of office-
holders may be elected. It is less certain whether term limits make the
electoral process more fair. Even the most stringent term limits allow
a member of Congress to serve three terms,57 a period of service that
may well assist incumbents' fund raising for reelection so long as sen-
iority remains a factor of congressional power. Thus, if "fairness" is
measured by the relative advantage of incumbent over challenger,
term limits may not make a difference. However, even if seniority
remains and the relationship between incumbent and political action
committee persists, it is plausible that the financial benefits of incum-
bency will be greatly reduced; some groups or individuals may believe
that the incentives to "invest" heavily in particular office holders no
longer exist. And reduced financial benefits would tend to increase
the likelihood of legislators eschewing the short-term gain of appeas-
54. Lee Iacocca, We Can't Even Throw The Rascals Out; Congress: What Does It
Mean When Incumbents Keep Getting Reelected? That We're Pleased With Their Work?,
L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1990, at B7. For retention data for both House and Senate, see
GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF DE-
LIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 73-89 (1992) [hereinafter WILL, RESTORATION].
55. The most "generous" limits bar representatives from reelection only after six con-
secutive terms and were enacted by Colorado, see supra note 9; Florida, see supra note 28;
and South Dakota, see S.D. CONST. art. III, § 32 (Constitutional Amendment A approved
Nov. 3, 1992).
56. OR. CONsT. art. II, § 20 (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
57. The Arkansas measure bars from the election for representative "[a]ny person
having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of
Representatives from Arkansas." ARK. CONsT. amend. 73, § 3(a) (approved Nov. 3, 1992).
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ing major donors and, instead, pursuing the long-term needs and in-
terests of the nation.58
Virtually all of the policy arguments in the term limits debate as-
sume that the public interest can be ascertained with some degree of
certainty. This hypothesis is especially problematic in clashes between
short-term, politically-appealing quick fixes and solutions taking a
more measured, and sometimes politically painful, approach. More-
over, proponents of term limits also assume that the interests of the
public and big donors are different. That proposition may add force
to their argument, but may be incorrect.
We believe the case for term limits remains largely a matter of
faith. However, the current debate concerning the wisdom of term
limits is not without precedent, which may explain why one of the
most prominent devotees of term limits, George Will, characterizes
term limits as a "loving step" toward restoration of "a more reserved
and respectful relationship [between the American people and] the
First Branch of government, Congress." 59 This remark suggests that a
balanced assessment of the term limits movement requires that we
consider and account for the views of the framers.
B. "Qualifications to Serve": The Framers' Views
Term limits seem entirely consistent with Madison's notion that
"it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a
common interest with the people."6 This was especially important
for the House of Representatives, which "should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people,"'61 and
was intended to serve as a counterweight to the Senate, which was
designed to eliminate the "mischievous effects of a mutable govern-
ment" that would flow from "a rapid succession of new members." 62
Term limit proponents, accordingly, pepper their analyses with the
statements of individuals like Charles Pinckney, who argued that pro-
58. We have avoided the broader implications term limits pose if they are universally
adopted. Universal term limits might shift the balance of influence from small states with
powerful incumbents to large states, even if they elect new representatives. Changes in the
balance of power also depend on the extent to which other practices change, such as the
current procedure for selecting committee chairs. We address only the constitutionality of
state-imposed term limits.
59. WILL, RESTORA-nON, supra note 54, at 231.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61. Id.
62. THE FEDERALIs'r No. 62, at 380 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
For a discussion of the Senate's role, stressing its "centrality" in constitutional matters, see
Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111 (1988).
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tracted terms of service "wd. fix [the representatives] at the seat of
Govt," where "[t]hey wd. acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer
their property & lose sight of the States they represent. ' 63 And they
note with particular force the sentiment of John Adams, who believed
representatives should be elected once a year, "like bubbles on the sea
of matter borne, they rise, they break, and to that sea return." 64
Nevertheless, it is one thing to agree that the framers sought re-
sponsive government and quite another to extrapolate from this that
they viewed rigid term limits as an acceptable means to attain that
end. Indeed, substantial evidence suggests to the contrary. Some of
this reflects the deferential temper of the times; "[w]ithin the con-
straints that eighteenth-century political etiquette imposed, most dele-
gates who were willing to retain their places in Congress were not
likely to be turned out of office." 65 And some of it derived from the
fact that many individuals either did not want to serve to begin with,
refused reelection, or declined to attend legislative sessions; "[g]iven
the recurring difficulties most states experienced in maintaining ade-
quate representation at Congress, the assemblies were probably grate-
ful to find individuals who were willing to serve there repeatedly." 66
But these realities do not fully explain the absence of express limita-
tions in the Constitution, particularly since various framers made a
strong case for what is modernly characterized as term limits that ulti-
mately was rejected.
For instance, the first set of proposals actually placed before the
Constitutional Convention stipulated that "the members of the first
branch of the National Legislature ought to be ... incapable of re-
election for the space of after the expiration of their term of service
and be subject to recall." 67 Introduced by Edmund Randolph, the so-
called Virginia Plan expressed the views of individuals like George
Mason, who argued that elected representatives should be subject to
"periodical rotation," for "[n]othing so strongly impels a man to re-
63. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 409 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
64. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMS 84, 89 (George A. Peek, Jr., ed., 1954).
65. JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 219 (1979).
66. Id.
67. 1 Farrand, supra note 63, at 20. The space for the time limit was left blank in the
original proposal. The "first branch" was the equivalent of the House of Representatives
and was contrasted with a "second branch," in effect the Senate, whose members would
"hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency," id., phrasing that
both implied a single term of service and articulated a basis for that limitation.
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gard the interest of his constituents as the certainty of returning to the
general mass of the people, from whence he was taken, where he must
participate [sic] their burdens.168 Mason was joined by others in this
belief. Jefferson, who was abroad at this time, would subsequently
lament the "abandonment ... of the principle of rotation in office
.. .. "69 And when Elbridge Gerry listed his reasons for not signing
the Constitution "the duration and re-eligibility of the Senate" was
the first objection.70
However, limitations on service, either by rotation or other
means, were opposed vehemently by individuals like Alexander Ham-
ilton. Hamilton maintained that "no government, founded on this
feeble principle, can operate well," for "[w]hen a man knows he must
quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention
chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which
few other situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitu-
tional usurpations."'71 And even Roger Sherman, who stressed that
"Govt. is instituted for those who live under it" and "[t]he more per-
manency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt.,"72 was satisfied with
only "frequent elections," sensing that periodic exposure to the peo-
ple would "preserv[e] th[e] good behavior" of those elected "because
it ensures their reelection." 73
Consequently, the Constitution as ratified did not expressly limit
terms, either by rotation or any other means, and the available record
suggests that the individuals who framed the Constitution believed the
Qualifications Clauses had both the purpose and effect of leaving the
length of congressional tenure to the people through the single, simple
device of the electoral process. Hamilton stressed, "The qualifications
of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked
upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and
68. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 485 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) [hereinafter Elliot]. Mason
also observed, regarding the Senate, that "[i]t is a great defect... that they are not ineligi-
ble at the end of six years" and that "[t]he biennial exclusion of one third of them will have
no effect, as they can be reelected." Id.
69. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 THE WRrr-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 327, 330 (H.A. Washington ed., 1853) [hereinafter JEFFER-
SON'S WRITINGS]. We discuss Jefferson's views more fully infra at text accompanying notes
90-141.
70. 2 Farrand, supra note 63, at 632.
71. 2 Elliot, supra note 68, at 320.
72. 1 Farrand, supra note 63, at 423.
73. Id.
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are unalterable by the legislature. '74 As Madison indicated, "The
qualifications of the elected ... have been very properly considered
and regulated by the [C]onvention. '75 This allowed him to character-
ize the Qualifications Clauses as "reasonable limitations [that left] the
door of this part of the federal government ... open to merit of every
description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and
without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of
religious faith. '76
There were several reasons why the majority of the framers felt it
important to leave control of the length of congressional tenure to the
people, albeit through the means of periodic elections. Perhaps the
most important was an abiding sense that experience in the office was
a valuable characteristic. Madison, for one, argued that:
No [person] can be a competent legislator who does not add to an
upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowl-
edge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this
knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie
within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. An-
other part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by
actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The
period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some
proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due
performance of the service.77
Moreover, he maintained this with full awareness of the possibility
that some individuals would in fact serve for extended periods:
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will pos-
sess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members
of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business,
and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages.
The greater the proportion of new members and the less the infor-
mation of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall
into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Some proponents of term limits focus on Hamilton's use of the "legislature" and
argue that this gives "the people" room to act. This is, we suspect, an approach that can
succeed only to the extent one posits that the Tenth Amendment factors into the equation.
For a discussion of this debate, see infra text accompanying notes 90-141.
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
76. Id.
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 332 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). If
Madison was correct, a compelling argument can be made that the modem trend toward
protracted service is a virtue rather than a vice. Given the exponential growth in the scope
and complexity of matters subject to legislative control and oversight, eighteenth-century
notions of the "proportion... of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of
the service" have little bearing on what is either necessary or appropriate today.
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applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.78
Madison and his colleagues embraced the possibility of extended
tenure with a healthy appreciation of the risks they arguably ran. If
"Parliamentary tyranny... was the principal cause of the American
war of independence, '79 then the face of tyranny was shaped in many
ways by the virtually hereditary nature of a seat in Parliament. The
problem was greater than that posed by the standing incapacities, 80
which severely restricted eligibility to serve and were expressly ad-
dressed by the three simple limitations articulated in the Qualifica-
tions Clauses. The framers were not naive. They were presumably
aware of the tendency on the part of some elected officials to pursue
their own enrichment, an impulse typified by the comment that it was
"reasonable [for] those who dedicate their time and fortune to the
service of the Government [to] be entitled to a share of the rewards
that are in its disposal.""' Hypocrisy and self-enrichment are then not
vices exclusive to a modem, entrenched Congress, but were recog-
nized evils in a Parliamentary system within which the same members
who "separately ... pursu[ed] the same traffic" in corruption spent
"much of their public time.., in stigmatizing the practice. '8 2
In spite of these clearly recognized dangers, the framers opted for
a system in which it was incumbent on the people, themselves, to turn
the entrenched representatives out, if and when they believed it war-
ranted. The framers' perception that limits on terms required consti-
tutional amendment had widespread support during the debate that
led to the passage of the Bill of Rights. Jefferson, for example, gener-
ally praised the draft Constitution, but "strongly dislike[d] . . . the
abandonment, in every instance, of the principle of rotation in office,
78. IiL at 335. Consistent with this, Jefferson noted subsequently that individuals
elected to represent districts within which they did not live would presumably possess
"such eminent merit and qualifications, as would make it a good, rather than an evil. . ."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 11 Tim WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 381 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter JEFFERSON's
WORKS].
79. 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 102 (1938).
80. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *175-
77.
81. The statement was made by one J. Garth, "a Whig who after seventeen years in
Parliament held neither a place nor pension" and is quoted in 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
79, at 578 n.1. One might argue that the generous pension scheme that Congress has au-
thorized for itself is an altruistic response to the dangerous assumptions implicit in Garth's
statement. We do not.
82. Id. at 576 (quoting HORACE WALPOLE, 3 MEMOIRS OF GEORGE 1I 153).
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and most particularly in the case of the President. '83 He therefore
maintained consistently that he was "anxious" for two amendments to
the Constitution: "A bill of rights, which it is so much the interest of
all to have," and a "[second] amendment... restoring the principle of
necessary rotation, particularly to the Senate and Presidency: but
most of all to the last."184 He was not alone. As part of the actual
drafting process, Thomas Tudor Tucker, a Representative from South
Carolina, moved various "propositions of amendment to the constitu-
tion of the United States," including:
Art. 1 sect. 2. clause 2. at the end, add these words, Nor shall any
person be capable of serving as a Representative more than six
years, in any term of eight years.
Clause 3. at the end, add these words, From and after the com-
mencement of the year 1795, the election of Senators for each State
shall be annual, and no person shall be capable of serving as a Sena-
tor more than five years in any term of six years.85
Tucker's motion was defeated. 86 While the record does not re-
veal the arguments raised against his suggestions, it is difficult to ig-
nore the implications of his unsuccessful attempt to limit terms by
amendment. Moreover, when Jefferson stressed that rotation had
been abandoned, he highlighted an additional salient historical fact,
the express limit on the number of years an individual could serve in
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 JEFFERSON'S
WRITINGS, supra note 69, at 327, 330. He repeated this view in subsequent letters to
Madison (July 31, 1788), id. at 443, 447, and Rutledge (July 18, 1788), id. at 433, 435.
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Carrington (May 27, 1788), JEFFERSON'S
WRITINGS, supra note 69, at 403, 404. Jefferson made it clear in a subsequent letter to J.
Sarsfield (Apr. 3, 1789), id. at 17-18, that the "rotation" in question was patterned on Arti-
cle V of the Articles of Confederation, under which delegates to Congress were appointed
"annually." See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 1, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 27, 28 (Charles C. Tansill
ed., 1927) [hereinafter Tansill].
85. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (debate on Aug. 18, 1789).
Tucker also proposed limiting presidential terms, see id. at 791 ("[n]or shall any person be
capable of holding" that office for "more than eight years in any term of twelve years"),
and would have eliminated Congress's Article I, Section 4 power to "make or alter" elec-
tion "time, place and manner" regulations. Id. at 790.
86. The record states simply that "[o]n the question, Shall the said propositions of
amendments be referred to the consideration of a Committee of the Whole House? [Ilt
was determined in the negative." Id. at 792. Tucker proposed seventeen changes, includ-
ing one that would have replaced the words "commander in chief' in Article II, Section 2,
Clause 1 with the phrase "have power to direct (agreeable to law) the operations." Id. at
791. The negative vote may simply reflect problems with the sheer scope of what he
sought.
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Congress within a given period, found in the Articles of
Confederation.8 7
The individuals who framed the Constitution seem to have made
a conscious choice. They were aware of the problems that might arise
when individuals served too long or badly. And they were familiar
with, and expressly changed from, a government charter in which the
prophylactic solution of express term limits was attempted. It is then
not surprising that in the period immediately after ratification of the
Constitution, a number of individuals discussing the possibility of
state-imposed qualifications would conclude that such state actions
were improper.88 Both the pre-ratification culture, as expressed in the
Articles of Confederation, and the views of individuals intimately in-
volved in the ratification debates, tended to indicate that the framers
believed amendment was the means by which terms were to be lim-
ited, if at all. The eventual recourse to amendment to limit presiden-
tial terms89 is consistent with the positions taken by Jefferson and
Tucker and lends credence to the notion that a similar course of action
is required in the case of Senators and Representatives.
C. Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: The Jefferson-Story Debate
One interesting, but often overlooked, aspect of the term limits
debate is the Tenth Amendment's bearing on the question. Is it possi-
ble that one of the powers not delegated to the United States, nor
prohibited to the states, and therefore "reserved to States respec-
tively, or to the people," is the authority to impose limits on the terms
served by United States Senators and Representatives?
The most compelling statement that the power to limit terms
might be reserved to the states was offered by Jefferson in a letter to
Joseph Cabell. Jefferson was responding to Cabell's inquiry "whether
the States can add any qualifications to those which the constitution
87. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 2 (Mar. 1, 1781), in Tansill, supra
note 84, at 28.
88. St. George Tucker, for example, noted that many additional state qualifications
"may possibly be found to be nugatory, should any man possess a sufficient influence in a
district in which he neither resides nor is a freeholder, to obtain a majority of the suffrages
in his favor." St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 213 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). Justice Story argued
that "[iut would seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that
when the constitution established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to
exclude all others, as prerequisites." 3 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 624 (photo. reprint 1991) (1833).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
July 1994]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
has prescribed for their members of Congress?" 90 Characterizing the
issue as one he had "never before reflected on," Jefferson indicated he
was inclined to change his initial, "off-hand opinion ... that [states]
could not; that to add new qualifications to those of the constitution,
would be as much an alteration as to detract from them."91 Jefferson
conceded, "[S]o I think the House of Representatives of Congress de-
cided in some case; I believe that of a member from Baltimore." g
However, having been "induced ... to look into the constitution," he
discussed at length why a different conclusion might now be
appropriate:
Had the constitution been silent, nobody can doubt but that the
right to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications of those
they would send to represent them, would belong to the State. So
also the constitution might have prescribed the whole, and excluded
all others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has exer-
cised the power in part, by declaring some disqualifications, to wit,
those of not being twenty-five years of age, of not having been a
citizen seven years, and of not being an inhabitant of the State at
the time of election. But it does not declare, itself, that the member
shall not be a lunatic, a pauper, a convict of treason, of murder, of
felony, or other infamous crime, or a non-resident of his district; nor
does it prohibit to the State the power of declaring these, or any
other disqualifications which its particular circumstances may call
for; and these may be different in different States. Of course, then,
by the tenth amendment, the power is reserved to the State.93
The issue clearly struck a responsive chord for Jefferson, who had
once argued a "[second] amendment" was needed to "restore rota-
tion" 94 and was now reconsidering the question in light of the inter-
vening ratification of the Tenth Amendment. Jefferson had always
seen "neither reason nor safety in making public functionaries in-
dependent of the nation for life, or even for long terms of years," 95
believing the "power of removing... by the vote of the people, is a
power which they will not exercise .... ,,96 Indeed, in 1776 Jefferson
had stressed the "danger which might arise to American freedom by
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 11 JEFFER-
SON'S WORKS, supra note 78, at 379.
91. Id. at 379-80.
92. Id. at 380. The reference was clearly to the McCreery case, which we discuss infra
at text accompanying notes 249-251.
93. Id. at 380.
94. See supra text accompanying note 84.
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Martin (Sept. 20, 1813), in 6 JEFFERSON'S
WRITINos, supra note 69, at 213.
96. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), supra note 69, at
330. Devotees of term limits will find solace in the words that followed, "and if they were
disposed to exercise it, they would not be permitted," id. at 330-31, which seem prophetic
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continuing too long in office the members of the Continental Con-
gress" and argued that they "shall not have served in that office longer
than two years."'97
These views had considerable support during the pre- and post-
ratification years. The State of Virginia, for instance, included a rota-
tion requirement in its initial Constitution,98 while the Articles of
Confederation specified that "no person shall be capable of being a
delegate for more than three years in any term of six years," 99 a for-
mulation that presaged the approach proposed by Tucker eight years
later.
However, that such limitations neither emerged expressly in the
Constitution as ratified, nor prevailed during the initial attempts to
amend it, proves no more than that a state's ability to impose addi-
tional qualifications is not stated within the text of the Constitution
itself. As Jefferson recognized:
If, wherever the Constitution assumes a single power out of the
many which belong to the same subject, we should consider it as
assuming the whole, it would vest the General Government with a
mass of powers never contemplated. On the contrary, the assump-
tion of particular powers seems an exclusion of all not assumed.100
The assumption of unspecified powers by the central government was
exactly what the Tenth Amendment was designed to counter. By
characterizing the specific question posed by Cabell as one he had
"never before reflected on," Jefferson seemed to affirm that his earlier
views on the need for a "[second] amendment" had changed in light of
in light of the argument that a combination of perquisites, current campaign laws, and
political action funds make it virtually impossible to defeat an incumbent.
97. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1760-1776, at 411 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
[hereinafter JEFFERSON's PAPERS]. Contrary to some accounts, there is no evidence that
the Congress actually considered, much less embraced, this view. Eid and Kolbe state that
"Jefferson's colleagues defeated his resolution." Eid & Kolbe, supra note 5, at 7 (citing
Mike Kelly, Term Limits, Expand Democracy, INDEPENDENCE ISSUE PAPERS No. 10-90
(Independence Institute, Golden, Colo.), July 1, 1990, at 9). The editors of Jefferson's pa-
pers, however, state that "[tihere is nothing in the Journals of Congress to indicate when,
or even if, this Resolution was proposed." 1 JEFFERSON'S PAPERS, supra, at 411. Our
independent review of the record accords with that of Jefferson's editors: there is simply
nothing in the published records of the Continental Congress to indicate that Jefferson's
proposal ever came forward.
98. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided for annual "rotation" of its members.
See VA. CONST. OF 1776, in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrTrIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS, 3812, 3816 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)
[hereinafter Thorpe].
99. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 2 (Mar. 1, 1781) in Tansill, supra note 84,
at 27.
100. Letter from Jefferson to Cabell, supra note 78, at 380-381.
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the Tenth Amendment's intervening, express reminder that certain
powers were reserved to the states or people.
Justice Story disagreed vigorously and directly with Jefferson's in-
terpretation, observing, "It does not seem to have occurred to this
celebrated statesman" that the Tenth Amendment "proceeds upon a
basis, which is inapplicable to the case."''1 That Amendment, he ar-
gued, "does not profess, and, indeed, did not intend to confer on the
states any new powers; but merely to reserve to them, what were not
conceded to the government of the union."'01 2 Since members of Con-
gress "owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the
whole, not of a portion, of the people,"' 0 3 the states "never possessed"
the authority to prescribe qualifications for national officers. Accord-
ingly, that power could not possibly have been "reserved" to them by
the Tenth Amendment. Indeed, Story feared the consequences if the
states were allowed to act, arguing that the authority to impose any
qualification, however meritorious, also implied the power "to impose
any other qualifications beyond those provided for by the constitu-
tion, however inconvenient, restrictive, or even mischievous they may
be to the interests of the union.."1°4
Story's assumption that the Tenth Amendment is merely a "tru-
ism"'01 5 or "tautology"'1 6 is correct: for the purposes of the Tenth
Amendment, the proper inquiry is "whether an incident of state sov-
ereignty is protected by a limitation on" one of the national govern-
ment's enumerated powers. 07 But Story's characterization of the
authority to appoint federal officials as one that "exclusively spring[s]
out of the existence of the national government"' 08 was certainly an
oversimplification at the time he wrote, and it may remain so today.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the states quite clearly ex-
ercised the sovereign power to "appoint representatives in the na-
tional government[.]' 0 9 The Articles were an agreement between
states that had "severally enter[ed] into a firm league of friendship
with each other.""10 The Articles reserved to the states the power to
101. 3 STORY, supra note 88, § 625.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 626.
104. Id. § 623.
105. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
106. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992).
107. Id.
108. 3 STORY, supra note 88, § 626.
109. Id. § 625.
110. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. III, in Tansill, supra note 84, at 27.
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appoint "delegates... annually... in such manner as the legislature
of each state shall direct," with "a power reserved to each state, to
recal its delegates, or any of them, at any time .... "111 Determina-
tions regarding who would rotate into a federal congress were, accord-
ingly, matters of state sovereignty and grace, and, for that matter,
consistent with the notion that longevity of service was to be avoided.
Story was then wrong: the power to appoint at least some "of-
ficers of the union" predated the Constitution and was an attribute of
state sovereignty. Accordingly, inquiries about the extent to which
some or all of that power had been surrendered were quite appropri-
ate. Moreover, he was also wrong about the nature of the post-ratifi-
cation government for not all of its officers "owe[d] their existence" or
exercised "functions... of the people."1 2 The Constitution crafted a
government of and for "We the People of the United States""13 within
which the members of the House of Representatives were "chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States.""14 Senators
from each state were, on the other hand, "chosen by the Legislature
thereof." 1 5 As Madison stressed in The Federalist, this meant the
Senate "derive[s] its powers from the States as political and coequal
societies," while "[t]he House of Representatives will derive its pow-
ers from the people of America;" the former was a "federal" entity,
the latter, a "national" one." 6
The Seventeenth Amendment changed this in one respect. Popu-
lar election of Senators means these individuals now are chosen by the
people themselves and represent them rather than the states per se.
As a result, one factor that made "the appointment of senators...
congenial with the public opinion" 17 of the time was lost. Lacking an
"agency in the formation of the federal government," the post-Seven-
teenth Amendment Senate no longer "secure[s] the authority" of the
states to determine who shall comprise its members." 8 The basic de-
sign, however, remains; a popularly elected Senate in which each state
has an "equal vote [that] is at once a constitutional recognition of the
111. Id. art. V, cl. 1.
112. 3 SToRY, supra note 88, § 626.
113. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. 1, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII, § 1.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See also 2 Elliot, supra note 68, at 319 (statement by Alexander Hamilton that "the equal
vote in the Senate was given to secure the rights of the states").
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
118. Id.
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portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States and an in-
strument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." 119 This is still a
fundamental change from the approach taken under the Articles, in
which the powers attributed to the national sovereign were character-
ized as ones exercised by "[t]he united states in congress assem-
bled. ' 120 But-as Story himself recognized-the Senate differed from
the Confederation Congress only in that votes were cast by each indi-
vidual senator,121 and the "very structure of the general government
contemplated one partly federal, and partly national.' 22 As a result,
"No law or resolution can be passed without the concurrence first of a
majority of the people," that is the House of Representatives, "and
then of a majority of the states," that is the Senate. 23
In addition, the exercise of the power to amend the Constitution
through the Seventeenth Amendment in ways that returned authority
to the people highlights an important aspect of the Tenth Amendment,
which speaks not simply of the powers of the states, but those of "the
States respectively, or [of] the people."' 24 Neither Jefferson nor Story
account fully for this. Jefferson, in his letter to Cabell, ignores the
people entirely, writing only that "by the tenth amendment, the power
is reserved to the State."' 25 Story makes an attempt, on the other
hand, when he declares that "[t]he people of the State, by adopting
the constitution, have declared what their will is, as to the qualifica-
tions for office."' 126 But this statement assumes its conclusion; that is,
that the list in the Qualifications Clauses is exclusive. Story invokes
the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to bolster his posi-
tion, 27 but his argument cannot account for the negative wording of
the applicable clauses, a drafting choice that seems to leave ample
room for Jefferson's approach.128
119. Id. at 378.
120. Article IX, for example, reserved the "sole and exclusive right and power of deter-
mining on peace and war" to these "united states." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERA-nON art. IX,
cI. 1, in Tansill, supra note 84, at 31.
121. 3 STORY, supra note 88, § 691.
122. Id. § 696.
123. Id. § 699. For an argument that the institutional importance of the Senate should
be recognized, albeit one that does not dwell on the state representation role, see Amar,
supra note 62.
124. U.S. CONsT. amend X.
125. Letter from Jefferson to Cabell, supra note 78, at 380.
126. 3 STORY, supra note 88, § 627.
127. That is, if the text expresses one exception, it excludes all others.
128. Various individuals have argued that the negative wording of the Qualifications
Clauses leaves room for state action. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 5, at 112 ("A need for a
federal 'floor' of qualifications hardly abrogates the state power to add qualifications.").
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The Congress created by the Articles of Confederation may well
have been "dormant in times of peace[,] ... possessed of but a delu-
sive and shadowy sovereignty, with little more than the empty pag-
eantry of office."'1 29 But whether it was strong or weak as an absolute
matter has little bearing on two critical questions: the scope and ori-
gins of "the power to appoint" the only "national" officers created by
the Articles of Confederation, and the extent to which ratification of
the new Constitution was an act by -which the states ceded some, but
not all, of that authority. Story's approach, in essence, treats the na-
tional government formulated by the Constitution as one that
emerged, Venus-like, wholly formed from the sea. That was not the
case. The Constitutional Convention was convened by the Articles of
Confederation Congress for the express purpose of remedying "de-
fects in the present Confederation,"'130 the resulting document was
presented to that same Congress for transmission to the states,131 and,
after ratification by the ninth state, 132 further action by that Congress
was required "for the purpose of bringing the new government into
operation." 33
The language as ratified was clearly a deliberate choice. Compare 2 Farrand, supra note
63, at 129 (summary of initial proceedings framing qualifications in a "positive" manner)
with U.S. CONS-r. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (actual "negative" approach). The notion that the text
stipulates minimal qualifications to which states might add is, accordingly, suggestive. It
must, nevertheless, account for the strong counsel of individuals like Madison, who be-
lieved the Constitution left the "door" to service "open to merit of every description," THE
FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), a characteriza-
tion that leaves little room for this inference.
129. 2 STORY, supra note 88, § 245. Story quotes a number of contemporary observers
to this effect in idU §§ 246-247. For a summary of the competing theories and a defense of
the idea that both the pre-Articles and Articles government exercised considerable power,
see Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh
Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of the
Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 783 (1993).
130. See Resolution of Congress (Feb. 21, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra note 63, at 13.
131. See Resolution of the Federal Convention Submitting the Constitution to Con-
gress (Sept. 17, 1787), in Tansill, supra note 84, at 1005; Resolution of Congress Submitting
the Constitution to the Several States (Sept. 28, 1787), in id. at 1007.
132. We take no position on the question of whether the nine-state provision, which
abandoned the unanimity requirement of the Articles, made "[t]he ratification of this Con-
stitution... so repugnent [sic] to the Terms on which we are all bound to amend and alter
the [Articles of Confederation], that it became a matter of surprise to many that the propo-
sition could meet with any countenance or support." Luther Martin's Remarks before the
Maryland House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 1787), in 3 Farrand, supra note 63, at 151,
159. For a sample of the debate on this question, see 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrTION
647-71 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
133. Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422 (1820).
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Jefferson believed state-imposed qualifications fell within the
powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment. His position is both
compelling in its own right and consistent with a view of government
he had harbored for years. Others may have disagreed, but conflicting
statements about the meaning of the Constitution as framed are not
unusual and are largely beside the point if the text itself resolves the
matter. Thus, Jefferson's observations cannot be lightly discarded,
particularly by a legal community that has found his views persuasive
in other contexts.134 Moreover, disputes about the precise scope of
Article I in no way resolve the parallel possibility that subsequent
amendments to the Constitution either recognize that option or create
entirely new ones. 135
Of course, there are dangers in a system in which, as John Adams
phrased it, a "Representative Assembly" is "in miniature, an exact
portrait of the people at large" that "should think, feel, reason, and
act like them.' 36 The "exact portrait" approach may be appropriate
in England where Parliament is ostensibly the creation of its people
and its powers are not constrained by a written constitution. 37 We
not only have such a Constitution, but have embraced a fundamental,
written text in part because of the perceived need to occasionally
134. The best example of this is acceptance of Jefferson's "wall of separation between
church and State," which surfaced for the first time in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878) (quoting Reply to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Ass'n, in 8 JEFFER-
SON'S WRITINGS, supra note 69, at 113), and has, depending on one's perspective, provided
either a principled approach to church and state matters or a whipping horse ever since.
Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Jefferson in Reynolds
with approval) with Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) ("A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech.") and
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (extolling prayer at
public functions as a historically sound practice and noting Jefferson's practice of same).
135. Or, as Professor Akhil Amar has argued, that "[w]e the People of the United
States-more specifically, a majority of the voters-retain an unenumerated, constitutional
right to alter our Government and revise our Constitution in a way not explicitly set out in
Article V." Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458-59 (1994). Discussion of this "First Theo-
rem" is well beyond the scope of this Article. It is, nevertheless, a variation on Hills's
central argument, that there is a tenable distinction between state-imposed limits that are
effected by "the people" themselves and those enacted indirectly by their representatives.
See Hills, supra note 5, at 137-51. But as we will note, see infra note 174, Hills fails entirely
to account for Powell, and that omission is probably fatal to his enterprise.
136. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86, 87
(Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979).
137. For a discussion of these matters, see GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY 35-72 (1980); Frederick Pollock, The History of English Law as a Branch of Poli-
tics, in JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL ESSAYS 185, 203-11 (1978).
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check majoritarian impulses. 38 That Constitution articulated a pow-
erful variation on Adams' sentiments when it created a Congress
where power is shared by a "populist" House and a Senate that is
"powerful, deliberative, [and] energetic," rather than simply "repre-
sentative. ' 139 The view that Congress should respond directly and im-
mediately to the demands of the electorate finds at least some support
in many of the great decisions of the Court, which articulate a belief
that "[s]ince legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all
citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are collec-
tively responsible to the popular will." 14° Congress is, nevertheless, an
institution that functions within a system that constantly checks the
majoritarian impulse and should presumably be neither reflexively
nor absolutely dedicated to total deference to "the people." This does
not mean the people are powerless, and it may well be that the current
movement toward term limits is equivalent in form and implication
with those that led to the ratification of the Seventeenth and Nine-
teenth Amendments.' 4' But we do sense that considerable care must
be expended on detailed consideration of just what powers the people
and the states surrendered and that the Jefferson-Story exchange is a
necessary part of that dialogue.
D. The Historic Record: Some Initial Thoughts
The case for term limits is an uncertain one if it is to be proven by
resort to the historical record. It seems unlikely that the framers be-
lieved term limits were either necessary or appropriate, and those who
did seek such limits expressed a belief that the Constitution itself
needed to be modified. However, those judgments were framed dur-
ing a period in which it was equally implausible that individuals
elected to Congress would serve, as has Representative Jamie L. Whit-
ten of Mississippi, for over fifty years.' 42 More tellingly, conditions
138. See, for example, Madison on this question in Tr FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For an interesting discussion of the signifi-
cance Chief Justice Marshall placed on ours being a written Constitution, see Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
139. Amar, supra note 62, at 1121.
140. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
141. See generally Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.. 1971 (1994).
142. Congressman Whitten was first elected to the 77th Congress at a special election
in November 1941 and began his twenty-seventh term with the commencement of the 103d
Congress in January 1993. See 1993-1994 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECrORY: 103D
CONGRESS 162 (1993). He was elected "on the strength of his prosecution of gamblers who
came across the state line from Tennessee" and "fac[ed] few challengers until 1992 when he
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have changed dramatically, 143 as have the responsibilities of elected
representatives. Thus, the assumptions the founders brought to bear
in their discussions of these matters may no longer apply, just as views
of what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" are now mea-
sured by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society"'144 rather than the fate awaiting a felon in 1790.
Given the changing standards, the issue may now be the extent to
which other sections of the Constitution, particularly the Qualifica-
tions Clauses, are susceptible to a similar developmental treatment.
Any careful examination of the term limit debate rapidly trans-
forms itself into a treatise on the general thrust and current direction
of American democracy, an experiment that remains "the world's pre-
eminent drama of popular sovereignty,"'145 whose vitality has assumed
special significance following the end of the Cold War and the collapse
of the major Communist states. Although the controversies of con-
gressional "paralysis" and "corruption" seem beyond dispute, it is far
from certain whether term limits will cure these ills. Thus, the prover-
bial bottom line in the policy debate about term limits remains a fun-
damental dispute about which policy should guide the selection and
retention of Senators and Representatives.
There are no immediate, practical answers. Fortunately, there
are beacons that shed some light on how to assess policy decisions
made by the framers, given the constitutional matrix within which the
term limits litigation will be resolved.
captured only 59 percent of the vote." Congressman Since 1941 Says He'll Retire, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A17.
143. The average life expectancy in 1790 "was probably about 35 years," and "[ailmost
half of all deaths occurred in the first decade of life, with the following two decades the
next most fatal." George Rosen, Life Expectancy, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN His-
TORY 148, 150 (1976). Individuals who reached the ages of 30 and 35-the thresholds
selected for service as a Senator and President, respectively-were the exception and had
good prospects for continued survival. These factors may have been important considera-
tions for the framers, who seemed to value experience and mature judgment.
144. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Justice Scalia, of course, seems to disa-
gree. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(arguing for an approach that embraces the narrowest and most specific historic tradition).
This portion of Justice Scalia's opinion commanded, however, the support of only himself
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 132 (O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (re-
jecting "prior imposition of a single mode of historic analysis").
145. WILL, RESTORATION, supra note 54, at 231.
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H. State-Imposed Term Limits: The Constitutional Matrix
The constitutional dimensions of the term limit debate have tradi-
tionally been viewed as two distinct, but interrelated, lines. That as-
sumption is incomplete, as we will demonstrate when we turn our
attention to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Part III of this
Article. A proper understanding of Section 2's role requires, how-
ever, that we sketch the parameters of the usual term limits dialogue.
The first query within that discussion focuses on the extent to which
the Qualifications Clauses in Article I exhaust the field. Did the fram-
ers, by expressly listing age, duration of citizenship, and place of resi-
dence, intend for those qualifications to remain the sole criteria of
office? The second line of inquiry, usually undertaken only when the
Qualifications Clauses argument does not offer resolution, explores
the impact that other constitutional provisions have on "the individ-
ual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political
ends,"' 46 in particular, the freedom of speech and association guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. We now consider each in turn.
A. Term Limits as "Additional Qualifications" or "Manner" Restrictions
(1) Powell v. McCormack and "Qualifications"
Most of the debate about the constitutionality of state-imposed
term limits focuses on the Qualifications Clauses and, in particular,
the Court's treatment of them in Powell v. McCormack.147 The imme-
diate issue in Powell was whether the House could exclude Adam
Clayton Powell, who had been accused of "deceiv[ing] the House au-
thorities as to travel expenses" and "certain illegal salary pay-
ments.' 48 Powell was returned to Congress in spite of these
difficulties, winning reelection in November 1966 by a wide margin
over his nearest challenger.149 A special subcommittee of the House,
146. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
147. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Powell was Chief Justice Warren's "last controversial major-
ity opinion," The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 62 (1969); and one of
history's ironies is that the decision Warren affirmed in part and reversed in part was writ-
ten by the man who would succeed him, Warren Burger. See Powell v. McCormack, 395
F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968). It is worth noting, however, that then-Judge Burger's opinion
simply announced the result and his rationale. Judges McGowan and Levanthal concurred
only in the result, and each filed a separate opinion. See id. at 605 (McGowan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 607 (Levanthal, J., concurring).
148. Powell, 395 U.S. at 490.
149. Congressman Powell received 45,308 of the 61,187 votes cast, which was 74%. His
Republican opponent received 10,711, which was 17.5%. See Brief for Petitioner at 5,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (No. 138) in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS OF THE SuPmREM COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415, 519
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after an investigation marked by disputes about its authority even to
undertake the task, found Powell's actions "reflect[ed] discredit upon
and br[ought] into disrepute the House of Representatives and its
Members."'150 The House resolution, which recommended "public
censure" and the payment of a fine, was rejected by the full House.' 5'
Instead, the House passed a resolution in which it recognized that
Powell "possesses the requisite qualifications of age, citizenship, and
inhabitancy for membership,"' 52 but nonetheless "exclud[ed] Powell
and direct[ed] that the speaker notify the Governor of New York that
the seat was vacant."' 5 3
Powell and "thirteen electors" contested the decision, maintain-
ing that Powell met the constitutional qualifications and that his "ex-
clusion" violated a variety of constitutional guarantees. 54 The district
court held, "By reason of the doctrine of separation of powers, this
Court has no jurisdiction in this matter" and dismissed the com-
plaint. 55 That determination was affirmed by the court of appeals, 156
after which Powell's second petition for a writ of certiorari was
granted. 57 Characterizing the question as whether "the Constitution
gives the House judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for
membership and to judge whether prospective members meet those
qualifications,"'' 58 the Court held the House was "without authority to
exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the
requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the
Constitution." 59
While much of the discussion in Powell dealt with questions of
justiciability,160 the focal point was clearly the history and terms of the
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). Powell also won the "special election
called to fill the vacancy determined to exist by reason of his expulsion." Powell, 395 F.2d
at 579 n.1.
150. Powell, 395 F.2d at 584 (citing H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
151. Id. at 583-84.
152. Id. at 584 (citing H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
153. Powell, 395 U.S. at 493 (citing H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
154. See Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 354 (D.D.C. 1967).
155. Id. at 359-60.
156. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
157. 393 U.S. 949 (1968). An earlier attempt to have the Court hear the case "prior to
the judgment" of the court of appeals had been rejected. Powell v. McCormack, 387 U.S.
933 (1967).
158. Powell, 395 U.S. at 520.
159. Id. at 522.
160. Powell is routinely characterized as a separation of powers case, and the only dis-
senting vote was predicated on the assumption that Powell's subsequent admission to the
91st Congress rendered the case moot. Id. at 559-74 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
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Qualifications Clauses, which the Court examined in considerable de-
tail. The Court's review indicated the clauses were deeply influenced
by "the most notorious English election dispute of the 18th century-
the John Wilkes case,"'161 a "bitter struggle for the right of the British
electorate to be represented by men of their own choice."'162 In the
Court's estimation, the Wilkes episode meant that "on the eve of the
Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposi-
tion that 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of mem-
bers to serve in [Pjarliament' and [that] those qualifications were 'not
occasional but fixed.""' 163 Thus, when the Court turned to the ratifica-
tion debates, citing many of the same passages quoted by both sides in
the modern term limits dispute, it stressed that "[t]he parallel between
Madison's arguments and those made in Wilkes' behalf is striking."' 64
The Court found, "It appears that on this critical day the Framers
were facing and then rejecting the possibility that the legislature
would have power to usurp the 'indisputable right [of the people] to
return whom they thought proper' to the legislature.' 65
Chief Justice Warren conceded various aspects of the record
lacked clarity and, in particular, that the ratification "debates are sub-
ject to other interpretations.' 66 Nevertheless, he found the "ultimate
conclusion" in Powell was correct: Neither "branch of Congress [has]
the authority to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifica-
tions expressly set forth in the Constitution."'167 The Court thus reaf-
firmed that "[the] fundamental principle of our representative
democracy is, in Hamilton's words, 'that the people should choose
whom they please to govern them.""' 68 As a direct consequence, Con-
gress was not free to simply "exclude" individuals duly elected by the
people who met the constitutionally prescribed qualifications. The
Powell decision also meant, "[a]s Madison pointed out at the Conven-
Douglas wrote separately to stress his conclusion that any "expulsion" required a two-
thirds vote. I&. at 551-59 (Douglas, J., concurring).
161. Powell, 395 U.S. at 527.
162. Id. at 528.
163. Id. at 528 (quoting 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 589, 590 (1769)).
164. Powell, 395 U.S. at 534.
165. Id. at 535 (quoting 16 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 589 (1769)).
166. Powell, 395 U.S. at 532.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 547 (quoting 2 Elliot, supra note 68, at 257).
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tion," that "this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the
people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.' 69
The Court's treatment of limitations on. qualifications for office is
routinely characterized as "exhaustive,"' 170 and as standing for the
proposition that an "additional qualification is only acceptable if it is
added to the Constitution by amendment.' 17' It is then not surprising
that both decisions striking state-imposed limits on congressional
terms have treated Powell as dispositive. In Thorsted Judge Dwyer
characterized the holding in Powell as "narrow," but found neverthe-
less that "the [Supreme] Court [had] marshaled [sic] the historical and
legal precedents showing that neither Congress nor the states can add
to the Article I, Sections 2 and 3, qualifications.' 1 72 The majority on
the Arkansas court, in turn, described the House action at issue in
Powell as an attempt to add a qualification and declared that "Qualifi-
cations set out in the U.S. Constitution, unalterable except by amend-
ment to that document, is a conclusion that makes eminently good
sense."'1 73 There are, however, reasons to believe that Powell may not
have definitively answered the question, some of which have been
suggested in the cases and commentary, and some of which have not.
For example, a number of commentators have stressed that the
actual holding in Powell is confined to the specific question presented
in the case: whether the House could exclude a member duly elected
who met the constitutional qualifications. They argue that "Powell
simply restricts the power of a single House of Congress from adding
qualifications" and that "[n]othing in Powell states that the qualifica-
tions listed in the U.S. Constitution exclude qualifications from any
other source.' 74 What that "other source" might be is, however, dif-
ficult to discern. One suggestion is derived from the Court's conces-
sion that various other constitutional provisions were "no less a
'qualification' within the meaning of Art. I., § 5, than those set forth in
Art. I, § 2."175 The argument becomes that "the three federal qualifi-
169. Powell, 395 U.S. at 547. The reference is to Madison's statement that "[a] Repub-
lic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capa-
ble of being elected, as the number authorized to elect." 2 Farrand, supra note 63, at 250.
170. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 5, at 1926.
171. Barnicle, supra note 5, at 433.
172. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
173. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Ark. 1994).
174. Hills, supra note 5, at 100 n.15. This terse statement constitutes the entirety of
Hills's discussion of Powell.
175. Powell, 395 U.S. at 520 n.41 (citing P. Allan Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the
Constitutional Issues in the Powell and Related Cases, 17 J. Pun. L. 103 (1968)). The Court
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cations... can be construed to exclude any other qualifications that
might otherwise be implicitly imposed by the U.S. Constitution."'7 6
This approach, derived from the expressio unius exclusio alterius
maxim, 177 is troubling for a number of reasons. First of all, the various
provisions listed by the Court are constitutional constraints. Those, we
believe, differ in fundamental respect from limitations that might be
imposed by entities acting outside prescribed constitutional avenues.
More significantly, these additional "qualifications" lie entirely within
the original text. This makes it reasonable, as Madison found in The
Federalist,178 to read the various clauses together as a unified state-
ment of what the Constitution as ratified required. Speculation about
whether a state might have elected a female representative in 1789,179
or whether an individual who has been convicted in an impeachment
proceeding should be seated before he is expelled,180 might, accord-
ingly, have a certain degree of intellectual interest. However, these
considerations have little real bearing on the issues actually posed in
the debate over the constitutionality of state-imposed term limits.
A second theory finds the "point" of the Qualifications Clauses
"is to limit the federal control of the local decision; it is not to restrain
the state peoples' decision embodied in the state constitutions."8l
Under this approach to Powell, supporters of state-imposed term lim-
its argue the Constitution "makes only a few qualifications mandatory
in order to allow the state peoples latitude in specifying other qualities
that they will require from their representatives."'8 This is a varia-
tion on the rationale advanced by Jefferson in his letter to Cabell, and
is a favorite of term limit supporters. The normal response is to refer
stated that it "need not reach this question.... since both sides agree that Powell was not
ineligible under any of these provisions." Powell, 395 U.S. at 520 n.41.
176. Hills, supra note 5, at 114. The primary example of an explicit constitutional re-
quirement is the admonition that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifica-
tion to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 3.
177. See supra note 127.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
179. This is the example Hills offers. Hills, supra note 5, at 114. It is problematic for
any number of reasons, not the least of which is that the franchise was not extended to
women in any state at that time, a necessary precondition for election. More to the point,
as later observers recognized, see infra text accompanying note 455, it is unlikely Madison
would have found the suggestion worth considering.
180. That, of course, is the issue posed by the election of former Judge Alcee Hastings
to Congress in the wake of the Court's recent affirmation of the procedure used to impeach
him in Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
181. Hills, supra note 5, at 115.
182. Id.
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largely to the arguments of Story183 and others,184 or to simply dismiss
the point without explanation. 185 As we have indicated, the assump-
tions Story brought to his treatment of this question are suspect as an
absolute matter and subject to whatever additional pronouncements
appear within the amended text.
Still, while textual silence may imply state latitude, it is an unset-
tling suggestion because it implies states are free to amend the Consti-
tution in ways other than those specified in Article V.186 Those
insisting Powell is not dispositive are unlikely to analogously argue
that the state action limitations articulated in the First and Fourteenth
Amendments leave states free to use the referendum process to estab-
lish a state church or to deny a particular group the equal protection
of the laws. In fact, the Court has expressly repudiated the theory,
stressing, "Fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they de-
pend on the outcome of no elections,"' 87 and holding, "The fact that a
challenged legislative apportionment plan was approved by the electo-
rate is without federal constitutional significance, if the scheme
adopted fails to satisfy the basic requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause" as delineated by the Court in Reynolds v. Sims. 88
(2) Terms Limits as a Condition on the "Manner" of Elections
A more convincing argument characterizes "term limit[s] [as] bet-
ter considered a regulation affecting the manner of an election" rather
183. See, e.g., Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1082-83 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(relying largely on Story to find that the Tenth Amendment "cannot be read to allow states
to limit their citizens' freedom of choice by adding qualifications for Congress").
184. See, e.g., 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
64 (1868); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 229 (6th ed. 1848).
185. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994) (asserting
without discussion or support, "This is not a power left to the states under the Tenth
Amendment.").
186. We recognize that we have not accounted for Professor Amar's arguments in this
regard. See Amar, supra note 135.
187. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
188. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964). The issue in Lu-
cas was whether the Court should shy away from applying the rule articulated in Reynolds
where "a majority of the voters... indicate[d] a desire to be governed by a minority .. "
Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 944 (D. Colo. 1963) (Doyle, J., dissenting). That tracks
rather closely the idea that courts should defer to the wishes of the electorate, even in the
face of an express constitutional guarantee. Of course, the document was amended in the
approved manner with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the extent to
which the "deny or abridge" language of Section 2 recognizes a degree of state authority
over suffrage and qualifications is another question entirely.
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than as a "qualification.' 89 The "regulating" function of a term limit
focuses on the Constitution's express grant of authority to the states 90
and proposes a "reasoned basis upon which to affix the manner regu-
lation label to a term limitation."' 9' Reliance on this view is danger-
ous; the same constitutional provision acknowledging state power to
regulate also provides that "Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Sen-
ators." 19 2 Thus, to the extent a state may impose term limits under the
guise of a "time, place, and manner" regulation, the limit itself is sub-
ject to alteration, and potentially abolition, by Congress. 93 This as-
sumes Congress has the political will to negate a state's efforts to
impose term limits, which proponents of term limits do not believe to
be likely. However, Congress has evidenced a healthy, albeit devious,
inclination to contravene the people's wishes when it suits its own en-
trenched purposes. The same members of Congress, willing to risk
the wrath of voters by increasing their own compensation and finess-
ing future increases into the simple device of annual cost of living ad-
189. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 5, at 355. See also Safranek, supra note 5, at 327-
50 (extensive discussion of origins and meaning of the Time, Place and Manner Clause).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
191. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 5, at 368. The argument is, by the authors' own
admission, "a complex question of labelling and categorization." Id. We will not attempt
to summarize or probe it, nor do we have to, since our point is more fundamental: on what
principled basis can we draw a distinction between a congressional mandate that elections
be by district and a state-imposed term limit?
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The exception for the place a state selected its Senators
was tied to the original determination that Senators "from each State" were to be "chosen
by the Legislature thereof," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, a requirement eliminated by the popu-
lar election provisions of the Seventeenth Amendment. Congress now has as much author-
ity over Senate elections as it does over those for Representatives, although the number of
Senators per state may not vary without state consent, see U.S. CONST. art. V, while the
number of Representatives will change with each "apportionment," except that "each
State shall have at Least one Representative." U.S. CONST. art I, § 2. These realities factor
into Section 2, which is expressly limited to "Representatives in Congress" in recognition
of what historians have characterized as "the Great Compromise." See, e.g., LEONARD W.
LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 38-39 (1988).
193. As the Court has stressed, "[t]he power of Congress, as we have seen, is para-
mount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and
so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the State
which are inconsistent therewith." Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1879). This expan-
sive reading is consistent with Patrick Henry's observation that "[t]he power over the man-
ner admits of the most dangerous latitude." 3 Elliot, supra note 68, at 175. See also XIII
Letter of Agrippa to the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 22, 1788), in 4 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 102 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("Of all the powers of government
this is the most improper to be surrendered.").
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justments, 194 would certainly be even more willing to resist the will of
the people when the stakes are raised to whether they will continue in
office. Simple logic suggests as much. Many term limit measures, if
characterized as a time, place, or manner regulation and left unre-
pealed, would serve as absolute bars to reelection. But a vote to abol-
ish such measures would at least leave individual members of
Congress free to plead their cases with the voters, an escape route that
might well prove successful given the already-noted propensity on the
part of the electorate to see evil in every elected representative but
their own.195
A compelling case can then be made that Congress has every-
thing to gain, and little -to lose, by exercising its Article I power to void
state-imposed limits on congressional terms. And these incentives
may well be just as pronounced even where the measures offer "es-
cape hatches," such as the ability to run as a write-in candidate. The
sparse prospects for success via such routes led both the Thorsted and
U.S. Term Limits courts to reject Article I, Section 4 arguments. In
Thorsted Judge Dwyer found that the measure was "aimed not at
achieving order and fairness in the process but preventing a disfa-
vored group of candidates from being elected at all."'1 96 He stressed,
"The record shows that in the country as a whole only three candi-
dates for the House have been elected by write-in votes since 1958,
and only one candidate for the Senate has been elected by that
method since 1954."'197 The Arkansas court, citing Thorsted, found
"These glimmers of opportunity for the disqualified ... are faint in-
deed-so faint in our judgment that they cannot salvage Amendment
73 from constitutional attack.' 98 Moreover, while both courts cited
Burdick in their opinions, neither discussed the implications of that
decision's holding that a state may constitutionally bar write-in candi-
dacies outright. 199
194. See 2 U.S.C. § 31(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This approach has spurred litigation
in the wake of the recently ratified provision stipulating that "[n]o law, varying the com-
pensation for the services of Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an elec-
tion of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVII. See Boehner
v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992) (cost-of-living adjustment provisions of Eth-
ics Reform Act of 1989 (Pub. L. No. 101-194, §§ 701, 704, 103 Stat. 1763) do not violate
27th Amendment).
195. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
196. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
197. Id.
198. U.S. Term Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 357 (citing Thorsted).
199. See Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at 1080 (citing Burdick, 112 S. Ct. 2059, for the proposi-
tion that states may regulate to make elections "fair and honest" and orderly); U.S. Term
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The idea that a term limit is a "manner" regulation seems, ini-
tially, counterintuitive. The assumption behind term limits is most
likely that serving for a certain specified period renders one "ineligi-
ble" to serve again, subject only to whatever escape routes might be
available.2°° If that is the case, how can a term limit fall, not within
the Qualifications Clauses, but rather within the inherent power of the
state to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, subject only
to congressional override?
The answer to this question lies in the Court's long-standing ac-
quiescence to another regulatory limit that looks very much like a
qualification, but arguably is not: the division of states into congres-
sional districts. Prior to 1842, members of Congress were elected at-
large unless state law or practice provided otherwise. As Story noted,
with regard to the Qualifications Clauses, "It is observable, that the
inhabitancy required is within the state, and not within any particular
district of the state, in which the member is chosen.120 1 In 1842, how-
ever, Congress invoked its power to regulate time, place, and manner
to require that
in every case where a State is entitled to more than one Representa-
tive, the number to which each State shall be entitled under this
apportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous
territory equal in number to the number of Representatives to
which said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than
one Representative. 2°2
This provision has remained in the Code ever since, with a few
exceptions not material to our purposes. It does not require, in so
many words, that a candidate for election actually live in his district.203
But the current stipulation requiring the Representative to be
"elected from" 2°4 that district strongly suggests that limitation, and it
Limits, 872 S.W.2d at 359-60 (using Burdick to support the propositions that "[s]eparating
the rights of the candidate from those of the supporter may be difficult" and that "a more
flexible standard" is now used in assessing burdens on voters).
200. Either by seeking another office, sitting out for a specified period, or pursuing
reelection as a write-in candidate.
201. 1 STORY, supra note 88, § 619. Story, drawing on the experience of England,
thought this was a good thing: "It was found by experience, that boroughs and cities were
often better represented by men of eminence, and known patriotism, who were strangers
to them, than those chosen from their own vicinage." Id. A state-imposed district resi-
dency requirement thus became an evil to be avoided. Id. 88 624, 629.
202. Act of June 25, 1842, Ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491.
203. The provisions of the various state codes governing elections are generally now
silent on this, reflecting decisions holding states could not require one to live in the district.
See, e.g., Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908 (Md. 1958); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446
P.2d 445 (N.M. 1968).
204. See 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (1988).
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is difficult to imagine a candidate seriously attempting to run as a rep-
resentative "from" San Francisco while openly maintaining Los Ange-
les as his or her permanent place of residence. Substantial political
liabilities arise when one does not live in the district or at least engage
in the pious pretense of living there. Members of Congress go to ab-
surd lengths to establish their residential bona fides, a long-evident
political reality. In a nineteenth century commentary, for example,
the author described one such "subterfuge" and warned that
"[w]henever it becomes necessary to resort to a 'legal fiction' in order
to accomplish any purpose, the wisdom of the law which is thus sought
to evade becomes at once questionable. ' 20 5 Indeed, while Jefferson
was skeptical about the willingness of the people to exercise their
power to remove incumbents via elections, he did believe "the partial-
ities of the people [were] a sufficient security against [the] election" of
a non-resident.20 6
Functionally, this requirement operates as an additional qualifica-
tion, prescribed by Congress, as an expression of its Article I, Section
4 powers. More significantly, the Court has effectively recognized it
as such. One illustration is the Court's discussion, in Ex parte Siebold,
of the extent to which Article I, Section 4 authorized Congress to "in-
terfere" with state regulation of elections.20 7 The Court gave this
power an expansive reading: If Congress "chooses to interfere, there
is nothing in the words to prevent its doing so, either wholly or par-
tially."20 8 The Court also noted, "Congress has partially regulated the
subject heretofore," expressly citing the "law for the election of repre-
sentatives by separate districts" and referring to other measures "fix-
ing the time of election, and directing that the elections shall be by
ballot. ' 20 9 Subsequent cases and discussions have echoed this treat-
ment. In United States v. Gradwell, for example, the Court observed,
"Although Congress has had this power of regulating the conduct of
congressional elections from the organization of the Government...
[f]or more than 50 years no congressional action whatever was taken
on the subject until 1842 when a law was enacted requiring that Rep-
resentatives be elected by Districts." 210
205. The Legal Qualification of Representatives, 3 AM. L. Rnv. 410, 410 (1869).
206. Letter from Jefferson to Cabell, supra note 78, at 381.
207. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
208. Id. at 383.
209. Id. at 384.
210. 243 U.S. 477, 482 (1917).
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However, these decisions do not contain an authoritative defini-
tion that, even remotely, favors treating a residential limitation as a
time, place, or manner regulation. In contrast, there is judicial lan-
guage casting doubt on the propriety of this characterization. In Mc-
Pherson v. Blacker, for example, the Court stated:
The district system was largely considered the most equitable, and
Madison wrote that it was that system which was contemplated by
the framers of the Constitution, although it was soon seen that its
adoption by some States might place them at a disadvantage by a
division of their strength, and that a uniform rule was preferable.211
And while the Court's most exhaustive discussion of the statutory pro-
vision does speak in terms of "a complete code for congressional elec-
tions,' '212 the enumeration of examples suggests nothing deviating
from common understanding of the terms:
[N]ot only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registra-
tion, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and
canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short,
to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards
which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the funda-
mental right involved. 213
Our point is a simple one. If Congress may use its Article I, Sec-
tion 4 "manner" powers to require that Representatives be elected
from particular districts, why is a state barred from using the same
residual power to limit terms? The only answer that makes sense is
that the statutory language commanding the division of a state into
districts does not expressly stipulate the individual must reside in that
district. Neither the United States nor the various state codes contain
such a requirement. And while the courts have held that the states
have no power to enforce such provisions, no court has held that Con-
gress cannot do so, and presumably would not, given the logic of Ex
parte Siebold and the decisions that followed.
If one may infer that districts are a time, place, and manner limi-
tation, it is only a small intuitive leap to analogously characterize a
state-imposed term limit as such a regulation. From a constitutional
standpoint, there is little discernible difference between a measure
211. 146 U.S. 1, 29 (1892). McPherson was one of a long line of cases stating "[t]he
right to vote intended to be protected [by the Fourteenth Amendment] refers to the right
to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State." Id. at 39. This perspective
is, as we indicate infra at text accompanying notes 291-295, important for the purposes of
understanding the scope and impact of Section 2.
212. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
213. Id. at 366.
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barring an individual from the ballot because it would be his third
"consecutive" term and a measure barring him because "'[e]very can-
didate for election to the House of Representatives shall be a resident
of the congressional district in which he seeks election."' 214 This as-
sumes certain traditional assumptions about the meaning of "time,
place, and manner" may be discarded, most notably, those arising
under the First Amendment. There is little to distinguish a term limit
from the measures at stake in many traditional First Amendment
cases 215 when the measures are distinguished as substantive, that is,
content-based, or merely procedural, that is, content-neutral. A term
limit is arguably procedural, and content-neutral, in the very limited
sense that it bars individuals of all political persuasions from office.
However, a term limit is substantive, and certainly content-based,
when one looks at the type of speech (e.g., running for a specified
political office) and the nature of the restriction (e.g., barring only
those who have engaged previously in a specified period of such
speech). Even so, the Court has clearly approved Congress's mandate
of districts based on the only constitutional predicate for such action,
the reservation to Congress of the power to regulate the "manner" of
elections.
While we believe an argument might be made that the Powell
decision defines and exhausts the field, several glaring anomalies re-
main unaddressed, and at least two pose major problems for those
who argue that state-imposed limits are unconstitutional. The first
unaddressed issue, the seeds of which lie within Jefferson's letter to
Cabell, posits that there are strong historical bases for an inherent
state power to limit terms within the Tenth Amendment's reservation
of powers. The second unaddressed issue is the contention that a term
limit is simply a permissible state "manner" regulation, recognizing
that election from specified districts operates in precisely the same
way. These two arguments are even more powerful than they first
appear, given the guidance of Section 2. But before we consider Sec-
tion 2, certain other issues must be addressed.
214. Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 909 (Md. 1958) (quoting MD. CODE art. 33,
§ 158(c)). As we note, supra note 203, the provision was declared invalid.
215. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (finding unconstitutional a provision
that prohibited signs critical foreign governments within 500 feet of embassies).
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B. Term Limits as a Burden on Free Speech or as a Basis of Electoral
Integrity
The second major theme in the debate about the constitutionality
of term limits is the extent to which such limits are subject to the free
speech and association guarantees of the First Amendment. Two dis-
tinct, but inescapably interrelated, interests are at issue: the right of
an individual to vote for the candidate of his or her choice and the
prerogative of a particular person to be that candidate.
The Court has indicated, in no uncertain terms, that the individ-
ual "right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society" and that "any alleged infringement of the rights of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. '216 A state may
employ certain routine administrative devices to insure that the right
person casts the ballot and that the state completes its ministerial du-
ties in a timely fashion. There is a "wide scope for exercise of [this]
jurisdiction," 217 even though regulations requiring a certain duration
of residence, for example, may occasionally impose heavy burdens.21 8
As the Court stressed in Storer v. Brown, "As a practical matter, there
must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes. '219 States may not, however, absolutely
prohibit the exercise of the franchise, absent either conditions that de-
monstrably interfere with "intelligent use of the ballot" 220 or conduct
that falls within the one express constitutional exception, Section 2's
allowance for individuals who have "participat[ed] in rebellion, or
other crime."'221
The right to be a candidate has also been recognized, albeit
largely as one derived from the right to vote itself. An individual has
no constitutionally protected right either to be elected or appointed to
216. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
217. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
218. Compare Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee's re-
quirement of residence in the state for one year and in the county for three months) with
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (sustaining an Arizona rule given an "amply justifi-
able legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary"). We assume technologi-
cal innovations have rendered most durational residency schemes tenuous.
219. 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
220. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51. The specific issue in Lassiter was "[t]he ability to read and
write," id., which was sustained as an appropriate and neutral qualification.
221. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2. This authority was expressly recognized in Rich-
ardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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a public office.222 However, candidates do "have a federal constitu-
tional right to be considered for public service without the burden of
invidiously discriminatory disqualifications. The State may not deny
to some the privilege of holding public office that it extends to others
on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guaran-
tees. '223 Federal election reforms imposing "substantial rather than
merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political
speech" are therefore invalid.224 And state regulations imposing
property qualifications 225 or filing fees226 have been struck down when
the Court found that they imposed conditions "not reasonably neces-
sary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election
interests. 227
In each instance, the Court was clearly assessing an amalgam of
interests. The measures examined in Buckley v. Valeo burdened both
candidate and voter, for they impaired "the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office," considered an
"essential" aspect of the election process; "for the identities of those
who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation. ' 228 And when a state imposes a filing fee as a precondition to
appearing on the ballot,
[t]he interests involved are not merely those of parties or individual
candidates; the voters can assert their preferences only through can-
didates or parties or both and it is this broad interest that must be
weighed in the balance. The right of a party or an individual to a
place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the
rights of voters.229
These decisions project a vision of an election system in which
state-imposed limitations on the right of an individual to stand for re-
222. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (the "right" to "be a candidate
for and to be elected to public office upon receiving a sufficient number of votes... is one
secured ... by state statute").
223. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1970).
224. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
225. See, e.g., Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977).
226. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
227. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,718 (1974). The Court's use of the phrase "reason-
ably necessary" is misleading since it implies use of the extraordinarily deferential "ra-
tional basis" level of review. Many of the Court's decisions speak, however, of "close
scrutiny." See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144. As we note, see infra text accompanying
notes 246-247, the Court will presumably, in the wake of Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct.
2059, 2064-65 (1992), use a "sliding scale" with the level of scrutiny varying according to
the degree of "impairment."
228. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
229. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716. See also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (voters are "substantially
limited in their choice of candidates" by filing fees).
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election appear to burden the rights of both the candidate and the
voters who would select that candidate, particularly because "the
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to
neat separation." 230 If, as some of the decisions imply, state-imposed
term limits are subject to a form of strict scrutiny as a burden on the
speech of voters, the ability of the state to sustain term limits is ques-
tionable in light of the availability of less burdensome approaches.
One plausible argument in this vein is that a term limit denies "the
constitutional interest of likeminded voters to gather in pursuit of
common political ends, thus [reducing] the opportunities of all voters
to express their own political preferences." 231 If that characterization
applies, strict scrutiny follows. The state must "demonstrat[e] ... a[n]
... interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation... and we
have accordingly required any severe restriction to be narrowly drawn
to advance a state interest of compelling importance." 232 Assuming,
for the sake of argument, that a state is correct in asserting that the
elimination of "corruption and the appearance of corruption" is a
"compelling interest,"' 2 3 the state must still convince the Court that
the means selected are narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.
That might be possible if sheer rotation of bodies is the only means to
eliminate corruption. It is less likely if, as is almost certainly the case,
legislative malfeasance can be addressed in ways that do not implicate
the fundamental rights of voters and candidates alike. 23 4
In contrast, the Court has also routinely sustained election regu-
lations having both the purpose and effect of barring particular indi-
viduals from the ballot, and it has implied that many of these
measures will be tested within the extraordinarily deferential "rational
basis" regimen. In one recent consideration of the electoral restric-
tions, Burdick v. Takushi, the Court stated that while "[i]t is beyond
cavil that 'voting is of the most fundamental significance under our
constitutional structure,' . . . [i]t does not follow ... that the right to
vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes
230. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
231. Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992).
232. I. (citations omitted).
233. California Term Limits Act of 1992 § 3(a), reprinted in Cal. Elec. Code § 25003
(West Supp. 1994) (Proposition 164 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
234. This assumes that "narrowly tailored" means "least restrictive," a proposition the
Court rejected in the somewhat analogous context of the First Amendment time, place,
and manner doctrine in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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through the ballot are absolute." 235 This means "[t]he mere fact that a
State's system 'creates barriers... tending to limit the field of candi-
dates from which voters might choose ... does not of itself compel
close scrutiny.' '2 36
These decisions are consistent with a long-standing recognition
that the time, place, and manner authority recognized in Article I
means "government must play an active role in structuring elec-
tions.' '237 The Court has sustained a variety of state regulations that
arguably place exactly the same sort of restrictions on individual can-
didacy as a term limit. In Williams v. Rhodes,238 for example, the
Court invalidated Ohio's overly burdensome requirements that virtu-
ally precluded a new party from obtaining a place on the ballot. In
Anderson v. Celebrezze,239 the Court rejected an early filing deadline
Ohio had imposed on an independent candidate for the office of Pres-
ident. In doing so, however, the Court made it clear that it would
balance the competing rights and interests of the parties and uphold
"evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of
the electoral process itself."240 Accordingly, ballot access limitations
were appropriate since "[t]he State has the undoubted right to require
candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in
order to qualify for a place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful
and confusing to encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous can-
didates."'241 And in Clements v. Fashing, the Court recognized the
state's authority to protect the integrity of the offices it created in up-
holding a state requirement for officeholders to resign from one office
before running for another.2 42
The net effect of these decisions is somewhat speculative because
the Court clearly employs different approaches. The Court tests
"heavy" burdens by requiring the state to show a "compelling" inter-
est, while "slight" burdens are subjected to a much lower level of scru-
tiny. Thus, in one of its most recent pronouncements on election
limitations, Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was sustained in light of
235. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063 (quoting Illinois Bd. Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).
236. Id. at 2063 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
237. Id.
238. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
239. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
240. Id. at 788 n.9.
241. Id. See also American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. 431 (1971).
242. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
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the "easy access" afforded by virtue of the three means of ballot ac-
cess Hawaii made available to potential candidates.243 That access
was assessed, however, in the light of the "limited" burden imposed, a
condition that would not necessarily be present in any particular term
limit formulation.
Consequently, while term limits arguably run afoul of the First
Amendment, one must take into account certain anomalies in the de-
cisions of the Court and the approaches the various states have taken
to limiting terms. For instance, while Burdick suggests a state may bar
an individual from the ballot, the conclusion that term limits them-
selves are constitutional is much too broad. Under the logic of the
Burdick decision, measures only forbidding an individual from ap-
pearing as a formal candidate might still be appropriate.244 Of course,
Burdick also means a state is not obligated to offer the write-in route
to election, and if a state does not offer that option, the viability of any
concomitant term limitation will depend on other factors.
At the other end of the spectrum, measures purporting to make
an individual "permanently ineligible," like that approved in North
Dakota,245 may push the envelope in ways the measure at issue in
Burdick did not. In finding the Hawaii measure "presumptively
valid," the Court considered the burdens imposed to be "slight" and
stressed that Hawaii offered ample alternative means by which candi-
dates could place their names on the ballot.246 Where the term limit
prohibition is absolute, the burden, presumably, will be more than a
"slight" one. Moreover, many of the Court's decisions seem to turn
on the premise of a state having the right to "protect" its ballot from
"frivolous" candidates. 247 "Protecting the ballot" is not at issue when
the question is one of term limitation, unless, of course, term limit
devotees could convince the Court that repeated service is frivolous
per se, a rather suspect proposition.
243. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2064-65 (1992). The dissent, stressing the
local domination of the Democratic Party, disagreed with both the conclusion that ade-
quate alternatives were available, id. at 2068-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and the assump-
tion that the proffered state interests justified the ban, id. at 2071-72.
244. Montana and California, for example, specifically allow candidates who might be
barred from the ballot by their tenure to be elected as write-in candidates. See MoNT.
CoNsr. art. IV, § 8(3) (Constitutional Initiative 64 approved Nov. 3, 1992); California Term
Limits Act of 1992 § 4(b), reprinted in CAL. ELEC. CODE § 25003 (West Supp. 1994) (Prop-
osition 164 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
245. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
246. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2064-65.
247. This was the characterization employed in Anderson. See supra text accompany-
ing note 239-241.
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Collectively, the various First Amendment decisions do not pro-
vide an absolutely clear answer. If elections function as a means by
which the people "winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen
candidates," 248 then state-imposed term limits are arguably inconsis-
tent with the Court's admonition that it is the people themselves,
through elections, who will make this determination. If, on the other
hand, the power to regulate elections carries with it the inherent au-
thority to dictate certain absolute limits on the choices the electorate
may make, term limits may be an appropriate exercise of such
authority.
C. A Necessary Consideration: Prior Debates and Adjudications of
Similar Issues
One noteworthy facet of any litigation challenging term limits will
be the extent to which many of the issues involved have already been
resolved, either in Congress or court. Thus, while it may be true, in a
certain constricted sense, that Powell says nothing about what states
may do, the interpretive record is far from silent.
Questions arising from state-mandated congressional qualifica-
tions cropped up shortly after ratification of the Constitution. In 1807,
for example, Joshua Barney sought to negate the election of Repre-
sentative William McCreery, based on his failure to live in the part of
the congressional district from which he was elected.2 49 The House of
Representatives rejected this challenge by a vote of 89 to 18,25o follow-
ing a report by the Committee of Elections declaring that Maryland's
requirement "restricting the residence of the members of Congress to
any particular part of the district for which they may be chosen is con-
trary to the Constitution of the United States .... [Thus], McCreery
is entitled to his seat in this House."251 Similar questions were subse-
quently raised regarding the election of state judges to Congress dur-
ing their judicial terms in violation of state constitutional provisions
barring judges from serving in other offices until their judicial terms
expired. In each instance, the individual whose election was chal-
248. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
249. McCreery was seated in the House in 1807. His district was created by the Mary-
land Legislature and was to send two Representatives, one of whom lived in the City of
Baltimore. McCreery, whose seat required city residence, lived in Baltimore County. 17
ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807).
250. 17 id. at 1237.
251. 17 id. at 871-72.
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lenged-Lyman Trumbull2 2 and Samuel Marshall253 in 1856, and
Charles Falkner2 4 in 1888-was allowed to take his seat after a vote
of the House or Senate. Indeed, Faulkner was seated by unanimous
vote.255
Some term limit proponents, recognizing the implications of these
early determinations, have suggested these congressional cases have
limited precedential value.256 While this analysis has merit, it is un-
wise to discount the early cases for a number of reasons. The Mc-
Creery decision was a factor in the exchange between Jefferson and
Cabell, a dialogue that cannot be discounted. Moreover, while the
political ebb and flow within the various congressional debates some-
times led to official declarations that were less than decisive, the es-
sence of the exchanges evidences a strong awareness of virtually all
the arguments and authorities routinely cited as part of the current
term limits debate. Additionally, the congressional cases must play
some role in shaping modem understanding of the Qualifications
Clauses, if only because the early judicial cases treated these decisions
as applicable, often dispositive, precedent. 5 7
252. Judge Lyman Trumbull was seated in the Senate in 1856 to represent Illinois. The
Illinois Constitution then required that "judges of the [state] supreme ... court[ ] shall not
be eligible to any other office... in the United States, during the term for which they are
elected, nor for one year thereafter." ILL. CONST. OF 1848 art. V, § 10, in 2 Thorpe, supra
note 98, at 985, 999. Trumbull resigned from the state supreme court in 1853, although his
term was not to expire until 1861. He was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1855. 25 CONG.
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 514, 547-52, 579-84 (1856). The Senate vote to seat Trumbull
was 35 to 8. Id. at 584.
253. A separate dispute under the same Illinois provision arose over the seating of
Judge Samuel Marshall in the House. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st. Sess. 865-68 (1856).
Marshall was seated by a vote of 80 to 45. Id. at 868.
254. Judge Charles Falkner was seated in the Senate to represent West Virginia despite
a challenge based on a state constitutional article similar to the Illinois provision. 19
CONO. REC. 3 (1888).
255. Id. at 54.
256. Mr. Hills compared the debates over the elections of McCreery and Trumbull.
Hills, supra note 5, at 123-33. He rightly concluded the emphasis of the speakers in Mc-
Creery's case was more on the federalist principle involved than on the politics of the
candidates. The focus in Trumbull's case, however, was on whether to seat Trumbull, a
moderate Democrat supported by Abraham Lincoln, or Governor Matteson, a radical
Democrat supported by Stephen Douglas. From the limited consideration of the case then
before Congress, Hills concluded that the McCreery case established only that legislatures
may not add congressional qualifications. Id. at 128. From the political focus in Trumbull's
case, Hills determined that the precedential effect of the case on the power of the states to
add qualifications by state Constitution is less than conclusive. Id. at 131.
257. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 10 Ohio Dec. 255, 259-61 (Cuyahoga Ct. Comm. Pleas
1900), rev'd in part on other grounds, 20 Ohio C.C. 551 (Cuyahoga Cir. Ct. 1900), affd as
modified without op., 63 N.E. 1133 (Ohio 1902) (Trumbull case basis of refusal to enforce
Courts have routinely thwarted state attempts to attach condi-
tions to congressional service. States have attempted to require that
candidates for the United States House live within a congressional dis-
trict,2 58 and have tried to bar state judges from running for Con-
gress.2 59 Candidates have been required to comply with state-imposed
election spending limits. 260 They have been told all elected officehold-
ers must resign before running for Congress,2 61 and states have tried
to bar anyone convicted of a state crime from candidacy.2 62 Admit-
state election expenditure law invalidating election of non-reporting candidates); State ex
reL Chandler v. Howell, 175 P. 569, 571 (Wash. 1918) (reciting the cases).
258. See, e.g., Hellmann v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908 (Md. 1958) (holding that district resi-
dence requirement violates Qualifications Clause); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d
445 (N.M. 1968) (holding that district residence requirement violates Qualifications
Clause).
259. See Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 35 A.2d 903 (Del. 1944); State v. Supe-
rior Court, 151 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1958); Riley v. Cordell, 194 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1948); Ekwall
v. Stadelman, 30 P.2d 1037 (Or. 1934); State ex reL Chandler v. Howell, 175 P. 569 (Wash.
1918); State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1946). The Wisconsin
case is especially interesting since the individual who was allowed to run for the United
States Senate, and was eventually elected, was Joseph McCarthy.
260. See State v. Russell, 10 Ohio Dec. 255 (Cuyahoga Ct. Comm. Pleas 1900) (statute
that voids election in which candidate fails to certify limited campaign expenditure
unconstitutional).
261. One of the more interesting cases arose in Florida, where two county sheriffs at-
tempted to run for House seats without resigning. The state courts forbade Sheriff William
Davis from filing, holding the requirement was not an additional qualification for Con-
gress, but an obligation of the office of sheriff. State ex reL Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415
(Fla. 1970). A three-judge federal court reached a different conclusion and allowed Sheriff
Struck to file. State v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970). The state supreme
court then stayed its judgment as a matter of comity, State ex rel. Davis v. Adams, 238 So.
2d 417 (Fla. 1970), and Justice Black, in a one-Justice opinion, affirmed the stay, observing
that "[o]n balance, I am inclined to think the Court would hold that Florida has exceeded
its constitutional powers." Davis v. Adams, 400 U.S. 1203, 1204 (1970). The same issue,
albeit without the panoply of opinions, has arisen in other states. See Lowe v. Fowler, 240
S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1977) (mayor not ineligible despite statute requiring resignation to run for
House); State v. Superior Court, 151 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1958) (governor and lieutenant gov-
ernor not barred from Senate); Richardson v. Hare, 160 N.W.2d 883, 887-88 (Mich. 1968)
(sheriff not barred from running for judge, noting statute was amended to remove language
affecting candidacy for U.S. Senate); Oklahoma State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776
(Okla. 1980) (statute barring district attorney from candidacy for U.S. Senate during term);
In re Opinion of the Judges, 116 N.W.2d 233 (S.D. 1962) ("beyond reasonable dispute"
that Governor and Lieutenant Governor cannot be barred by state constitution from ap-
pointment to U.S. Senate during terms); State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864 (Wyo.
1948) (state constitution cannot bar Governor and Lieutenant Governor from becoming
members of Congress during term).
262. See State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmahl, 167 N.W. 481 (Minn. 1918) (candidate con-
victed of federal crime allowed on ballot for U.S. Senate); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44
N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1950) (candidate convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the federal gov-
ernment allowed on ballot for U.S. House); In re O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct.
1940) (neither belief in communism nor conviction of crime can bar access to ballot).
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tedly, none of the challenges mounted against these measures has gen-
erated an opinion on the merits by the United States Supreme Court.
But even though the litigation has been largely confined to the lower
courts, and in particular state courts,263 these cases reveal how a court
would treat virtually all of the measures recently enacted. Indeed, one
of the most striking things about these cases is that ten of them had
been brought before the highest courts of the fifteen states that now
have term limits, and that these courts had, in effect, already declared
similar measures unconstitutional before the November 1992
election.264
Each of the decisions has followed a common line of reasoning.
The courts begin by recognizing, for example, "the general rule is that
when the constitution establishes specific eligibility requirements for a
particular constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclu-
sive. '265 The next step is usually the expression, in no uncertain
terms, that the Qualifications Clauses exhaust the criteria for congres-
sional candidacy,266 and the contested requirement is a "superaddi-
tion" or a further qualification.267 The court generally concludes by
finding the limitation at issue either is unconstitutional in and of it-
self268 or merely "cannot affect the qualifications of a candidate." 269
Or it finds that, as an attempt to enact a law beyond the state's power,
263. There are a few federal cases, but they do not add much to the analysis. See, e.g.,
Hopfnann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1984) (sustaining Massachusetts Democratic
Party rule requiring candidate to secure 15% of vote at convention as prerequisite to chal-
lenge of party endorsement), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 471 U.S. 459 (1985), on
remand, 769 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1023, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1033
(1987); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1980) (New York "resign to run" provi-
sion valid measure protecting integrity of state government).
264. States that have enacted term limits whose supreme courts have already issued
opinions suggesting additional state-enacted qualifications violate the Constitution are:
Arizona, see Stockton v. McFarland, 106 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1940); Florida, see State ex rel.
Davis v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1970); Michigan, see Richardson v. Hare, 160 N.W.2d
883 (Mich. 1968); Nebraska, see State ex reL O'Sullivan v. Swanson, 257 N.W. 255 (Neb.
1934); North Dakota, see State ex rel Sundfor v. Thorson, 6 N.W.2d 89 (N.D. 1942); Ohio,
see State v. Russell, 10 Ohio Dec. 255 (1900); Oregon, see Ekwall v. Stadelman, 30 P.2d
1037 (Or. 1934); South Dakota, see In re Opinion of the Judges, 116 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.
1962); Washington, see State ex rel Chandler v. Howell, 175 P. 569 (Wash. 1918); and Wyo-
ming, see State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864 (Wyo. 1948). Of the other five states,
one has held the limits on state offices are constitutional. See Legislature State of Cal. v.
Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992), and cert. denied, Califor-
nians for Better Gov't v. Legislature State of Cal., 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992).
265. Oklahoma State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, 778 (Okla. 1980).
266. See, e.g., Ekwall, 30 P.2d at 1040; Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.W.2d at 233.
267. See, e.g., Russell, 10 Ohio at 263.
268. See, e.g., Thorson, 6 N.W.2d at 92.
269. See, e.g., Stockton, 106 P.2d at 331.
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the act was not within the state's authority 70 or, as a consideration of
a power beyond the state's authority, that the state court did not have
jurisdiction to decide the issue.271
The apparent ease with which these courts have uniformly found
such measures unconstitutional is all the more striking, given that ten
of the jurisdictions that have rejected attempts to add "qualifications"
are states that embraced term limitations during recent elections. Sig-
nificantly, in each instance, the court characterized the restriction at
issue as a qualification. In so doing, the courts have defined "qualifi-
cation" broadly,272 although they have distinguished requirements
based upon the congressional position sought from requirements
based exclusively on a state position held. For instance, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court sustained a requirement for local district
attorneys to resign from office prior to running for election to any
other office, including one in Congress.2 73 The court held the require-
ment was an obligation of the state office already held and was neither
a bar to or a qualification for Congress.2 74 The opinion was tailored
carefully to follow the same court's earlier holding that the state con-
stitution could not prevent a state judge from becoming a candidate
for United States Senator, although one person could not run for both
offices simultaneously.2 75
A different representation of the issue might lead to a different
result. The best illustration, which we have already discussed,2 76 is to
characterize term limits simply as attempts to regulate the "manner"
of election and to assume that they are an extension of the power
expressly reserved to the states by the Elections Clause in Article I. It
also means that how one characterizes the burdens imposed by a par-
ticular measure is extraordinarily important. In the Washington State
case the court found that the initiative was "unduly restrictive. '277
The plain purpose of the measure was to "prevent[ ] a disfavored
group of candidates from being elected at all,"278 and the alternate
270. See, e.g., Ekwall, 30 P.2d at 1040; O'Connor, 17 N.Y.S.2d at 759; Stockton, 106
P.2d at 331; Crane, 197 P.2d at 867, 874.
271. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 151 N.E.2d 508, 515 (Ind. 1958).
272. At least one court simply defined qualifications to be synonymous with "eligibility
and competency to hold the office if chosen." Id. at 511.
273. Oklahoma State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, 776 (Okla. 1980). This is
consistent with the position the Court took in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
274. Coats, 610 P.2d. at 780.
275. Riley v. Cordell, 194 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1948).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 189-215.
277. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
278. Id. at 1081.
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avenue of write-in candidacy was illusory.279 The same was true in
Arkansas where "[t]hese glimmers of opportunity" were "so faint"
that the limits imposed on federal terms could not withstand scru-
tiny.280 Interestingly enough, however, limits on state officeholders in
Arkansas were "sufficiently rational and even compelling when
weighed against the residual burden placed on the rights and privi-
leges of elected officeholders and those desiring to support them."'281
Why the electoral prospects of state office candidates were any less
faint than their congressional counterparts was never explained.282
Perhaps the assumption was that the state interest in regulating state
offices was so compelling that any barrier, even one suspect under the
tolerant Burdick standard, was permissible.
In addition, decisions evaluating various limits on congressional
eligibility have uniformly omitted any discussion of the extent to
which Section 2 might govern the issue. This omission is easily under-
stood given the nature of the opinion writing process: One opinion
will tend to follow the next, in form as well as in substance. More
importantly, whether a law violates the Qualifications Clauses is an
inquiry independent from other constitutional tests. A limit on candi-
dacy may, for example, violate the Qualifications Clauses, but not
abridge the First Amendment right to vote for the candidate of one's
choice. In the same manner, a term limit might not constitute a quali-
fication, but may nevertheless "deny" or "in any way abridge" the
right to vote in ways contemplated by Section 2.
The converse might also be true; there is no reason a single regu-
lation must affect federalism and the right to vote in exactly the same
manner or extent. The resulting inquiry is likely to turn on matters of
degree: Is a term limit an alteration of the attributes that make a can-
didate competent to hold office? More specifically, does it alter these
attributes to such an extent as to be a "qualification"? An independ-
ent question is whether a term limit is a sufficient abridgment of the
right of the citizen to vote for the candidate of choice, a denial or
279. Id.
280. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994).
281. Id. at 360.
282. The court stated it had "already referred in this opinion to those legitimate inter-
ests in the political process which are protected under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." Id. at 359. The reference was to its discussion of standing, within which it cited
Anderson and Thorsted. As indicated, see supra text accompanying notes 240-241, Ander-
son spoke of the "integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself," 460 U.S. at 788
n.9, a characterization of term limits Judge Dwyer rejected. See Thorsted, 841 F. Supp. at
1081.
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abridgment of the right to vote. A term limit may not so change the
attributes required to hold or attain an office as to be a superadded
qualification, but still may abridge the right of citizens to vote in some
lesser way. Such a limit, without actually violating the Qualifications
Clauses, will violate Section 2.
Finally, there is the problem of amendments to the Constitution.
The Qualifications Clauses must be read in the light of all of the
amendments that might modify them. State regulation of the right to
vote is the sole object of the Fifteenth Amendment and a major con-
cern of the Fourteenth, and these amendments possibly change the
textual delimitation of state powers referred to in the original text of
the Constitution. As the Court recognized in Guinn v. United States,
"the very command of the [Fifteenth] Amendment recognizes the pos-
session of the general power by the State, since the Amendment seeks
to regulate its exercise as to the particular subject with which it
deals. ' 283 Thus, to the extent either Amendment enshrines an allow-
ance of state denial or abridgment of the right to vote, all earlier and
inconsistent clauses were modified.
III. Section 2 and State-Imposed Term Limits:
The Analytic Matrix
As we stressed at the outset, perhaps the most important element
of the term-limits debate is the extent to which one can postulate the
framers' dispositive intent. Those relying on Powell in this regard fo-
cus on what they believe to be the intent of the Qualifications Clauses,
arguing there is no room for state action. Clearly, the rejection of the
Tucker amendments by the First Congress provides one possible affir-
mation of the framers' desire to leave matters to the people, via the
elective process, rather than mechanical limits. But Jefferson appears
to have disagreed, and the meaning of "the record" is less clear than
originally foreseen. Moreover, whatever that original intent might
have been in 1787, it is subject to and qualified by any intervening
actions of the people, speaking through the amendment process out-
lined in Article V. The missing constitutional ingredient, up until
now, has been Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
283. 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915).
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A. The Drafting and Enforcement of Section 2: From a "Most
Important" Provision to "Quaint Comer of the Constitution"
We have already noted that modem observers tend to character-
ize Section 2 as an "historical curiosity" and suggest that
"[p]resumably, the efficacy of other efforts to vindicate the right to
vote, precludes any further effort to invoke this provision of the Con-
stitution.' '284 This does not mean Section 2 is never discussed in the
context of voting rights. But when it is mentioned, it is generally
treated as a pawn in the larger dispute over the original intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment,2 5 an invocation that does little to imbue this
provision with independent value or significance. We suspect, how-
ever, that Section 2 may soon become something more than "[a]
quaint comer of the Constitution, read only by the antiquarian, [that
is] of no consequence whatever. ''286
The individuals who crafted the Fourteenth Amendment cer-
tainly had a different impression. Thaddeus Stevens, for example,
characterized what became Section 2 as "the most important [section]
in the article."' 287 This statement was notably disingenuous, for Ste-
vens and his allies had their eyes on more mundane matters than the
textually express objective of securing the vote for the recently freed
284. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 529
(Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 1978) [hereinafter CORWIN].
285. Compare Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation". The Activist Flight
from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 17 (1986) (Section 2's "limited sanction against
discrimination in voting bars an inference that it was prohibited altogether") and Klarman,
supra note 4, at 228 ("Section IWo... plainly assumed the lawfulness of racial discrimina-
tion in voting") with Komesar, supra note 4, at 8 ("Section two reflects only that racial
restrictions on voting were not included in section one. It does not necessarily imply that
they were excluded.").
286. Irving Younger, Prosecuting, 73 MINN. L. REV. 829, 845 (1989). The article is a
posthumous excerpt from Professor Younger's unpublished autobiography and details
some of the exploits of Victor Sharrow, a "Section 2 warrior" whose efforts we chronicle
infra at text accompanying notes 346-362.
287. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). The provisions of Section 1 were
described, in turn, simply as "just," with the purpose of that section being to "cure" a
constitutional "defect" by making these aspects of our "organic law" applicable against the
states. Id. The floor debates and some of the committee reports have been collected in
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CON-
TEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (Alfred
Alvins ed., 1967) [hereinafter Alvins] and STATTORY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES:
CIVIL Rioin-s (PART I) (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). The full report of the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction and an extensive commentary may in turn be found in THE JOUR-
NAL OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONGRESS, 1865-
1867, 50 (Benj. B. Kendrick ed., 1914) [hereinafter JOURNAL]. Unfortunately, each col-
lection omits some materials especially pertinent to our purposes. We have, accordingly,
cited the original records whenever possible.
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slaves by penalizing states that did not comply. Accordingly, the first
of the measures to emerge from the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion did not express the more familiar, and more frequently construed,
equal protection and due process guarantees ultimately set forth in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the proposal con-
sisted of a single section dealing with the apportionment of Repre-
sentatives, within which "denials" or "abridgments" of individuals "on
account of race or color" would result in the exclusion of "all persons
of such race or color ... from the basis of representation. 288
This approach to the drafting of what would become the Four-
teenth Amendment was one of two originally suggested within the
Committee, and the choices the Committee made in this regard are
instructive, for the rejected language took the direct route to freed-
man suffrage: "[A]ll provisions in the Constitution or laws of any
State, whereby any distinction is made in political or civil rights or
privileges, on account of race, creed or color, shall be inoperative and
void. ' 289 The bare record of the Journal of the Joint Committee does
not indicate why the later proposal became "the basis of their action,"
only that it did so by a vote of eleven in favor and three against.290
However, it is quite clear that there was considerable opposition
within both the Committee itself and Congress as a whole to any mea-
sure that would strip the states of their power to control suffrage and
elections. On January 22, 1866, the Committee rejected two proposals
that would have given Congress express control over "elective" rights
and "the elective franchise."'291 During the ensuing floor debate on
the emerging recommendations, proponents stressed that the pro-
posed Amendment left matters with the states, and that the decision
to do so was a pragmatic one. As Senator Howard stated:
It is very true, and I am sorry to be obliged to acknowledge it, that
this section of the amendment does not recognize the authority of
the United States over the question of suffrage in the several States
at all; nor does it recognize, much less secure, the right of suffrage to
the colored race. I wish to meet this question fairly and frankly; I
have nothing to conceal upon it; and I am perfectly free to say that
if I could have my own way, if my preferences could be carried out,
288. J. Res. 51, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). The measure passed in the House, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (1866), but failed in the Senate id. at 1289. For more
detailed recitations of the events leading to what we now know as Section 2 than is neces-
sary for our purposes, see FLACK, supra note 4, at 97-127, and Zuckerman, supra note 4, at
94-107.
289. JOURNAL, supra note 287, at 50.
290. Id. at 51.
291. Id. at 54-55.
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I certainly should secure suffrage to the colored race to some extent
at least. .... 292
The final version, he stressed, was a question not of what he, the Sen-
ate, or the House might wish, but
what will the Legislatures of the various States to whom these
amendments are to be submitted do in the premises; what is it likely
will meet the general approbation of the people who are to elect the
Legislatures, three fourths of whom must ratify our propositions
before they have the force of constitutional provisions? ...
The committee was of the opinion that the States were not pre-
pared to sanction so fundamental a change as would be the conces-
sion of the right of suffrage to the colored race.293
The result was "The second section leaves the right to regulate
the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with
that right. '294 The theory underlying the section was "few States
would exercise" this power "to any great extent, since the penalty was
so severe as to prevent it."295 What became Section 2 was then both
the focal point in the initial post-Civil War efforts to enfranchise the
newly freed slaves and, until the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment on February 3, 1870, the only available means for achieving that
end.
However, any suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment ren-
dered Section 2 superfluous is misleading.296 The Fifteenth Amend-
ment had the express purpose and effect of reversing the earlier
determination to avoid any direct grant of suffrage for the freed
slaves. But, as was the case with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
drafting and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment reflected a com-
plex amalgam of sensitivity to human rights and sheer politics. In his
notification of the Amendment's ratification to Congress, President
Grant conjured up the image of both the representation formula Sec-
tion 2 was designed to replace297 and the discredited Dred Scott v.
292. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 2766 (1866). Howard assumed the lead role in
securing passage in the Senate in the absence of the Chairman of the Committee, Senator
Fessenden, who was ill.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. FLACK, supra note 4, at 115-16. The individuals who framed the section would
likely not, however, have been particularly disappointed if the section was invoked, since,
as we will indicate shortly, there was something more afoot than a simple desire to see that
justice was done in state implementation of control over the franchise.
296. That is, as we have indicated, the characterization voiced in CORwIN, see supra
note 284, and other authorities, such as the Congressional Research Service edition of the
Constitution, supra note 2.
297. As ratified, the Constitution allocated Representatives "according to their respec-
tive Numbers, which shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free Persons...
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Sandford298 when he described the Amendment as one "which makes
at once 4,000,000 people voters who were heretofore declared by the
highest tribunal in the land not citizens of the United States, nor eligi-
ble to become so . . ",299 President Grant then praised the new
Amendment as "a measure of grander importance than any other one
act of the kind from the foundation of our free Government to the
present day. '300 For the individuals who introduced and supported it,
however, the "controlling motive" behind the Fifteenth Amendment
was "the need of supplying a new basis for the continuance of con-
gressional control over the suffrage conditions of the Southern
States,"301 and, in particular, "to save the Republican party from de-
feat by granting universal Negro suffrage by an amendment .... ,,302
It is just as important to recognize that, whatever else the actual
impact of the Fifteenth Amendment on Section 2 might be, it was
manifestly not a measure that was intended to disturb the threshold
powers of the states. As the Court emphasized in its first examination
of the later Amendment:
The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage
upon any one. It prevents the States, or the United States, however,
from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the
United States over another on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. Before its adoption, this could be done. It
was as much within the power of a State to exclude citizens of the
United States from voting on account of race, &c., as it was on ac-
count of age, property, or education.303
The state's inherent power to exclude would-be voters was, obviously,
subject to the possible sanction of a proportionate reduction, but that
and ... three fifths of all other Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868).
Section 2 changed this by "counting the whole number of persons in each State," U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2, although it did retain the exclusion for "Indians not taxed." Id.
298. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
299. President Ulysses S. Grant, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives
(Mar. 30, 1870) in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
1789-1897, at 55-56 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898).
300. Id.
301. JOHN M. MATHEWS, THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HIsTORY OF THE FIF-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 21 (1909). Mathews attributes this to an emerging realization that
"most of the ex-Confederate States had in large measure been rehabilitated" in the wake
of the Fourteenth Amendment and legislative measures that flowed from it. Id. at 20-21.
302. WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 34 (1965). Gillette assigns this motive to Thaddeus Stevens and
notes that Stevens's views on the matter of suffrage shifted as the political tides ebbed and
flowed. Id. at 35. See also id. at 56-58 (noting threats to passage posed by "Republican
dissension" and the embrace of "Negro suffrage as a political necessity" by many northern
Republicans).
303. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875).
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power did exist. "The States, as a general rule, regulated in their own
way all the details of all elections. They prescribed the qualifications
of voters, and the manner in which those offering to vote at an elec-
tion should make known their qualifications to the officers in
charge." 304
This view of state authority was consistent with a line of decisions
in which the Court stressed repeatedly that "[t]he right to vote in-
tended to be protected refers to the right to vote as established by the
laws and constitution of the State. '305 Moreover, these interpreta-
tions conveyed a second perspective on the "right" to vote that re-
mains in force today, one that recognizes that "while the right of
suffrage is established and guaranteed by the Constitution ... it is
subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discrimina-
tory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting
pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed. ' 30 6 The Court's
initial, negative view of a Fifteenth Amendment that conferred "no
affirmative right to the colored man to vote" 307 gradually changed to a
more positive image within which "it is easy to see that under some
circumstances [the Amendment] may operate as the immediate source
of a right to vote. '308 The Court would presage future developments,
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, with its recognition that "[tihough not re-
garded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by
society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless
[voting] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preserva-
tive of all rights. '30 9 Nevertheless, the promise implicit in these and
similar statements remained largely unfulfilled, "a seed planted for
the future, struggling for life in the harsh soil of post-reconstruction
voting rights repression. '310
Furthermore, the Fifteenth Amendment made Section 2 unneces-
sary only if Section 2's sole objective was to enfranchise the freedmen
by exacting a penalty for the failure to do so. As the history of Sec-
tion 2's adoption indicates, that was not what many of the key framers
304. Id. at 219.
305. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1892).
306. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). In Lassiter
the Court sustained a literacy test requirement, id. at 51-52, a decision that, as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, remains valid today.
307. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884) (citing Reese, 92 U.S. at 218).
308. Id.
309. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1885).
310. Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fif-
teenth Amendment, 64 NEa. L. Rnv. 389, 395 (1985).
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actually had in mind.311 Rather, Section 2 was primarily intended as a
means by which the Republicans would preserve their political power.
The Republican members of the Committee and Congress were
acutely aware of the fact that giving the vote to millions of freedmen
in the South would mean a substantial increase in the number of con-
gressional seats allocated to their opponents. Fearing the conse-
quences of such a shift in the political balance, the proportional
reduction provision in Section 2 became a way to ensure the southern
states would not reap such benefits. This meant "in the end the deter-
mination of the congressional plan of reconstruction was not left to
the most able and statesmanlike congressmen, but to mere politicians
who acted almost entirely from motives of party advantage. ' 312 In
practical terms, it also meant the implementation of the section's com-
mands remained subject to the ebb and flow of the political tides.
Thus, when Thaddeus Stevens stressed that the provisions of the
amendment were not self-executing and, in particular, that Congress
"must legislate for the purpose of ascertaining the basis of representa-
tion, ' 313 he predicted a fact of life that would render Section 2 largely
dormant for over a century. 31 4
While Congress initially seemed to take the promise implicit in
the constitutional command seriously, the first effort to enforce Sec-
tion 2 died quickly. Congress adjourned before the House could act
on a Senate resolution "inquir[ing] into the propriety" of "report[ing]
a bill for the apportionment of representatives in compliance with the
provision of section two of the fourteenth amendment .... 315 And
311. Indeed, some have argued "[e]nfranchisement of the colored race at that time was
a political mistake, even in the best interest of the colored race." WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE,
LECTURES ON THE FOURTEENTH ARTICLE OF AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 15 (1898). Guthrie characterized Section 2 as "fair and just," id.. and
stated, "Had the South promptly and graciously accepted this clause ... and afforded some
protection to the negroes, no one can doubt that the Fifteenth Amendment would never
have been adopted." Id.
312. JOURNAL, supra note 287, at 294-95.
313. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2544 (1866). We do not believe this charac-
terization means courts have no role in enforcing the amendment, an interpretative ap-
proach some have taken. See infra text accompanying notes 330-332. Rather, we read
Stevens's remarks as an expression of a practical problem, the need to ascertain the
number of Representatives authorized and the distribution of those seats between the
states.
314. In stating this we only concede the obvious, that the treatment of Section 2 by the
Congress and the courts makes it clear that there is as yet no room for Section 2 in the
modern political inn. We do not, quite obviously, believe these judgments are constitution-
ally sound.
315. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 158 (1868) (statements of Senators Harlan
and Trumbull). The resolution was directed to the Committee on the Judiciary and, as
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while compliance with Section 2 became a major theme in the devel-
opment of the Ninth Census in 1870, actual execution of that process
produced less than satisfying results. The Director of the Census, "in
compliance with what was believed to be the requirements of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the Constitution," added questions to
the census "for determining these two classes of the population." 316
The collected data was subsequently considered by the Forty-Second
Congress,3 17 and a provision that would have had the effect of actually
reducing representation after adoption of the 1872 apportionment was
approved.31 8 During that apportionment, however, the complaint was
voiced that "[t]he census takers do not appear to have comprehended
it, and certainly have failed to grapple with it.... The small numbers
set down in the census tables to each State as affected by this amend-
ment are confessedly unreliable, and, if considered, will not materially
affect the result. '319 Consequently, the general consensus was that the
census reports detailed "abridgments" that were "too insignificant" to
warrant any action.3 20
introduced, would have "instructed" the Committee to report such a bill. Id. Senator
Trumbull, however, found that to be "a pretty strong resolution," id., and proposed the
modification, which was accepted.
316. Report of the Superintendent of the Ninth Census, 1 NINTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES xxviii (1872). This action followed on the heels of extensive congressional
debate about the matter, the details of which, along with those of subsequent events, may
be found in Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 107-16. It is worth noting that the census report
stated "[n]o anticipations were entertained that the results of these inquiries would be of
value for the purpose for which directly they were introduced" and the task was under-
taken because "the Department would not be clear if it neglected" to do so. 1 NINTH
CENSUS, supra at xxviii.
317. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1872).
318. Id. at 713. As we indicate, see infra text accompanying note 485, this approach
suggests individuals considering enforcement of Section 2 at the time it was framed did not
believe the seats lost would be reallocated to other states.
319. Id. at 670 (remarks of Sen. Morrill). See also id. at 83 ("The Secretary of Interior
says officially that the result is not satisfactory or trustworthy."). For statements indicating
a desire to enforce Section 2, see id. at 65 (Rep. Willard, noting the property qualifications
in Pennsylvania and Georgia); id. at 83 (Rep. Willard, noting Georgia tax to be paid by all
males over 22). What was or was not an abridgment was, however, a matter of perspective,
given Congressman Shellabarger's contention that Ohio's one-year residency requirement
was "a mere regulation to secure the purity of election." Id. at 81.
320. The data in the table, id. at 83, suggest the need for caution. Even leaving aside
the casualties inflicted during the Civil War and the fact that women and children were part
of the overall population count, it is difficult to believe that of the 1,184,109 persons living
in Georgia, only 234,971 were "[m]ale citizens of the United States 21 years of age and
upward," and that of those only 1,064-in a state that had a poll tax-had their right to
vote abridged. Similar anomalies were evident in the numbers for each southern state.
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Section 2's commands were added to the United States Code in
1872,321 and serious attempts to compel Congress to recognize and
invoke Section 2 in recognition of the South's refusal to let African-
Americans vote were made at the turn of the century and in the pe-
riod immediately preceding the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.322 Many individuals argued vigorously for Section 2 to be in-
voked to force Southern states to remove the various invidious imped-
iments those states placed in the path of citizens attempting to
exercise the franchise. 323 These efforts were made in vain and did not
lead to anything even remotely approximating a declaration by Con-
gress recognizing that representation "shall" be reduced whenever the
right to vote is denied or in any way abridged. Rather, the initiatives
invariably died in committee. These failures to act tended to verify
the absence of a collective will to secure equality of treatment. They
also underscored the extent to which Section 2's arguably draconian
remedies created a poison pill no sensible politician could be induced
to swallow.
The same failure to act, unfortunately, describes the actions of
the courts, which have generally treated Section 2 as a provision that
posed problems best avoided. There have been rare exceptions. In
1873, for example, Justice Hunt-sitting as a Circuit Justice in New
York-rejected Susan B. Anthony's claim that she had the right to
vote, observing that Section 2
assume[s] that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the especial
object of its protection, [and] it assumes and admits the right of a
state, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the
defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of
the male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male
inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to
the states as a state's right.324
321. Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. XI, § 6, 17 Stat. 29. This statutory version of Section 2
remains on the books today as 2 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
322. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445. For a general discussion of the attempts to in-
voke Section 2, see Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 116-24.
323. Both the Bonfield and Margolis articles, supra note 4, for example, were written
as eloquent but ultimately unsuccessful briefs for congressional and judicial enforcement of
Section 2.
324. United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 831 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459)
(emphasis added). Justice Hunt supported this approach by stressing the express protec-
tion of male rights in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. He also cited the
now infamous Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), a decision in which-to
his credit-he did not join the declaration that "[t]he natural and proper timidity and deli-
cacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
[Vol. 45
SECTION 2 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
However, misogyny aside, the courts have tended to shy away from
any attempt to invoke Section 2. Thus, when Eugene Dennis argued
that one member of the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties, John E. Rankin of Mississippi, "[was] not a member of Congress
at all" in light of "the election laws and practice of Mississippi,"32 the
court of appeals characterized the assertion that the Committee's ac-
tion was invalid as "closely approach[ing] the fantastic" and "sheer
nonsense, '326 citing in support of its conclusion one of the very few
"reasoned" explications of Section 2, Saunders v. Wilkins.327
In Saunders the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected
an attempt to use Section 2 to attack the Virginia poll tax. Saunders
had sued to have his name placed on the ballot in the 1944 election as
a candidate for the office of "member of the House of Representa-
tives from the State at large," alleging that the poll tax had the pur-
pose and effect of abridging the right to vote and required both
reduction in the state's delegation and election of the remaining mem-
bers at-large.328 The court dismissed his complaint, holding "this con-
tention presents a question political in its nature which must be
determined by the legislative branch of the government and is not
justiciable. ''329
This conclusion, given then-prevailing notions of what constituted
a political question, was probably appropriate. Prior to Baker v. Carr,
the Court treated virtually every case posing representation issues as
one subject to the "exclusive authority" of Congress, making them a
325. Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1948). Dennis's conviction
was, of course, subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in an abandonment of the
First Amendment in the face of the McCarthy-fueled Red Scare of the period. See Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). As we have already noted, see supra note 259, Sena-
tor McCarthy was the beneficiary of a decision that struck down a state-imposed limit on
his candidacy. The invocation of Section 2 by one of his victims is, accordingly, paradoxi-
cal, given what we suspect Section 2's proper role might be vis-a-vis such limitations.
326. Dennis, 171 F.2d at 992-93.
327. 152 F.2d 235, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 825. As we
make clear, our characterization of the decision as "reasoned" refers only to the fact that
the court purported to examine the issue with some care. Id. at 235-36.
328. Virginia was entitled to nine Representatives under the 1940 reapportionment.
Saunders argued the poll tax abridged the right to vote of 60% of the population and
required the delegation be reduced to four. If that was the case, the Representatives
would need to be elected at large, consistent with the Court's holding in Smiley v. HoIm,
285 U.S. 355 (1932). Saunders also maintained the tax posed equal protection problems, a
contention dismissed on the authority of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), in which
the Court, citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), held that "the State
may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate." Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283.
329. Saunders, 152 F.2d at 237.
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"political thicket" it ought not enter.330 The tortured logic of Saun-
ders, however, revealed a court struggling to avoid the issue, rather
than one trying to determine whether the Constitution had been vio-
lated. The question presented was "political," the court reasoned, be-
cause of the uncertain effect of poll taxes "or other qualifications for
voting" in other states, if and when Section 2 was applied to the prac-
tices of other states.331 We find it difficult to understand, however,
what difference possible loss of representation in other states made.
The complaint before the court did not require it to determine the
overall composition of Congress, which at that time arguably was a
political determination.332 The central issue in Saunders was whether
an abridgment existed in Virginia, and, if so, whether there should be
a reduction of Virginia's total number of representatives from the nine
to which Congress had declared it entitled.
Most courts subsequently recognized, as Professor Emerson pre-
dicted,333 that the holding in Saunders would not survive the Court's
reassessment of the political question doctrine in Baker.334 Other ju-
dicial roadblocks were needed, and soon appeared. In Lampkin v.
Connor,335 for example, the plaintiffs attacked a variety of allegedly
discriminatory voting practices in three southern states. The district
court dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing and, in the alternative, that they could not obtain "the relief they
seek" since Congress had not expressly "implemented" Section 2.336
Once again, the logic embraced was suspect. With regard to the
standing question, the court stated it would be "sheer speculation"
that an alteration in the allocation of representatives would follow if
Section 2 were applied.337 The court also alleged it was "problemati-
cal" that the states in question, if confronted by the spectre of reduc-
tion in representation, would end the disputed practices. 338 The first
330. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554, 556 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
331. Saunders, 152 F.2d at 238.
332. However, that issue is now clearly justiciable. See United States Dep't Commerce
v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992) (rejecting state challenge to the loss of one seat after the
1990 census, but finding the issue justiciable).
333. "Similarly, [Baker] may even open up such questions as federal court enforcement
of Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment .... Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment
and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (1962).
334. See, e.g., Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Sharrow, 309 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1962).
335. 239 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965).
336. Id. at 762.
337. Id. at 760.
338. Id. at 762.
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of these assertions ignored the plain language of both Section 2 and
the parallel United States Code provision, which declare that repre-
sentation shall be reduced, not that it might be reduced, if only one of
the constitutional actors finds the will to do so. The second assertion,
that a state might opt to continue the improper practice, in turn, is
irrelevant. Section 2 was not inserted in the Fourteenth Amendment
as a declaration that states must extend the franchise. Instead, it was
the product of a deliberate decision to offer the states an option re-
garding the scope of the right to vote and to signal the consequences if
a state decided to deny, or in any way abridge, the voting rights of
particular individuals.
The argument regarding congressional implementation rested on
the assumption that a lack of data documenting the extent to which
the right to vote had been denied or abridged ended the matter. The
court stressed that Congress had not asked the Census Bureau to col-
lect the information and that the President, who is to inform Congress
as to "the number of Representatives to which each state would be
entitled, '339 could not make the appropriate factual determinations. 340
This is, to say the least, a curious approach to what would otherwise
appear to be a constitutional mandate. Courts do. not, for example,
characterize equal protection or due process claims mounted pursuant
to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as ones in which the avail-
ability of constitutional protection depends on the extent to which
Congress has acted. Indeed, the right to be free from invidious racial
discrimination in the public schools was recognized in spite of congres-
sional inaction and the continuing enforcement of such policies in the
schools of the District of Columbia.341 Moreover, one also wonders
just what congressional action is required, since the command articu-
lated in Section 2 also appears in the United States Code. When the
district court stated in Lampkin that the parallel provision in the
United States Code "is merely declaratory of § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and "does not implement that constitutional provi-
sion,"342 it chose to ignore a constitutionally enacted expression of na-
tional policy because Congress had not previously taken some
indeterminate additional steps, a state of affairs that stands the
Supremacy Clause on its head.
339. 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
340. The court characterized "the controversy here" as one "concem[ing] only the
question of legal authority without involving a factual dispute," making it fit for summary
judgment. Lampkin, 239 F. Supp. at 763.
341. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
342. Lampkin, 239 F. Supp. at 766 n.13.
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court ruling in Lampkin
in the light of the subsequent passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, an action the court characterized as "Congress ... select[ing] its
own method of insuring the right of all citizens to vote. '343 The panel
found "Congress has, thus, acted vigorously and comprehensively to
remove the obstacles to voting of which the appellants complain" and
that allowing the suit to go forward "would not afford [these actions]
the respect an Act of Congress deserves. ' ' 344 It cautioned, however,
that "we think it also premature to conclude that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not mean what it appears to say. '345
This statement seems to reject the district court's suspect approach to
Lampkin's Section 2 claim and to affirm that Section 2 may still be
invoked. However, it would be a mistake to read too much into this,
for Section 2 continues to be honored more in the breach than the
observance, as the futile efforts of Victor Sharrow, on Section 2's be-
half, establish.
Sharrow, described by the late Professor Younger as Section 2's
"only champion," was the aberrant sort of person who, while in law
school, "did not rest content with merely reading the opinions in the
case book; he read the Constitution itself. And in the Constitution he
made what was to him a remarkable discovery. ''34s Obviously, that
find was Section 2, which Sharrow embraced with a fervor that gener-
ated innumerable lawsuits and a privately published book expressing
his disdain for those who could not see that the single "living provi-
sion providing for the apportionment of Representation" was "the
one and only [S]ection 2 of the 14th Amendment. '347
Sharrow mounted, as far as we can determine, at least ten legal
assaults invoking Section 2, each of which failed.348 The first appar-
ently occurred in 1960, when he refused to fill out the required census
343. Lampkin v. Connor, 360 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
344. Id. at 511.
345. Id. at 512.
346. Younger, supra note 286, at 841, 845.
347. VICTOR SHARROW, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 58
(1960). The book is a delight-in a perverse sort of way. It was written by someone who
reminded the reader that "Victor Sharrow rhymes with Clarence Darrow" and who pre-
dicted, incorrectly, that the book would "cause the biggest political explosion in the United
States since the 'century' old, misnamed, Civil War .... Id. at 1.
348. These include the decisions we discuss below, as well as Sharrow v. Reagan, 697
F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1982); Sharrow v. Myerson, 646 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 939 (1981); Sharrow v. Holtzman, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980). There are no lower court citations for another decision, Sharrow v. Abzug,
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974).
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form "'specifically to raise a constitutional case and controversy to
determine whether the census law was constitutional.' '349 Sharrow
was convicted of violating the statutory requirement that one answer
census questions.350 He appealed, but the court rejected his attempt
to invoke Section 2, stating "[t]he denial of the suffrage is a complex
question, and it has been thought inappropriate to use census forms in
order to obtain information relative thereto."351 That being the case,
"there was nothing unconstitutional in the omission from the census
form of a question relating to disenfranchisement. '352
Chief Judge Lumbard, in a concurring opinion, made it clear the
only issue for the panel, vis-a-vis the conviction, was whether the re-
quirement that one answer census questions was itself constitu-
tional.353 Sharrow, accordingly, took a new tack, arguing in a series of
cases that the Census Bureau had violated the implicit command of
Section 2 by failing to collect information regarding denials or abridg-
ments of the right to vote.354 The courts conceded that Sharrow
presented complex and potentially important constitutional questions,
assuming a denial or abridgment had occurred.35 5 The problem, of
course, was that the Census Bureau had not gathered the data, and
Sharrow himself had not "undertake[n] the Herculean task of compil-
ing the necessary statistics," 356 to demonstrate-at least to the courts'
349. United States v. Sharrow, 309 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1962) (quoting Sharrow affida-
vit), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 949, reh'g denied, 372 U.S. 982 (1963). We characterize this as
the first "apparent" case; there is a reference in another decision to "a civil suit com-
menced in 1960 in the District of Columbia" that "attacked that year's census." Sharrow v.
Brown, 319 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting Sharrow v. Eisenhower, No. 60
Civ. 3569 (D.D.C. 1960), affd, 447 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 968, reh'g
denied, 405 U.S. 1076 (1972)).
350. Professor Younger, who handled the matter for the government, tells the story in
Younger, supra note 286, at 840-45.
351. Sharrow, 309 F.2d at 80 (citing 1 NINTH CENSUS oF THE UNIrED STATES (1870)).
The statement is clearly wrong in one important respect because the information was col-
lected in 1870. See supra notes 316-320.
352. Sharrow, 309 F.2d at 80.
353. Id. (Lumbard, CJ., concurring).
354. Sharrow v. Fish, 501 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 659 F.2d 1062 (1st Cir.
1981); Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir.
1978); Sharrow v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 968, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1076 (1972).
355. See, e.g., Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d at 96 ("We agree that an increased State
delegation would benefit individual citizens of New York.").
356. ld. at 97.
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satisfaction-the "alleged continued disenfranchisement of voters in
States. '357 Once again, Sharrow lacked standing.3 58
Quite apparent in these decisions is a judicial inclination to avoid,
rather than resolve, the issues. Some of the courts' hesitancy was
Sharrow's fault: he arguably sued the wrong people359 and raised the
wrong claims.3 60 However, if "apportionment practice would seem to
indicate that at least the first sentence of Section 2 has been consid-
ered mandatory," 361 we wonder why the second is not also, unless
"shall" somehow changes meaning in the transition from apportion-
ment to reduction in representation.3 62 Moreover, it is difficult to un-
derstand why Victor Sharrow was not allowed to challenge the
candidacy of someone running for a seat that might not legally exist or
why, in the alternative, the Census Bureau is not obligated to gather
the data necessary to determine whether there is an office for which a
candidate may run.
B. Reappraising Section 2: Idle Comment or Constitutional Command?
Today, Section 2-when discussed at all-is generally character-
ized as a provision "that became a part of the Fourteenth Amendment
largely through the accident of political exigency rather than through
the relation which it bore to the other sections of the Amendment. '363
It is, by virtue of "the efficacy of the other efforts to vindicate the right
to vote,"364 relegated to the constitutional backwaters. Our reading of
the record leads us to the conclusion that these impressions are incor-
rect. Moreover, little can be found in the limited amount of judicial or
scholarly debate that has taken place to disabuse us of this conclusion.
357. Sharrow v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. at 1016. See also Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp.
at 325 (Sharrow "has not established that the alleged failure to enforce" Section 2 "has
resulted in a detriment to his rights of representation").
358. See Sharrow v. Fish, 501 F. Supp. at 204; Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp. at 325;
Sharrow v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. at 1016.
359. Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d at 97-98 ("Sharrow has not sued the Secretary of
Commerce, nor the President, nor the Clerk of the House of Representatives."). This,
presumably, was why he selected Ronald Reagan as his target in the equally unsuccessful,
but unreported, Sharrow v. Reagan, 697 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1982).
360. Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d at 98 ("Because of our disposition of the present
appeal, we do not reach many of the difficult problems of constitutional interpretation
raised by [Section 2] not argued by Sharrow.").
361. Id. at 98 n.9.
362. As we indicate elsewhere, see infra note 437 and accompanying text, "shall" is the
language of command, "mandatory and not precatory." Banner Indus. v. Central States
Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1285, 1288 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989).
363. MATHEWS, supra note 301, at 14.
364. CORWIN, supra note 284, at 529.
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The most important champion of Section 2 was the second Justice
Harlan, who argued vigorously in his dissent in Reynolds v. Sims that
Section 2 "expressly recognizes the States' power to deny 'or in any
way' abridge the right of their inhabitants to vote for the members of
the [State] Legislature. '365 In a subsequent dissenting opinion, he fur-
ther observed, in an almost plaintive manner, "If that history does not
prove what I think it does, we are at least entitled to be told why. '366
Justice Harlan stressed that "[t]he [Fourteenth] Amendment is a
single text"3 67 and insisted that "[t]he comprehensive scope of the sec-
ond section and its particular reference to the state legislatures pre-
clude the suggestion that the first section was intended to have the
result reached by the Court today.1368 In this instance, the "result"
that concerned him was the belief that the Equal Protection Clause
somehow restricted certain choices available to the states, at least as a
matter of the original understanding of the Amendment.3 69 Probing
deeply into the history and events surrounding the drafting and adop-
tion of the Amendment, Justice Harlan concluded that Congress "de-
liberately chose not to interfere with the States' plenary power... to
control voting rights because [they] believed that if such restrictions
were included, the Amendment would not be adopted. '370 Thus, as
discussed previously, the states retained the "express power" to "deny
or abridge" a "right" they granted, subject only to the "remedy" set
forth in Section 2, if and when the states acted in that manner.
As various commentators have stressed, Justice Harlan's analysis
has never been directly addressed by other members of the Court.
Neither Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Reynolds,
nor Justice Stewart, performing the same task in Carrington, dealt ex-
pressly with what Justice Harlan had to say, a silence commentators
365. 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
366. Carrington v. Rash , 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As we will
note, see infra 385-387, the Court arguably provided the answer in Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985), albeit in a way neither express nor, in our estimation, definitive.
367. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 594 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
368. Id.
369. See id. at 590-91 ("[H]ad the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter,
it would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the
States in choosing any democratic method they pleased for the apportionment of their
legislatures.").
370. Id. at 607 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan's examination of the record appears
id. at 595-608 and stresses, among other facts, statements of the individual framers of the
amendment to the effect that "'It]he second section leaves the right to regulate the elective
franchise with the States, and does not meddle with that right."' Id. at 601 (quoting Sena-
tor Howard, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)).
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have found "remarkable and confounding" 371 for it seemed "tacitly to
have conceded the argument, if not the vote. '372 This has prompted
even those observers who harbor reservations about Justice Harlan's
conclusions to concede that "[t]he persistence with which [he] has
maintained his position is completely understandable," since
"[n]either in [Reynolds] nor in any of the other reapportionment cases
did any member of the Court fault [his] historical presentation. '373
Despite the lack of rebuttal from other members of the Court, it has
not led them to embrace his position, largely because of a belief that
"the language of the Equal Protection Clause 'is plainly capable of
being applied to all subjects of state legislation' and it is broad enough
to include the claim to political equality recognized in the Reappor-
tionment Cases. '374
An abiding belief that the exalted commands of Section 1 should
be read expansively does not mean Justice Harlan's reading of Section
2 is incorrect. Rather, advocates for an appropriately "modem" inter-
pretation argue Justice Harlan's views should be discounted in light of
competing objectives, goals to be attained largely through a more
"elastic" reading of the interrelationship between Sections 1 and 2,
recognizing that "contemporary circumstances, scarcely foreseeable
even by the most visionary reconstructionists, are so vastly differ-
ent. '375 This is not necessarily an inappropriate approach to a Consti-
tution that lacks "the prolixity of a legal code" and whose "nature,
therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which com-
pose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects them-
selves. '376 Nevertheless, it is an approach to the text that ignores,
rather than explains, the individual role and meaning of its constituent
parts. Such an approach, arguably, is a luxury academics enjoy. But
371. Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One
Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 75.
372. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 36.
373. Id. at 35.
374. Auerbach, supra note 371, at 75 (quoting Alexander Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-61 (1955)). See also The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 248,249 (1964) ("Mr. Justice Harlan's histor-
ical evidence is persuasive, and a rebuttal must look beyond the apparent intent of the
framers to the organic nature of the Constitution.").
375. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 37.
376. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). As we have stressed,
see supra text accompanying notes 311-314, there is ample room to dispute just what the
"important objects designated" within the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments might
actually have been. For current purposes, we simply note the language of the amendments
themselves and the conclusions that follow.
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we would normally expect that the Court itself would refuse to remain
silent in the face of a position espoused with the sort of vehemence
employed by Justice Harlan. Quite the contrary, the Court has been
surprisingly unwilling to respond to the challenge in the only post-
Reynolds cases in which Section 2 has been mentioned, Richardson v.
Ramirez377 and Hunter v. Underwood.378
In Richardson the Court considered an equal protection chal-
lenge to California's decision to deny the voting franchise to three
convicted felons who had been paroled. Focusing directly on the lan-
guage in Section 2 that made an exception for "participation in rebel-
lion or other crime," the Court held that
the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the historical
and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability to state
laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distin-
guishing such laws from those other state limitations on the
franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause by this Court.379
The majority in Richardson acknowledged Justice Harlan's position in
Reynolds and Carrington, characterizing it as an assertion that "[Sec-
tion] 2 is the only part of the Amendment dealing with voting
rights. ' 38 0 But they stated they
[N]eed not go nearly so far as Mr. Justice Harlan, [given] the de-
monstrably sound proposition that [Section] 1, in dealing with vot-
ing rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a
form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the
less drastic sanction of reduced representation which [Section] 2 im-
posed for other forms of disenfranchisement. 381
Whether or not one need "go so far" as Justice Harlan, it was
apparent that most members of the Court were willing to make at
least a tacit concession to certain aspects of his reasoning, admissions
that are highly significant for our purposes. For example, the majority
in Richardson declared, "[T]he framers of the Amendment were pri-
marily concerned with the effect of reduced representation upon the
States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement which
were exempted from that consequence by the language with which we
are concerned here.' ' 38 They also rejected an attempt to characterize
377. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
378. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
379. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
380. Id. at 54-55.
381. Id. at 55.
382. Id. at 43.
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Section 2 as "an accident of political exigency," stressing "[ilt is as
much a part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and how
it became a part of the Amendment is less important than what it says
and what it means. ' 38 3 That meaning was captured by Justice Mar-
shall's dissent, in which he declared that Section 2 "put Southern
States to a choice-enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional
representation. ' 38 4 Thus, while the other members of the Court re-
mained silent in the face of Justice Harlan's assault, they seemed qui-
etly to apply that aspect of his analytic framework that treated
Sections 1 and 2 as parts of a whole.
Hunter, in turn, involved a provision in the Alabama Constitution
of 1901, disenfranchising felons who committed "'any crime . . . in-
volving moral turpitude. ' ' 38 5 The Court found that Section 182, while
neutral on its face, "was motivated by a desire to discriminate against
blacks on account of race and ... continues to this day to have that
effect. As such, it violates equal protection under Arlington
Heights.' 38 6 The Court considered, and rejected, an argument predi-
cated on Section 2, stating that "we are confident that Section 2 was
not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending
the enactment and operation of § 182 which otherwise violates Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 387 That depiction of Section 2,
of course, simply means that the Court will not use it to "revive" state
actions that otherwise run afoul of the Amendment, and is consistent
with the view expressed by some that "[S]ection two reflects only that
racial restrictions on voting were not included in section one. It does
not necessarily imply that they were excluded." 388 That proposition,
however, says nothing about what follows when a state action denies
or abridges in ways that do not reflect racial animus.
Justice Harlan's analysis has not been completely ignored. Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne, for one, examined the same history and reached
the opposite conclusion, albeit, as he noted, one predicated on empha-
sizing different portions of the record. Perhaps the most important
383. Id. at 55.
384. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, accordingly, quarreled not
with the majority's analysis of Section 2, so much as with what he characterized as its
assumption that the "special penalty" in Section 2 could be treated as "the exclusive rem-
edy for all forms of electoral representation." Id.
385. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223 (quoting ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182).
386. Id. at 233. That is, under the doctrine articulated in Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the state was unable to show the section
would have been enacted absent the "motivating" factor of racial discrimination.
387. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
388. Komesar, supra note 4, at 208.
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aspect of Van Alstyne's analysis is his emphatic rejection of Justice
Harlan's characterization of the Amendment as a "single text." Pro-
fessor Van Alstyne stressed that "the Fourteenth Amendment was a
package of proposals, the more significant of which were pieced to-
gether from independent bills offered by different men at different
times and originally debated in Congress as wholly separate amend-
ments. '38 9 This allowed him to read the equal protection guarantee in
Section 1 independently and expansively and meant he found no
problem in extending that provision to voting.
Professor Van Alstyne's approach has appeal, assuming that the
objective is to explain how the final package was crafted and that the
developmental process should dictate how one reads the language that
emerged. But these assumptions run contrary to established interpre-
tive canons, which postulate that one starts with the text and resorts to
secondary materials and rules of construction only when the text itself
is unclear. More to the point, the strength of Professor Van Alstyne's
arguments discounting the specific statements quoted by Justice
Harlan depends on our willingness to accept his version of events,
when the most he seemingly can say for it is that it "makes fully as
much sense . . . as the preemptive view proffered by Mr. Justice
Harlan." 390
In the immediate context of this concession, this means state-
ments by Thaddeus Stevens suggest "that § 2 no more recognizes a
right of states to disfranchise Negroes under § 1, than a separate stat-
ute forfeiting the right to vote of a criminal convicted of larceny rec-
ognizes his right to commit larceny."'391 The problem with this
comparison is that his example is, to say the least, infelicitous and at
odds with the actual history of Section 2. Criminal sanctions both rec-
ognize society's judgment that certain acts are not to be tolerated and
articulate a punishment scheme to be applied if and when these
prohibitions are ignored. But as we have already seen, Section 2 did
not tell the states they could not "deny" or otherwise "abridge" the
right to vote. Indeed, the individuals who crafted that provision went
to great lengths to explain both that the states retained that power and
389. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 43. Professor Van Alstyne is not the only one to
discuss Section 2, but his is the most detailed examination of Justice Harlan's position yet
made.
390. Id. at 58.
391. Id. at 59
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that Section 2 simply made it clear what the consequences would be if
they exercised it.392
Moreover, as the Court stressed in Richardson, Section 2 by its
express terms recognizes the right of states to deny the franchise for
"rebellion, or other crime. ' 393 This exception to the proportionate re-
duction mandate, using normal principles of construction, seems to
acknowledge a preexisting power while exempting from sanction one
aspect of its exercise. That is, using Justice Harlan's approach, voting
matters are left to the states, subject to the understanding that if a
state denies or abridges in any way whatever right to vote it might
confer, in ways other than those expressly excepted, then certain con-
sequences will follow.
As Professor Van Alstyne observes, that approach may have had
the immediate practical effect in 1866 of "preserving Republican con-
trol of Congress. '394 But it says nothing about how other matters-
discussed in other sections of the Amendment-play themselves out.
For example, Professor Van Alstyne quotes at length from a statement
by Representative Bingham in which Bingham described Section 2 as
simply "a penalty for a violation on the part of the people of any State
of the political right of franchise guarantied by the Constitution to
their free male fellow-citizens of full age." 395 This characterization,
repeated twice in response to questions from other individuals during
the debate, 396 seems damning-at least in response to, as Bingham
expressed it, whether the reduction provisions operate "in aid of the
[Article IV, Section 4] guarantee [of a Republican Form of Govern-
ment], not in avoidance of it.''397 But it is also a curious interpretation
since one does not normally expect to find penalties for violation of
the Constitution within the text itself. As Chief Justice Marshall made
clear long before the adoption of the Amendment, "[A]n act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. '398 That being the
392. See supra text accompanying notes 311-314 and infra text accompanying notes
400-401.
393. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
394. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 58.
395. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 431-32 (1866).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 432. Article IV, Section 4 states that "[tihe United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," and Justice Harlan's obser-
vations regard the impact of Section 2 on this promise. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
598-99 (1964). For a recent discussion of the treatment and implications of the Guarantee
Clause, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
398. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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case, there appears to be no need for a further "penalty," unless other
objectives are sought.399
One possible explanation is that Bingham believed it essential to
place the penalty within the Constitution itself, lest a state against
whom it was inflicted attempt to raise an Article IV, Section 4, objec-
tion if the penalty were merely the creature of statute. Interestingly,
Representative Boutwell seemed to have this view in mind in 1869
when he characterized Section 2 as "a political penalty for doing that
which in the first section it is declared the State has no right to do." 400
Boutwell's subsequent remarks, however, belie any notion that the
courts may not themselves recognize and impose the penalty:
We were then acting in the presence of the fact that many States of
the Union were doing that which the first section declared they had
no right to do. It was uncertain when Congress would exercise the
power conferred by the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment,
and in order that the States should not take advantage of their own
wrong during the period while Congress might be inactive a penalty
was provided.4°1
More to the point, one can certainly argue that the Court itself
recognized distinctions between and among the various sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the means to be employed to enforce
them. In The Civil Rights Cases, for example, the Court stressed a
close relationship between Sections I and 5 when it asked, with regard
to the latter provision:
To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate
legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws
and State acts, and thus to render them effectively null, void, and
innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress,
and this is the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to
legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legisla-
tion; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State
action, of the kind referred to.402
399. Unless, of course, the objective is not simply to protect rights, but to keep the
South in its conquered, dependent state. That, as we have indicated, was exactly what the
Radical Republicans sought, and we believe Professor Van Alstyne did not adequately
account for this reality.
400. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 558-60 (1869).
401. Id. With regard to the measures being debated, which extended suffrage to the
freedmen and tracked what eventually became the Fifteenth Amendment, Boutwell ob-
served "[p]ower was given to Congress to remedy this evil, and that power Congress is now
called upon to exercise." Id. One difficulty with this is that the vision of the Amendment
proposed by Stevens and Boutwell was not shared by all of their colleagues. Moreover,
their remarks are contrary to the then-appropriate distribution of powers reflected either
in the text of the Amendment itself or, as indicated above, in the decisions of the Court
that followed in its wake.
402. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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Viewed in this manner, Sections 1 and 5 articulate not only certain
guarantees, but also the means for attaining them-congressional ac-
tion. Section 2, in turn, expresses a slightly different goal and recog-
nizes, within the context of that objective, the more sweeping,
inherent authority states exercised in matters affecting the franchise.
And because of potential conflicts with other sections of the Constitu-
tion, Section 2 contained an express constitutional penalty.
This reading is entirely consistent with the then-accepted, albeit
now-discarded, characterization of voting as a mere political privilege
the state graciously confers. It also makes sense regardless of the ana-
lytic path taken: Harlan's unified view of the Amendment or Van Al-
styne's fragmented approach.
Taken together, either interpretation-that of Justice Harlan or
that of Professor Van Alstyne-is permissible, depending on which
pieces of the record one selects and how one chooses to view them.
This is not unusual given the problems posed when resorting to legis-
lative history.40 3 Of course, the problem need not arise if one posits
that the language of the Amendment is susceptible to a clear interpre-
tation. We believe such a clear interpretation is certainly possible,
particularly if one recognizes the political chicanery that attended the
drafting and embrace of Section 2.
More importantly, contemporaneous decisions of the Court
treated Section 2 as an express recognition of the inherent power of
the states over voting matters. In one of the very few cases squarely
to consider Section 2, Minor v. Happersett, the Court lent credence to
this view when-upon considering Section 2-it observed, "Why this,
if it was not in the power of the legislature to deny the right of suf-
frage to some male inhabitants? '' 404 The answer, at least at that time,
403. Notions regarding the uses and abuses of legislative history, particularly in light of
what many have characterized as "the new textualism," are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For a brief treatment that sketches the history and parameters of the dispute, see
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat. The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992). For the views of some of the main combat-
ants, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analy-
sis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 581 (1989-90); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990).
404. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 174. The approach articulated in Minor prevailed
until the transformation of voting from a privilege to a fundamental right in Baker. See,
e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (Court refuses to consider whether state's re-
fusal to place name of nominated candidate on ballot raises claim under Civil Rights Act);
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (individual entering state must declare intent to
become citizen and resident one year before registering to vote). For general discussions
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was simple: "[t]he Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to
the privileges and immunities of citizenship. ' 40 5 State practices con-
trolled, and those usages made it clear that "in no State were all citi-
zens permitted to vote"-certainly not individuals like Virginia Minor,
who was, after all, a "mere" woman. 406
One year later, Justice Hunt echoed many of these sentiments:
By the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, each
State had the power to refuse the right of voting at its elections to
any class of persons; the only consequence being a reduction of its
representation in Congress, in the proportion which such excluded
class should bear to the whole number of its male citizens of the age
of twenty-one years. This was understood to mean, and did mean,
that if one of the late slaveholding States should desire to exclude
all its colored population from the right of voting, at the expense of
reducing its representation in Congress, it could do SO. 4 0 7
Justice Hunt spoke in dissent, but his observations were well within
the view of state power articulated in a line of decisions in which the
Court consistently presented a history of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments that made it quite clear the states controlled the voting
franchise, subject only to whatever "nondiscrimination" principles
might be articulated in the amendments themselves. As the Court ob-
served in 1872:
A few years' experience satisfied the thoughtful men who had been
the authors of the other two amendments that, notwithstanding the
restraints of those articles on the States, and the laws passed under
the additional powers granted to Congress, these were inadequate
for the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which free-
dom to the slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied
the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white man
alone.4o8
Justice Hunt stressed,
A higher privilege was yet untouched; a security, vastly greater than
any thus far given to the colored race, was not provided for, but, on
the contrary, its exclusion was permitted. This was the elective
of the history and issues, see BERNARD GROFMAN, VOTING RIGHTS, VOTING WRONGS:
THE LEGACY OF Baker v. Carr (1990); Frederic S. Le Clercq, The Emerging Federally Se-
cured Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. REv. 607 (1975); Alexander Athan Yanos,
Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1810
(1992).
405. Minor, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 171.
406. Id. at 172.
407. U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 247 (1875) (Hunt, J., dissenting).
408. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,71 (1872). Indeed, the Court argued
with regard to Section 5 that "[w]e doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision." Id. at 81.
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franchise,-the right to vote at the elections of the country, and for
the officers by whom the country should be governed. 40 9
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments being insufficient, then,
the Fifteenth followed: "The negro having, by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States, is
thus made a voter in every State of the Union."'4'0
The specific holding of Minor, that Missouri did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when it denied women the right to vote, has
been superseded by the Nineteenth Amendment. And the views ex-
pressed in Reese about the permissible scope of various federal stat-
utes enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
have, in turn, been modified by a Court willing to give a much more
expansive reading to the authority conferred.411 These developments,
however, say nothing about the nature and scope of Section 2 itself, as
a matter of either original intent or modem interpretation. More im-
portantly, the vision of Section 2 articulated in Minor, voiced so soon
after the section's ratification, cannot be lightly discarded given the
settled doctrine that "a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the
Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acqui-
esced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its
provisions. ' 412 This is especially appropriate in voting cases since, as
the Court stressed in Powell, "[t]he relevancy of prior exclusion cases
is limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the
draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the precedential value of
these cases tends to increase in proportion to their proximity to the
Convention in 1787." 4' 3
Finally, while the Court's treatment of the franchise has changed
dramatically since Section 2 was framed, that transformation does not
mean the state's role has somehow vanished. Neither the Court nor
the individuals who framed the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the
right to vote as "fundamental." Rather, all characterized voting as a
"political" rather than "civil" right,414 a distinction that resulted in ju-
409. Reese, 92 U.S. at 247 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
410. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71.
411. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 113 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966).
412. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926).
413. Powell, 395 U.S. at 547.
414. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (statement of Senator
Trumbull). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 75-77. For a brief discussion of the
distinction, see Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and
the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEo. L.J. 1493, 1501-06 (1989).
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dicial scrutiny of state actions that would be cursory at best. As the
Court observed in 1849:
Certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the
United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giv-
ing the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and estab-
lished constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from
those to whom it is given....415
Baker and Reynolds obviously altered the constitutional calculus in
one sense by recognizing the fundamental importance of the right to
vote. But this new approach means only that the States must allege
"compelling" justifications when they deny or abridge the right and
that the means selected must be narrowly tailored. It does not indi-
cate the states have no role.
Indeed, the often repeated contention that classifications involv-
ing fundamental rights and suspect classes are assessed within a matrix
where that which is "strict in theory" is "fatal in fact"416 is misleading,
at least for the purposes of reaching a proper understanding of mod-
em equal protection theory. Clearly, the purpose of the test is not
simply to invalidate perforce any and all burdens on fundamental
rights. Rather, the Court has eschewed all "absolutist" approaches to
constitutional interpretation and application, even in the face of what
otherwise might appear to be clear constitutional language dictating
that result.417 The Court generally approaches such matters with the
415. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849)
416. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,552 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
The phrase seems to have originated in an article by Professor Gunther, see Gerald Gun-
ther, Foreword.- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972), and gained currency when quoted
by Justice Brennan in Regents Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically, the individual who most frequently
criticized the test, Justice Marshall, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), found no problem using it to sustain a rather dubious
distinction between "corporations" and "media corporations" in Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
417. The classic example is the First Amendment, which, as Justice Black observed,
"says in no equivocal language that Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of
speech, press, assembly, or petition." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 (1959)
(Black, 3., dissenting). Of course, one could quibble-as did Justice Black when he either
wrote or joined in the following-about whether the speech in question was the sort the
framers had in mind, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941)
("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."); was
consistent with the environment within which it transpired, see, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is a myth to say that
any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he
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avowed intent of sustaining government action, if the interests are
found to be compelling and the means selected to attain those objec-
tives are narrowly tailored.
The normal strict scrutiny calculus is, however, designed to tell us
only whether a given government action may stand or fall. It is ex-
pressly not an approach to be employed where the Constitution recog-
nizes the authority to act and simply conditions that authority by
making clear the consequences of the action. This is a vacuum Section
2 fills nicely when the subject is the right to vote, and the question is
not whether it may be denied, but only at what cost. When Section 2
was inserted in the Constitution, the only provisions bearing on the
exercise of the voting franchise were found in Article 1418 and Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since then, they have been ex-
panded to include the Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The fact that the contours of the field
have altered does not, however, mean it is proper to ignore any partic-
ular provision of the text. Because Section 2 cannot be rightfully ig-
nored, it is necessary to consider the extent to which it advances the
case for state-imposed term limits and, inevitably, the impact it has if
such limits are constitutional.
IV. Section 2 and Term Limits
Our belief that Section 2 must be taken into account in voting
matters, obviously, is not determinative in itself. Does a revitalized
Section 2 factor into the term limits debate? We maintain it does for
two reasons. First, Section 2 expresses a commitment to a state role in
electoral matters that complements, and is not supplanted by, any col-
lateral concerns raised by the other substantive guarantees expressed
in the Fourteenth or succeeding amendments. Second, the current
Court interpretations of the parameters of the right to vote and, par-
ticularly, the relationship between voter and candidate indicate that
state-imposed limits on the terms of United States Representatives do
violate Section 2's mandate that the voting franchise is not to be
"den[ied] or in any way abridge[d]." We now consider each of these
arguments in turn.
pleases."); or was actually "speech," see, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Cohen's absurd and immature antic, in my view, was mainly
conduct and little speech.").
418. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 ("[Tlhe Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature").
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A. Section 2 and the Reserved Powers of the States
Taken at face value and as a matter of the framers' intent, Section
2 expresses the fundamental, residual role of the states in electoral
matters, and it provides a mechanism for enforcing compliance with
those aspects of voting that do not violate major substantive guaran-
tees articulated in other provisions of the text. As Senator Fessenden
stressed, the Fourteenth Amendment "leaves the power where it is;
but [Section 2] tells [the states] most distinctly, if you exercise that
power wrongfully, such and such consequences will follow." 419 This
suggests that Jefferson may well have had the better of things in his
debate with Story regarding the Tenth Amendment. By recognizing
expressly that considerable authority to regulate the franchise re-
mained with the states, Section 2 confirmed that the Constitution "has
exercised the power [only] in part"420 and that, consistent with the
Tenth Amendment, the states remain free to act in a variety of
ways.421
Moreover, Section 2 cannot be brushed aside as a necessary casu-
alty in society's quest for an appropriately "modem" understanding of
Section l's equal protection guarantee. This does not mean we agree
in all respects with Justice Harlan. His insistence that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not apply in cases involving state regulation of
voting matters seems both incomplete and mistaken. Section 2, by its
express terms, addresses only those circumstances in which the right
to vote is "denied" or "in any way abridged" in certain specified elec-
tion contests. As indicated,422 the positions listed in Section 2 conspic-
uously do not include United States Senators, an omission that reflects
the express limitation on the amendment process to the effect that "no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate."423 We doubt a state would normally consent to the loss
of either of its senatorial seats. But it is interesting to speculate about
419. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
420. Letter from Jefferson to Cabell, supra note 78, at 380.
421. One can argue about what exactly the "power" at issue is. Justice Story, for exam-
ple, characterized it as the power to appoint officials of the national government, some-
thing the states could not possibly have had prior to the creation of that institution. That
meant, accordingly, that it could not be a power "reserved" to the states. See 1 STORY,
supra note 88, §§ 626-27. Under that view, the Story position seems more persuasive. But
if, as we have stressed, it is proper to characterize the statutory requirement of election by
district as a "manner" restriction, quite another picture emerges, and Jefferson's approach
seems eminently defensible.
422. See supra note 192.
423. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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whether the express embrace of senatorial term limits, in the face of
the clear language of Section 2, constitutes such consent.
Section 2's recognition that the state remains the principal actor
in electoral matters says nothing about how the state should treat the
franchise once conferred, absent the application of either Section 2's
penalty provisions or other express constitutional guarantees. Appli-
cations of Section 2, of course, simply involve questions about
whether the state action denies or in any way abridges the right to
vote, matters we will address shortly. Other constitutional provisions,
in turn, pose different but arguably related issues. There is a distinc-
tion between the allocation of the power to grant or withhold the
franchise and the imposition of conditions on the manner in which
such authority is exercised. Section 1, for example, indicates that the
states shall not deny the equal protection of the laws, which simply
conditions the manner in which a state exercises its control over the
franchise once conferred. 424 This leaves ample room for a doctrine
regarding this "individual and personal"425 right stating that "all who
participate in [an] election are to have an equal vote. '426 Other con-
stitutional provisions, such as the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments, mean simply that certain nineteenth-century assump-
tions about whether women or individuals under the age of twenty-
one should vote, once expressed through restrictions in Section 2, are
no longer valid.
Neither of these views of the constitutional landscape deprives
Section 2 of its force, assuming the predicate conditions-a denial or
abridgment-are met. For instance, there is no inconsistency between
the Court's recognition in Minor that Section 2 acknowledged that
"[f]or nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the
Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer
the right of suffrage" 427 and its subsequent declarations that the Nine-
teenth Amendment was properly enacted and women could vote,
state prohibitions notwithstanding.428 Each amendment and each de-
424. See, e.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) ("the right to vote as estab-
lished by the laws and constitution of the State").
425. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (citing United States v. Bathgate, 246
U.S. 220, 227 (1918)).
426. Gray v. Sanders, 373 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
427. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874).
428. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922). Among other things, the individuals chal-
lenging the Nineteenth Amendment argued "so great an addition to the electorate, if made
without the State's consent, destroys its autonomy as a political body." Id. at 136. The
Court rejected the contention, stressing the same could have been said of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which "has been recognized and acted on for half a century." Id. In a second
[Vol. 45
SECTION 2 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
cision simply eliminated one set of circumstances in which Section 2
would apply; neither repudiated the continuing force of its core guar-
antee where the predicate conditions are met.
One can argue until the constitutional cows come home about
whether the individuals who framed Section 2 contemplated its appli-
cation to anything other than a denial or abridgment of the voting
rights of the recently freed slaves. In The Slaughter-House Cases429
and Strauder v. West Virginia,430 for example, the Court declared that
the Fourteenth Amendment's "aim was against discrimination be-
cause of race or color,"431 and that it "doubt[ed] very much whether
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of" Section 5 of that Amendment.43 2 Those
narrow readings have long since given way to a more sweeping recog-
nition that "equal" means equal for all 433 and that Section 5 conferred
on Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and
Proper Clause, '434 powers that amply supported a congressional de-
termination that literacy tests were impermissible.435
There is no sound reason to believe that the Court would hold
differently regarding the reach of Section 2 or that Congress, assuming
a need for legislative action, would not apply the prohibition in a simi-
lar, sweeping manner. In fact, Section 2 seems to compel this conclu-
sion, "for its language plainly and unambiguously covers a wider
field." 436 And, as we have already noted, Section 2 does so in ways a
case decided the same day, the Court held another attempt "to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared void" was not justiciable. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129
(1922).
429. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
430. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
431. Id. at 310.
432. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81.
433. Given way, that is, grudgingly, and only relatively recently. The Court's statement
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), that "mandatory preference" for "members of either
sex over members of the other ... make[s] the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 76, may
have presaged a new era for treatment of gender. But it should be assessed as a historical
matter in the contexts provided by cases like Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), where a
unanimous Court declared "[d]espite the enlightened emancipation of women from the
restrictions and protections of bygone years" a "woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life." Id. at 61-62.
434. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (citing U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl.
18).
435. See id. at 649-52 (characterizing the issue as one of congressional power and de-
claring the holding in Lassiter, which found such tests constitutional, "inapposite").
436. MATHEws, supra note 301, at 16.
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court, willing to face up to the section's clear commands, would pre-
sumably find compelling. Section 2 inescapably mandates that if, as
part of the state's inherent power, it does "deny" or "in any way
abridge" voting rights, certain consequences shall follow; "the word
'shall' is ordinarily '[t]he language of command.' '437 Indeed, the
Court's treatment of similar constitutional provisions leads one to be-
lieve it would not hesitate to so parse Section 2, regardless of the
consequences. 438
The transition from the original understanding that the franchise
is a mere political privilege to its current status as a fundamental right
does not alter the analysis. If anything, the constitutional history and
cases following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment rein-
force this impression. Constitutional amendments were required to
force the states to extend the voting franchise in the states to blacks439
and women,440 lower the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen,441
and abolish the poll tax.442 And states still remain free, at least as a
constitutional matter,443 to impose literacy requirements, consistent
437. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482,485 (1947) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S.
490, 493 (1935)). As one of the standard treatises indicates, "fuinless the context otherwise
indicates the use of the word 'shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory in-
tent. Even the permissive word 'may' is interpreted as mandatory when the duty is im-
posed upon a pubic official and his act is for the benefit of a private individual." 1A
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.04 (Sands 4th ed., rev.
1985) (footnotes omitted).
438. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (re-
quirement in Presentment Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3, that President "shall"
consider all "legislative acts" cannot be evaded by "legislative veto"); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) ("inexorable command" of
Article III that the judicial power "shall be vested" in courts "having the attributes pre-
scribed" in Article III invalidates broad jurisdictional grant of Bankruptcy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549).
439. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
440. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX with Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (22 Wall.)
162, 173 (1874) ("So important a change in the condition of citizenship as it actually ex-
isted, if intended, would have been expressly declared.").
441. Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 113, 124-31 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.)
(Congress may not direct states to lower the voting age in state elections) with U.S. CONsT.
amend. XXVI.
442. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was, however, ar-
guably unnecessary given the Court's statement in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966), that "[t]o introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a
voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor" regardless of "the
degree of discrimination." Id. at 668.
443. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
(literacy test "has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the
ballot") with Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 131-34 (opinion of Black, J.) (literacy test ban in Voting
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with their status as the primary actors in franchise matters, absent an
express constitutional prohibition or intervening congressional action.
Professor Van Alstyne's insistence that Justice Harlan was wrong
about the scope of Section 1 also misses the point. Simply because the
equal protection guarantee governs voting matters says nothing about
the inherent authority of the states over the voting franchise. One
person, one vote is a matter of equal protection, not due process; as
the Court stressed in McPherson, "The right to vote in the States
comes from the States, but the right of exemption from the prohibited
discrimination comes from the United States." 444 The now fundamen-
tal right to vote in federal elections, in turn, flows from certain as-
sumptions made about the meaning of the language in other
constitutional provisions that imply (without expressly mentioning)
such a right,445 and not from any sense that states have lost all inher-
ent authority in electoral matters.
All of this analysis is arguably tangential to term limit matters,
since the question is not whether an individual will vote, but for whom
the vote will be cast. As will be discussed shortly, we believe the in-
terrelationship between the right to vote and the right to be a candi-
date is susceptible to a "deny" or "in any way abridge" treatment
within the meaning of Section 2. As a practical matter, that is enough
to invoke Section 2's penalties: To the extent that state-imposed limits
are constitutional, Section 2 applies.
The more important question at this juncture is whether Section 2
addresses the authority of the states to impose additional qualifica-
tions. We think it does for two reasons. As an initial matter, the prin-
ciple most courts and commentators derive from Powell-that the
Qualifications Clauses exhaust the issue446-is suspect if one recog-
nizes that Section 2 is a post-Article I recognition of, and expansion
on, the inherent power of the states to control the interrelated ques-
tions of individual franchise and political candidacy. More fundamen-
tally, if federal authority over the time, place, and manner of elections
includes the ability to require election by district-as Ex parte Siebold
suggests447-Section 2's edict applies when the states take actions that
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, a valid exercise of the
Enforcement Clause powers of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
444. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 38.
445. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (noting "command" of Arti-
cle I, Section 2 of the Constitution that Representatives be chosen "by the People").
446. See supra text accompanying notes 170-173.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 207-209.
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differ in no material respect from that which the Congress accom-
plished when it carved the states into districts.
The commands of Section 2, accordingly, must be accounted for
in any debate about whether state-imposed term limits are constitu-
tionally permissible. The case for Section 2 is by no means conclusive.
But it certainly adds force to the argument for a state power to add
qualifications, a constitutional impetus that is especially important in
light of the questions we have identified regarding other, more tradi-
tional approaches to the term limits question.
B. State-Imposed Term Limits: Abridgments of the Franchise?
Whether or not Section 2 is a bulwark in the case for the constitu-
tionality of term limits, if term limits are by any means found constitu-
tional, a second question must be addressed: what are the
implications of such a "victory"? Obviously, a state's term limits
would have a substantial impact on the political fortunes of incum-
bents who reach the end of the time allowed them by the state. The
nature and duration of that impact will vary with the jurisdiction. The
question for our purposes is whether the effects of a given term limit,
as a matter of constitutional law, "deny" or "in any way abridge" the
right to vote, either as a matter of Section 2's original purpose and
intent, or as a valid construction in this age.
Regardless of how one characterizes its underlying purpose,448
the operative dimension of Section 2 was a "gentle and persuasive"
attempt to "hold[] out to all the advantage of increased political
power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise." 449
The means by which that end would be attained in recalcitrant states
was to enact a constitutional and, eventually, statutory mandate im-
posing a reduction in representation for those states that prevented
the freedmen from voting. Viewed strictly in this manner, Section 2
seemingly does not apply to term limits: whatever else might be said
about them, term limits do not bar voters from the polls. Rather, they
merely restrict the voters' choices by disqualifying certain individuals
as a result of prior service of a particular length.
The language of Section 2, however, does not limit either its force
or effect to simple denials. Rather, it is triggered by either a denial or
an abridgment in any way, a sweep that seems to include within its
448. That is, as discussed supra at text accompanying notes 311-314, did the framers
care about whether the freedmen voted, or were their purposes fundamentally political?
449. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (June 8,
1866), in Alvins, supra note 287, at 94.
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ambit any measure that restricts the ability to vote for a particular
candidate for federal representative. This is entirely consistent with
Madison's sentiment that "[a] Republic may be converted into an aris-
tocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being
elected, as the number authorized to elect." 450 More importantly, it is
also within the contemplation of any number of decisions of the Court
that treat the right to vote, and the implications of any "abridgment"
of that right, in an expansive manner.
One obvious question is how the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment viewed denials or abridgments. Senator Howard, re-
sponding to a question, explained "abridged" this way:
I suppose it would admit of the following application: a State
in the exercise of its sovereign power over the question of suffrage
might permit one person to vote for a member of the State Legisla-
ture, but prohibit the same person from voting for a Representative
in Congress. That would be an abridgment of the right of suffrage;
and that person would be included in the exclusion, so that the rep-
resentation from the State would be reduced in proportion to the
exclusion of persons whose rights were thus abridged. 451
Further, Howard maintained:
It is not an abridgment to a caste or class of persons, but the
abridgment or the denial applies to the persons individually.... It
applies individually to each and every person who is denied or
abridged, and not to the class to which he may belong. It makes no
distinction between black and white, or between red and white, ex-
cept that if an Indian is counted in he must be subject to taxation.452
Howard, quoting from Madison, stressed that "'those who are to be
bound by laws ought to have a voice in making them.' ' 453 Then, in
response to an inquiry by Senator Sumner as to whether Section 2
would be "applicable to all without distinction or color," Howard re-
plied, "Certainly it is, and whether they can read and write or not."454
This suggests that as a simple, historical matter, Section 2 would
apply when the terms of Representatives are limited. An individual
voter would, for example, be subject to a clear prohibition: she could
not vote for candidate X. Actually, she could not vote at all, for when
Senator Johnson asked, "[f]emales as well as males," Howard drew
the line:
450. 2 Farrand, supra note 63, at 250.
451. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866).
452. Id.
453. Id. (quoting Notes on Suffrage, written at different periods after his retirement
from public life, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21, 25 (1865)).
454. Id
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I believe Mr. Madison was old enough and wise enough to take
it for granted there was such a thing as the law of nature which has a
certain influence even in political affairs, and that by that law wo-
men and children were not regarded as the equals of men. Mr.
Madison would not have quibbled about the question of women's
voting or of an infant's voting. He lays down a broad democratic
principle, that those who are to be bound by the laws ought to have
a voice in making them; and everywhere mature manhood is the
representative type of the human race.455
More importantly, the impact of the restriction would be uneven.
Voters in a district where the incumbent has not served the magic
number of years would, inevitably, have a greater degree of choice
than those in a district where the representative has reached the end
of the eligibility line. In a similar vein, voters in a state where the bar
is absolute would be burdened in ways distinct from those in states
where the prohibition is more flexible, either as a matter of renewed
eligibility after a period of non-service or where the opportunity to be
elected as a write-in candidate is available. In each instance, states "in
the exercise of their sovereign power" abridge the right of "individu-
als" to vote for the candidates of their choice.
There are, in addition, at least three distinct bases in the decisions
of the Court for considering any one of the fifteen state term-limit
provisions currently in force to be a denial or abridgement of the right
to vote. The first, and most straightforward, is the Court's recognition
that "[r]estrictions on access to the ballot burden . . . 'the right of
qualified voters... to cast their votes effectively."' 456 Time and again,
the Court has characterized any limit of the voters' choice of the can-
didates available as an impairment of the voters' ability to express
their political preferences. 457 For example, the Court assures us that
"[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government." 458 It is therefore
unsurprising that any method by which candidacy is regulated must
455. Id.
456. Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) (quot-
ing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
457. Id. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 (1976) ("[State ballot access laws]
were, of course, direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability to run for office but also
on the voter's ability to voice preferences .... ); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)
("The right of ... an individual to a place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is
intertwined with the rights of voters."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) ("[T]he
right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a
time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot.").
458. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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"pass muster against the charge of... abridgment of the right to
vote." 459
We doubt Judge Dwyer had Section 2 in mind when he wrote his
opinion in Thorsted, and it may well be that he would reassess the
language employed in the light of what we are about to say. We find it
significant, nevertheless, that he characterized the effect of the Wash-
ington measure in precisely this manner.
The operative section of the opinion begins with the declaration
that "The cases holding that neither the states nor Congress may add
to the Article I qualifications for service in Congress all rest on the
same foundation: the constitutional rights of voters in the United
States to elect legislators of their choice. '460 Judge Dwyer then quotes
substantial passages from Powell and concludes by stating, in no un-
certain terms, "As Powell... and the other authorities cited above
make clear, the voters' freedom to choose federal electors must not be
abridged by laws that make qualified persons ineligible to serve."'461 It
is of no particular significance, at least for our purposes, that Judge
Dwyer found the Washington measure unconstitutional. Our concern
in this Article is, after all, only partially a question of whether state-
imposed limits can withstand constitutional scrutiny. What is striking
is that Judge Dwyer sensed, as we have suggested, that the Washing-
ton measure abridged the right to vote. Indeed, that finding is argua-
bly all the more significant because it was reached reading much the
same evidence we have marshalled on the nature of the rights to vote
and be a candidate, and without what might otherwise have been the
disquieting spectre of Section 2 sanctions.
Second, states that do not enact limits may be left with a pre-
ferred class of voters whose options are not restricted by the reduction
in choices of voting. Within those states that do enact limits, some
voters are more and some are less restricted, as the citizens of some
states may more often vote for incumbents than the citizens of other
term-limiting states. To the extent that a state's term limit law creates
a preference for the voters of other states, that state has denied or
abridged the right of its citizens to vote. Such a preference is constitu-
tionally suspect. The Court has stated, in suggestive terms, that
[t]he concept of "we the people" under the Constitution visualizes
no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the
basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every
459. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1964).
460. Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (1994).
461. Id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
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other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of
several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions. 462
This principle, disfavoring preferences between voters of different
classes in elections for national office, may also be restated as a form
of the question posed in Baker v. Carr, by shifting the focus slightly
from "counties" to "states": "[t]he injury ... [wa]s that this classifica-
tion disfavors the voters in the [states] in which they reside, placing
them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis
voters in irrationally favored [states]. 463
Preferences creating divisions of states into those with and with-
out term limits and among states with various forms of limits need not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. The principles of equal protec-
tion would not be violated if, for instance, the courts were to find a
preference was not subject to strict scrutiny or promoted a vital state
interest by the least offensive means.464 Even so, a preference would
amount to some diminution of the right to vote among those whose
choice of candidate is in any way reduced. Such abridgment may be
properly described as a right denied a voter who sought to cast a bal-
lot for an individual and was thwarted by the regulation. The prohibi-
tion is made the more obvious because voters in other states will be
allowed to vote for candidates who have served the same number of
terms. The diminution may also properly be said to abridge the right
to vote of all voters, whether or not they truly intended to cast such a
vote. From this denial or abridgment, we believe a case can be made
that invoking the penalty provisions of Section 2 is, if not necessary,
certainly appropriate.
Third, the meetness of such a punishment is suggested by most
observers' recognition that Section 2 had a quite narrow, and arguably
sinister, purpose, "Protecting the Republican hegemony in Congress,
quite aside from any long-term effort to secure the right to vote
against arbitrary discrimination by the states. '465 Indeed, resort to
Section 2 seems especially appropriate if one assumes it offers en-
trenched office holders arms with which to combat pernicious at-
462. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
463. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
464. Thus, a deprivation resulting from a term limit might be similar to the Court's
view of the equal protection claim in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964-70 (1982),
where it held that a state constitutional provision prohibiting a judge from running for state
office during his term did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though it required
the resignation of elected officials who ran for another office, id. at 970-72. Cf Illinois Bd.
of Elections, 440 U.S. at 173 (signature requirement for ballot petition violated equal
protection).
465. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 44.
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tempts to deny them their sinecures. As we have noted more than
once, the assumption that Congress would be unwilling to undertake
this fight is by no means as sound as term limit proponents might wish;
indeed, the incentives might run in the other direction if the assump-
tions term limit supporters make about "career politicians" are true.
The application of Section 2 to term limits is then outside its in-
tended parameters only if one embraces an extraordinarily limited
view of its objectives. Any argument that Section 2 must be limited to
matters involving the voting rights of African-Americans must, of
course, give way in the face of the Court's abandonment of similar
limitations on Section 1. Indeed, this understanding of Section 2's po-
tential scope is consistent with the approach espoused by Professor
Bickel when he stressed, in his discussion regarding Brown v. Board of
Education,466 that "we are dealing with a constitutional amendment,
not a statute"467 and found nothing inconsistent between an acknowl-
edgment that Congress did not contemplate immediate cessation of
discrimination in the schools in 1866 and the recognition that the
Fourteenth Amendment's "general terms" could in fact eventually
embrace that result.
More tellingly, this view of Section 2 explains why Professor
Flack would characterize his discussion of "the second, third, and
fourth sections of the Amendment" as an attempt "to discover, if pos-
sible, any cause or causes which might have had weight in inducing the
people to accept the Amendment, and not so much for their intrinsic
466. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
467. Bickel, supra note 374, at 59. Thus, while Professor Wechsler's critique of Brown
still stings, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1, 33-35 (1959), most "originalists" tend to back away from a strict applica-
tion of their principles when Brown rears its head. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990) ("a judge is
to apply the Constitution according to the principles intended by those who ratified the
document") with id at 324 ("I have always supported the proposition that racial segrega-
tion by government is unconstitutional") and Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (framers of Fourteenth Amendment
intended for the Court to "secure against government action some large measure of racial
equality"). Mr. Bork's alternate "rationale" for Brown is, and must remain, at odds with
the actual practices, see Bickel, supra note 374, at 56-65 (summarizing his findings about
practices tolerated by the Amendment's framers), and avowed intent, see supra text ac-
companying notes 292-293 (concessions by Senator Howard), of the individuals who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment. Interestingly, some of the most eloquent statements
recognizing the need for appropriate flexibility pop up in the oddest places. See, e.g., Wil-
liam H. .Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 694 (1976)
("The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding
generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in
which they would live.").
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value. '468 As Justice Harlan stressed, Section 2 made the Fourteenth
Amendment "palatable" for two reasons. It did not, as a fundamental
matter, purport to interfere with the states' intrinsic right to control
the franchise. And it gave those states that decided to defy the sup-
posed national "consensus" that freedmen should vote a clear warning
of the consequences flowing from such a determination.
These rationales find their counterparts in state-imposed term
limits, assuming such limits are otherwise deemed constitutionally per-
missible. Term limit laws articulate a fundamental belief that the
states themselves control an important aspect of the franchise, the eli-
gibility of an individual to seek office. And they are available to and
exercised by the states with full recognition that they have a collateral
price.
C. Section 2 in Action: Some Initial Thoughts
We have not discussed Section 2's implications for limits on the
terms of "the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the mem-
bers of the Legislature thereof" for three reasons. As a threshold
matter, the people of each state are free to amend their constitutions
and statutes as they wish, provided they employ the proper means.469
The propriety of state-initiated limits on state office terms therefore
presents no federal constitutional questions, provided the focus is the
office itself. They raise, rather, concerns that depend on the nuances
and mechanics of each individual state's constitution and laws-in-
quiries we do not care to undertake.
Second, our conclusion that Section 2 may recognize greater state
authority over the franchise than is traditionally assumed does call
into question traditional assumptions about the extent to which the
Qualifications Clauses and Powell are the sole points of reference in
the term limits debate. One does not need Section 2 to validate state
attempts to limit the terms of state officials. A revitalized Section 2,
however, may have a direct impact on the permissibility of state at-
tempts to bar incumbents from federal offices.
Finally, if Section 2 applies when states limit the terms of federal
representatives, it applies in the same manner when they limit terms
468. FLACK, supra note 4, at 97.
469. That this will occur is far from clear. In Nebraska, for example, the term limit
measure was invalidated in its entirety by the state supreme court because "the submission
of at least 30,000 too few signatures" did not constitute "substantial compliance with the
provisions of the Nebraska constitution for an initiative by the people." Duggan v. Beer-
man, 515 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Neb. 1994).
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of the enumerated state officers. In each instance, the answers to two
questions are dispositive. Does Section 2 have continuing force, and
does a term limit "deny or in any way abridge" the right to vote? If
both answers are "yes," the penalty is also the same: proportionate
reduction of the "Representatives.. .'apportioned among the several
States." The applicability and impact of Section 2 therefore depend
on factors that have nothing to do with the locus of the office. 470
The individuals who crafted Section 2 understood its implications.
Senator Howard addressed the issue during the debate on the
Amendment. He stated that the "basis of representation is numbers,
whether the numbers be white or black; that is, the whole population
except untaxed Indians and persons excluded by State laws for rebel-
lion or other crime."471 He observed that the abolition of the "three-
fifths" principle 472 and "enfranchisement of the colored race.., will
increase the number of Representatives from the once slaveholding
States by nine or ten."473 Then, after a detailed recitation of data
from the 1860 Census, he indicated that his "best calculation" was that
"if the late slave States shall continue hereafter to exclude the colored
population from voting, they will do it at the loss at least of twenty-
four Representatives in the other House of Congress, according to the
rule established by the act of 1850."474
470. We do not underestimate the extraordinary implications of a Section 2 role in the
definition and control of state offices. It is important, however, to recognize that Section 2
was designed to protect the individual right to vote, not the offices themselves.
471. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Senator Howard).
472. That is, the original textual limitation that apportioned Representatives "accord-
ing to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and exclud-
ing Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." U.S. CONs-. art. I, § 2, cl. 3,
amended by U.S. CONS-. amend. XIV, § 2.
473. CONGR. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Senator Howard).
Howard also captured the spirit and rationale of Section 2 in ways that emphasized the
core state power over voting matters:
Shall the recently slaveholding States, while they exclude from the ballot the
whole of their black population, be entitled to include the whole of that popula-
tion in the basis of their representation, and thus to obtain an advantage which
they did not possess before the rebellion and emancipation? In short, shall we
permit it to take place that one of the results of emancipation and of the war is to
increase the Representatives of the late slaveholding States? I object to this. I
think they cannot very consistently call upon us to grant them an additional
number of Representatives simply because in consequence of their own miscon-
duct they have lost the property which they once possessed, and which served as a
basis in great part of their representation.
Id.
474. Id. at 2767.
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Howard recognized that "[t]he penalty of refusing will be se-
vere"; the offending states "will undoubtedly lose, and lose so long as
they shall refuse to admit the black population to the right of suffrage,
that balance of power in Congress which has been so long their pride
and boast. '475 He also stressed' that "this Amendment does not apply
exclusively to the insurgent States, nor to the slaveholding States, but
to all States without distinction .... It holds out the same penalty to
Massachusetts as to South Carolina, the same to Michigan as to
Texas. ' 476 This prompted an inquiry from Senator Clark, who wanted
to know "whether the committee's attention was called to the fact that
if any States excluded any person, say as Massachusetts does, for want
of intelligence, this provision cuts down the representation of that
State. '477 Howard responded, "[C]ertainly it does, no matter what
may be the occasion of the restriction. 478
The actual mechanics of applying Section 2 sanctions to achieve
these results pose interesting questions. Both Section 2 and its statu-
tory counterpart dictate the reduction "shall" take place, a mandatory
action that would occur in either of two ways: as the inevitable conse-
quence of routine application of the statutory provisions for allocating
the 435 seats currently authorized; or in response to litigation claiming
that the commands of Section 2 have been violated and asking for the
reduction as a matter of legal entitlement.
The first of these approaches involves simple application of ex-
isting procedures. Under the current statutory scheme, the allocation
of seats in the House takes place once every ten years when the Presi-
dent transmits to Congress "a statement showing the whole number of
persons in each State ... as ascertained under the ... decennial census
... and the number of Representatives to which each state would be
entitled. '479 Under normal circumstances, the Clerk of the House
then provides each State with a certificate indicating the number of
Representatives it would receive per the census numbers.480 That pro-
cess is, however, subject to the concomitant command of Section 2
and its statutory counterpart:
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (1988). The process and the "method of equal proportions" by
which the division is determined are described in United States Dep't of Commerce v.
Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1419-24 (1992).
480. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (1988).
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Should any State deny or abridge the right of any of the ... inhabit-
ants thereof ... to vote at any election... the number of Represent-
atives apportioned to such State shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such ...citizens shall have to the whole
number of... citizens ... of age in such State.48'
This means, for example, that if a state otherwise "entitled" to ten
seats bars two members from reelection to the House of Representa-
tives it would "deny or abridge" the rights of approximately twenty
percent of eligible voters, reducing its delegation from ten members to
eight. Within the offending state, the ensuing elections for the re-
maining seats would be by district, assuming the districts are redrawn
in a timely fashion and collateral litigation does not preclude putting
the revised districts in place. Given the complex and contentious na-
ture of the redistricting process, however, and the virtual certainty
that a challenge to the Section 2 reduction would be lodged, it seems
more likely that the elections would be at large.482 If, in turn, the term
limit measure barred all incumbents or an "Executive officer[ ] ... of
a State"4 3-say the governor-it presumably denies or abridges the
right to vote of all eligible voters, and the state would lose all but one
seat, given the requirement that "each State shall have at Least one
Representative. '484
Whether or not the seats lost by one state would be reallocated to
the others is less clear. The one serious attempt to invoke Section 2,
which was contemporaneous with its adoption, would have made the
reduction after the apportionment. 485 That approach suggests no re-
distribution would occur. That episode may not, however, dictate
what transpires today. There was no proportionate reduction in 1872,
and the statutory framework then in force did not stipulate a set
number of Representatives from which each state received a formula-
driven share. Thus, application of Section 2 today may well benefit
other states, a possibility that makes its invocation more tempting to
states not burdened by practices that "deny" or "abridge" the right to
vote.
The second approach to enforcement would be for opponents of
term limits-or states seeking to increase their own delegations-to
file a legal challenge demanding the reduction take place immediately.
481. 2 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
482. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (1988) ("if there is a decrease in the number of Representa-
tives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such decreased number of Repre-
sentatives, they shall be elected from the State at large")
483. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
484. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cI. 3.
485. See supra text accompanying notes 317-320.
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As the Court made clear in a recent, unanimous decision, questions of
the sort posed by a Section 2 claim are clearly justiciable. 486 The only
operative issue would be the extent to which immediate relief might
be barred under the theory that the code provisions require one to
wait for the decennial readjustment. We suspect they would not. As-
suming agreement with the threshold proposition that term limits do
"deny" or otherwise "abridge" the right to vote, these code provisions
pose squarely "whether Congress exercised its apportionment author-
ity within the limits dictated by the Constitution."'487 We find no rea-
son to believe the Supreme Court would now treat Section 2 less
seriously than it has the Fifteenth Amendment or Section 1 of the
Fourteenth, and we believe it would order appropriate relief. It could,
for example, simply find a Section 2 violation and defer to further
congressional and state actions, "so long as they are consistent with
constitutional norms. '488 Or it could direct the lower court to "tak[e]
appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted
under the invalid plan, '489 consistent with a federal court's broad, al-
beit not unlimited, equitable powers.490
It is always possible that a court will refuse to act, clinging to
those parts of the record indicating that the individuals who framed
the language contemplated a role for Congress in that process. We
suspect, however, that the federal courts will not display the same re-
luctance to enter the Section 2 fray they exhibited in a pre-Baker
world. This will especially be the case when litigation before them
poses issues far less inflammatory than, for example, the poll tax491 or
a challenge to Virginia's miscegenation statute just one year after
Brown was decided. 492 The term limits debate is intense and visceral,
but, as Justice Frankfurter observed, "The responsibility of those who
exercise power in a democratic government is not to reflect inflamed
public feeling but to help form its understanding .... -493
486. United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992).
487. Id. at 1426.
488. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
489. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964).
490. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Spallone v. United States, 493
U.S. 265 (1990).
491. As indicated, Saunders was at its heart a challenge to Virginia's poll tax, although
the justiciability concerns expressed were arguably appropriate at that time. See supra text
accompanying notes 327-334.
492. Compare Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). For an insightful history of the controversy, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER
CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 158-62 (1983).
493. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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There is also substantial room to believe that most members of
Congress-who, after all, saw problems with the nomination of Zoe
Baird as Attorney General only after the people revolted-will accede
to the wishes of the voters and refuse to invoke Section 2 against en-
acting states. But this is the same Congress that resorted to all man-
ner of artifice to secure annual pay raises, in spite of popular
opposition to what many characterized as "midnight raids" on the
Treasury. More to the point, if the devotees of term limits are correct
in their surmises about the character of Congress, it is entirely reason-
able to assume that a "dynastic ruling class" dedicated to "a self-per-
petuating monopoly of elective office" 494 would initiate the Section 2
process. That, as we have indicated, would resonate the spirit in
which Section 2 was enacted, a state of affairs within which the Radi-
cal Republicans of 1867 become the Imperial Congress of 1995 or be-
yond, its members dedicated to the preservation of their own political
lives.
Conclusion
We have tried to remain neutral in the debate about the advisa-
bility and, to a lesser extent, the constitutionality of term limit meas-
ures. We believe the parties to the term limit debate must account for
the existence and force of Section 2, both as a matter of the initial
constitutionality of term limits and as a factor in assessing their ulti-
mate effect. Obviously, given our views about the nature and force of
Section 2, we believe state-imposed term limits are more viable, at
least as a constitutional matter, than is normally assumed. At the
same time, we suspect the implications of such enhanced constitu-
tional vitality will prove disquieting for those states in which such lim-
its are in force. For if state-imposed limits are constitutional, the
argument that the remedies incorporated in Section 2 are available
becomes compelling.
Section 2 also focuses our attention on the rights and interests of
a group whose voice is at some risk of disappearing in the term limits
debate: the individual voters who do not believe a preemptive strike
is the only means by which congressional reform may be secured.
Term limit measures have proven overwhelmingly popular. Our con-
stitutional system recognizes, nevertheless, that there are limits to ma-
jority rule. Indeed, the message that emerges from the Court's
494. Preamble-Laws 1993, ch. 1, reprinted in WASH. REv. CODE § 43.01.015 (1993) (In-
itiative Measure No. 573 approved Nov. 3, 1992).
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franchise decisions is that we will tolerate even draconian burdens on
parties and candidates, but will under virtually no circumstances allow
a state to deny the individual voter the right to participate in the polit-
ical process.495
Section 2 is the most compelling expression of that principle in
the Constitution. Neither equal protection nor due process provide,
expressly or as parsed, absolute protection. Each is phrased and has
been interpreted by the Court as a relative guarantee. Section 2, on
the other hand, speaks much more directly and in terms that leave
little room for maneuver. It is triggered when any citizen's right to
vote is "denied or in any way abridged," a sensitivity to individual
rights within both the letter and spirit of a constitutional system that
believes voting to be "a fundamental political right, because preserva-
tive of all rights. '496
Regardless of the means invoked or specific avenues of compli-
ance ordered, successful invocation of Section 2 threatens to trans-
form a term limits initiative into the sort of poison pill the people
might be loathe to swallow. Some individuals opposed to an en-
trenched Congress may well maintain no representative is better than
the same old, career politician and accept the loss of one or more
seats. That is certainly their prerogative, although we suspect it will
not occur. But whether it does remains a matter for the people to
decide, consistent with the letter and spirit of Section 2.
Section 2 was inserted in the Fourteenth Amendment as a means
of informing a majority who opposed granting the freedmen the vote
of the price of opposition. Under our analysis, Section 2 serves the
same purpose today, apprising a majority fed up within "entrenched"
politicians of the costs associated with barring incumbents from office.
It is paradoxical that Section 2 may finally become a substantial pres-
ence on the constitutional landscape as a matter of accident, rather
than design. However, we sense that the individuals who crafted Sec-
tion 2 would find quiet satisfaction in its reemergence, particularly if it
becomes a means by which Congress challenges popular determina-
tions that conflict with the members' own vested interests. That same
self-interest, after all, motivated the creation of much of what we now
know as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. And while we
495. The most obvious exception to this is, interestingly enough, the power to deny
convicted felons the franchise, which withstood constitutional challenge in large measure
because Section 2 recognized that authority. See supra text accompanying notes 377-388.
496. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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may find it distasteful, it is nevertheless a political determination that
found its way into the constitutional text.

